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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Over one hundred murder cases have been tried since 1977
when the South Carolina legislature adopted a new scheme for
imposing capital punishment for murder.1 This article considers
the imposition of the. penalty in terms of practice, constitution-
ality, and philosophical justification. Two points are clearly indi-
cated by this consideration. First, capital punishment is consis-
tent with the United States Constitution and with the
requirements of just punishment only if fundamental prerequi-
sites such as the prohibition of racial discrimination are
respected and only if there is a meaningful basis for selecting
the persons to be sentenced to death. A meaningful basis exists
if the death penalty is imposed in accordance with standards
and procedures which adequately insure that the crime plausibly
could have been deterred by execution but not by life imprison-
ment and that the particular crime and defendant are so wrong-
ful that the death penalty is clearly proportional to the wrong-
fulness. Second, while the South Carolina statutory scheme
generally complies with these requirements, there are several ar-
eas where it does not, or where, on the basis of current data, a
determination cannot be made whether it is consistent. Because
of these shortcomings, this article goes beyond description and
analysis to suggest areas for further research and to propose re-
forms. The authors of this article hope that these reforms will be
adopted in order to preserve South Carolina's approach to capi-
tal punishment from constitutional or philosophical objections.
However, it is not clear that they will be adopted; and some of
the flaws in the South Carolina system may not be amenable to
any reforms short of abandoning the death penalty.
The article is divided into three parts: (1) a discussion of
South Carolina law, both in terms of statutes and cases and in
terms of practice and procedures used in implementing the stat-
utes and case law; (2) a brief analysis of the constitutionality of
the South Carolina scheme in light of recent United States Su-
preme Court cases; and (3) a philosophical analysis of the justice
of capital punishment in South Carolina. The discussion in each
part is limited in the sense that it focuses on such narrow ques-
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-20 through -28 (Supp. 1981). Unless otherwise indicated,
all code section references in this article are to the South Carolina Code Annotated. For
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tions as: How does South Carolina decide whether a person
should be executed for murder rather than imprisoned for life?
Is this approach to capital punishment constitutional? How can
it be improved?
On the other hand, the article adopts a broad perspective on
these narrow issues and not only discusses statutory and case
law, but also considers empirical and philosophical perspectives
on the death penalty in South Carolina. In addition, the article
has a broad audience in mind and is designed to assist not only
lawyers and judges, but also legislators, administrators, and citi-
zens as they work to improve the criminal justice system in
South Carolina.
I. THE SOUTH CAROLINA SCHEME FOR IMPOSING THE DEATH
PENALTY
A. Introduction and Summary
The present South Carolina capital punishment statute be-
came effective on June 8, 1977.2 The previous statute had been
declared unconstitutional in State v. Rumsey2 In order to avoid
such constitutional challenges, the 1977 statute was patterned
after the death penalty statute of Georgia,4 which had been up-
2. State v. Rodgers, 270 S.C. 285, 288, 293, 242 S.E.2d 215, 216, 218 (1978); 1977
S.C. Acts 407, No. 177.
3. 267 S.C. 236, 226 S.E.2d 894 (1976). A brief history of the recent legislation en-
acted in this area in response to decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court is found in State v.
Rogers, 270 S.C. 285, 287-88, 242 S.E.2d 215, 216 (1978). Persons who committed murder
in the period after Rumsey was decided and before the effective date of the current act
cannot be sentenced to death because there was no capital punishment statute in effect
at the time of their crimes. State v. Logan, - S.C. -, -, 286 S.E.2d 125, 127 (1982).
Persons tried under the 1974 statute, which was stricken down in Rumsey, could not be
resentenced and subjected to the possible imposition of capital punishment because they
could not be granted the required procedural safeguards. Rodgers, 270 S.C. at 293, 242
S.E.2d at 217-18. Since the emphasis of Logan is on the notice to defendant that murder
is subject to death and the emphasis of Rodgers is on procedural safeguards, it is not
clear whether a person could be tried and sentenced under the current South Carolina
statute for a murder committed prior to June 8, 1977. Such retrospectivity under the
Florida statute was upheld in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977), and one South
Carolina trial court has ruled that such persons can be tried under the current statute.
State v. Deveaux, No. 81-GS-10-1086, (Ct. Gen. Sess. Charleston Co. S.C. Feb. 22,
1982)(order denying motion to quash notice of intent to seek the death penalty).
4. State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 199, 255 S.E.2d 799, 802 (1979). See State v. Rodgers,
270 S.C. 285, 288, 242 S.E.2d 215, 216 (1978). Compare S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-10
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss2/5
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
held as constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in
Gregg v. Georgia.5 The underlying theory of Gregg, and a line of
related cases beginning in 1972 with Furman v. Georgia,' is that
states may impose capital punishment for murder without vio-
lating the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment or
the rights of due process and equal protection if the scheme in-
sures a meaningful basis for imposing the death penalty and
avoids an arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death pen-
alty.7 Thus, the South Carolina scheme can be viewed as a com-
plex set of substantive and procedural rules designed to struc-
ture and limit the discretionary decisions which are necessarily
involved at each stage of the determination of whether to impose
the death penalty.
The first step in this long process is the decision by the so-
licitor to seek the death penalty. The statute does not attempt
to limit this exercise of prosecutorial discretion. However, the
solicitor's decision to seek the death penalty triggers a number
of special pretrial protections for the defendant including rights
to certain types of notice and to special legal and other
assistance.
The trial proceedings are different from ordinary criminal
cases in several respects. The voir dire is influenced by the spe-
cial nature of the punishment. In addition, the trial itself is di-
vided into two parts. In the first phase of the trial, the issue is
whether the defendant is guilty of murder. If he is guilty, a sec-
ond hearing is conducted to determine whether he will be sen-
tenced to life imprisonment or to death. This sentencing deci-
sion is largely based upon a consideration of a statutory list of
aggravating and mitigating factors. In jury trials, the jury will
make the initial sentencing decision, and the death penalty can
only be imposed if the jurors unanimously recommend death.
Prior to sentencing on such a recommendation, the trial judge
must review the jury's decision in order to insure that it has not
abused its discretion.
Whenever the death penalty is imposed, the sentence is au-
through -40 (1976 and Supp. 1981), with GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101 (1972); 26-3102
(Supp. 1975); and 27-2302, -2503, -2514, -2534.1, -2537 (Supp. 1975).
5. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
7. See infra notes 108-32 and accompanying text.
1982]
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tomatically reviewed by the South Carolina Supreme Court. In
addition to other alleged errors raised by the defendant, this re-
view must address the questions of whether the imposition of
the death sentence is arbitrary, whether it is supported by a
statutory aggravating circumstance, and whether the penalty is
"proportional."
This statutory scheme has been upheld by the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court against a variety of constitutional attacks,
including allegations that it violates the rights to due process, to
equal protection, and to freedom from cruel and unusual punish-
ment granted by the United States Constitution," as well as the




The South Carolina statute makes no attempt to guide or
restrict the solicitor's exercise of discretion in making decisions
to press murder charges, to seek the death penalty, or to plea
bargain with a defendant or his defense counsel. Thus, the ini-
tial decisionmaking and negotiation process which determines
the route an alleged murderer will travel through the criminal
justice system is often completed before any statutory provisions
come into effect.
In State v. Shaw,10 the two defendants argued that the so-
licitor's unbridled discretion rendered the statute per se invalid
and that the discretion was arbitrarily applied in their case. The
court summarily rejected the per se claim because such claims
had been rejected by the United States Supreme Court."1 The
court then noted that the prosecutor had not abused his discre-
tion when he failed to seek the death penalty against a third
participant in the defendants' crime because there were three
8. State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979).
9. State v. Plath, - S.C. -, -, 284 S.E.2d 221, 224 (1981).
10. 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979).
11. Id. at 204, 255 S.E.2d at 804. Similar claims were rejected in State v. Thompson,
S.C. -, -, 292 S.E.2d 581, 584 (1982). For a discussion of the United States Su-
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factors distinguishing the defendants from the other participant:
(1) the two defendants were the actual triggermen; (2) the state
needed to secure eyewitness testimony from the other partici-
pant since there were no other living witnesses to the murder;
and (3) there was less likelihood that a judge or jury would im-
pose the death sentence on the other participant if the solicitor
decided to seek it.12
The court has not required solicitors to undertake any sort
of proportionality review of similar defendants and crimes in or-
der to compare decisions of whether to seek the death penalty in
their own or other circuits. Nor has the court made any attempt
to monitor these decisions on its own in order to determine
whether prosecutorial discretion is exercised fairly.13 The impor-
tance of this lack of comparison is indicated by the fact that
there are at least three instances in which solicitors did not seek
the death penalty in return for a plea, even though the aggravat-
ing circumstances in these cases were similar to cases in which
the death penalty was imposed at trial and upheld by the su-
preme court.1" The solicitor's decision not to seek death in these
three cases could not have been based on the first two factors in
12. Shaw, 273 S.C. at 204, 255 S.E.2d at 804.
13. See infra notes 277-82, 303-08, 395-563 and accompanying text.
14. Information in the South Carolina Supreme Court files, see infra notes 303-05,
323-26, 333-37 and accompanying text, indicates that the death penalty was not sought
by the solicitor for the defendants appearing in the table below:
Case Trial Date County Plea Sentence Sentence Aggravating
Sought Rec'd Circumstances
Established
Franklin DeWitt June, 1979 Richland Guilty Death (with- Life (by Prior murder
Morgan drawn in re- Judge) Convictions
turn for plea)
Joe Stinson Feb., 1980 York Guilty Death (with- Life (by Housebreaking,
drawn in re- Judge armed robbery
turn for plea)
William E. Sept., 1979 Sumter Guilty to Death (with- 12 yrs. Torture,
Ward, III voluntary drawn in re- Vol. Mans., housebreaking
manslaughter, turn for plea) 5 yrs. house-
housebreaking breaking and
larceny battery (by
I_ _ __ judge)
In addition to the death sentence for the two defendants in Shaw, the death
sentences of the defendants appearing in the following table have been upheld by the
South Carolina Supreme Court:
3991982]
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Shaw because there were apparently no co-defendants, 15 there-
fore, it must have been based on some other consideration. How-
ever, it is impossible to tell what that consideration may have
been from the records available to the South Carolina Supreme
Court.16 As a result, it is only possible to speculate about the
reasons for the prosecutor's decision. Consequently, it is not
clear whether the death penalty is being applied as fairly as it
might be or whether the threat of the death penalty has an ad-
verse impact on the plea bargaining process. 
7
2. Special Procedural Rights of Capital Defendants
The capital defendant is provided special procedural protec-
tions under the death penalty statute. The solicitor must notify
the defendant's attorney of his intent to seek the death penalty
at least thirty days prior to trial"8 and provide the defendant
with a copy of the indictment at least three days before trial.' 9
The defense must also be informed in writing, before trial, of the
evidence that the state will use to show that some aggravating
circumstance exists.20 The solicitor need not designate each ag-
gravating factor if he adequately apprises the defendant of the
evidence by allowing defense counsel access to his case file.2
In addition, the defendant is provided special protection to
increase the likelihood that he will have adequate counsel. Since
the solicitor must inform the defendant's counsel of his intent to
seek the death penalty thirty days prior to trial, the defendant
Case Aggravating Circumstances Established
Horace Butler Rape
Larry Gilbert Armed robbery, larceny with a deadly weapon
J.D. Gleaton Armed robbery, larceny with a deadly weapon
William Gibbs Hyman Armed robbery
Albert Thompson Armed robbery
15. No co-defendants were listed with the names of the three defendants listed,
supra note 14.
16. See infra notes 303-05, 323-26, 333-36 and accompanying text.
17. Cf. State v. Thompson, - S.C. -, 292 S.E.2d 581 (1982).
18. § 16-3.26(A)(Supp. 1981).
19. § 17-19-80 (1976).
20, § 16-3-20(B)(Supp. 1981).
21. State v. Plath, - S.C. -, -, 284 S.E.2d 221, 226 (1981). Plath indicates that
the State is not required to provide the file, but it may elect to do so in order to satisfy
the statute if the file is adequate for this purpose.
[Vol. 34
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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
has an implied right to counsel at least thirty days prior to trial.
The statute also explicitly provides that, where requested, the
defense attorney is excused from other trial duties ten days prior
to the term of court in which the trial is to be held.22 Indigents
are entitled to appointed counsel, only one of whom can be a
public defender.23 At least one of the appointed counsel must
have a minimum of five years experience as an attorney and
three years of experience in the actual trial of felony cases.24 In-
digents are also entitled to State payment for "investigative ex-
perts or other services . . . reasonably necessary for the repre-
sentation of the defendant .. ."5 The impact of the right to
these services is severely constrained by the low statutory maxi-
mums on the amount of money that may be awarded for indi-
gents. No more than fifteen hundred dollars may be paid for at-
torney fees and costs, 26 and no more than two thousand dollars
can be paid for "investigative expenses or other services.
' '2
7
C. The Trial Proceedings
All criminal trials can be divided into two stages: a first
stage, in which the question of guilt is determined, and a second
stage in which the sentence is imposed. The South Carolina cap-
ital punishment scheme goes beyond this usual division and
grants the jury a central role in the sentencing phase as well as
in the determination of guilt. The requirement of such a bifur-
cated hearing is set forth in the first part of section 16-3-20(B)
of the South Carolina Code of Laws, which provides:
Upon conviction, or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of
murder, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceed-
ing to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to
22. § 16-3-26(A)(Supp. 1981).
23. § 16-3-26(B)(Supp. 1981).
24. Id.
25. § 16-3-26(C)(Supp. 1981). See also State v. Woomer, [hereinafter cited as
Woomer (1)], 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696, 698-99 (1981). In Woomer (1), the defendant
was charged with a murder in Horry County. In State v. Woomer, [hereinafter cited as
Woomer (2)], - S.C. -, 284 S.E.2d 357 (1981), the same defendant was charged with a
different murder in Colleton County. See infra note 129.
26. § 16-3-26(B)(Supp. 1981). See also State v. Goolsby, - S.C .... 292 S.E.2d
180, 181 (1982).
27. § 16-3-26(C)(Supp. 1981). See also Goolsby, - S.C. at , 292 S.E.2d at 180-
1982]
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death or life imprisonment. The proceeding shall be conducted
by the trial judge before the trial jury as soon as practicable
after the lapse of twenty-four hours unless waived by the de-
fendant and the State, or if the defendant pleaded guilty, the
sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before the court.2"
As indicated below, the statutory scheme focuses on the sentenc-
ing portion of the trial.
1. Voir Dire
When a criminal defendant exercises his right to trial by
jury, he is entitled to a fair and unbiased jury representative of
the community. Voter registration lists are used for the selection
of jurors to insure fair representation.2 9 Impartiality is the pri-
mary responsibility of the trial judge, who is required to ex-
amine prospective jurors to insure that they are unbiased. In
noncapital cases, the judge has the discretion to allow the par-
ties to conduct the voir dire,30 but this practice is disfavored.3 '
Prospective jurors must be excluded from duty if they are re-
lated to a party, have a personal interest in the outcome, have a
preconceived opinion or bias as to the facts of the case, or are
otherwise prejudiced toward either side.32 In serious cases, the
defense may preemptorily exclude up to ten prospective jurors
and the State may exclude up to five.33
The voir dire procedure is altered in death penalty cases."
The defense has the right to examine prospective jurors 5 and
28. § 16-3-20(B)(Supp. 1981).
29. State v. Hyman, - S.C. 281 S.E.2d 209, 212 (1981); §§ 14-7-140, -640
(1976).
30. E.g., State v. Britt, 237 S.C. 293, 311, 117 S.E.2d 379, 388 (1960). See also State
v. Smart, [hereinafter cited as Smart I], 274 S.C. 303, 305, 262 S.E.2d 911, 912 (1980).
Smart I was an interlocutory appeal and State v. Smart, [hereinafter cited as Smart H],
- S.C. -, - S.E.2d - (1982), was an appeal of the defendant's conviction and
death sentence. See infra note 177. Smart II is pending.
31. State v. Brown, 170 S.C. 178, 170 S.E. 142 (1933).
32. § 14-7-1020 (1976).
33. § 14-7-1110 (1976). Where there is more than one defendant, the defense is enti-
tled to twenty challenges and the State ten. Where there is one defendant, the defense is
limited to ten preemptory challenges. State v. Goolsby, 275 S.C. 110, 117, 268 S.E.2d 31,
35 (1980).
34. For a discussion of voir dire in capital cases from a defendant's point of view,
see SOUTHERN PovERTy LAW CENTER, VoiR DIRE FOR CAPrFAL CASES (1979).
35. § 16-3-20(D)(Supp. 1981). However, the method and scope of this examination is
12
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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
the supreme court has approved the practice of allowing the so-
licitor to conduct voir dire.3 6
In addition, the trial judge's discretion is guided by section
16-3-20(E) which provides the following:
In every criminal action in which a defendant is charged
with a crime which may be punishable by death, a person may
not be disqualified, excused or excluded from service as a juror
therein by reason of his belief or attitudes against capital pun-
ishment unless such beliefs or attitudes would render him una-
ble to return a verdict of guilty according to law.37
Although this section speaks in terms of the determination of
guilt, the primary application of the provision has been to guide
the trial judge in the use of his discretion to provide a balance
between two concerns in the sentencing phase of trial: (1) to in-
sure that the jury reflects community views concerning the pro-
priety of imposing the death penalty on a particular defendant
for a particular crime,3 8 and (2) to insure that a juror's views do
not interfere with the proper discharge of his duties under a
constitutionally valid statute.39 The South Carolina Supreme
Court has held that the best way to balance these concerns in
accordance with the statutory provisions is to treat the juror's
beliefs about the death penalty as a ground for exclusion only if
these beliefs interfere with the proper exercise of sentencing dis-
cretion.40 For example, if a juror would not consider a particular
subject to the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Thompson, - S.C. -, -, 292
S.E.2d 581, 586 (1982); State v. Tyner, [hereinafter cited as Tyner I], 273 S.C. 646, 651,
258 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1979). Tyner I was an appeal of the defendant's initial conviction
and death sentence. State v. Tyner, [hereinafter cited as Tyner I], - S.C. -, -
S.E.2d - (argued Oct. 6, 1981), was an appeal of the defendant's second death sentence
resulting from the sentencing remand order of Tyner I. Tyner II is now pending before
the South Carolina Supreme Court.
36. State v. Plath, - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 227; Smart I, 274 S.C. at 305, 262
S.E.2d at 912.
37. § 16-3-20(E)(Supp. 1981).
38. See infra notes 108-112 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
40. See State v. Thompson, - S.C. at -, 292 S.E.2d at 585; State v. Horace But-
ler, - S.C. -, -, 290 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1982); State v. Hyman, - S.C. -, -, 281 S.E.2d
209, 211 (1981); State v. Goolsby, 275 S.C. 110, 116-17, 268 S.E.2d 31, 35 (1980). Unfor-
tunately, the court has not always followed this approach. For example, in State v. Gil-
bert, [hereinafter cited as Gilbert II], - S.C. -, 283 S.E.2d 179 (1981), the court held
that a juror was properly excluded because she had talked with her priest about the
Catholic Church's views on capital punishment, thereby introducing an outside influence
19821
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mitigating circumstance 4 1 or would not sentence to death under
any circumstances, he may be excluded.' 2
The South Carolina Supreme Court has also considered and
rejected various challenges to the composition of the jury in cap-
ital cases. The court has held that there is no constitutional ob-
jection to the selection process resulting in a disproportionately
small number of persons of a certain age 43 or to the provision
excusing women with children under the age of seven.4 The
court has also rejected the argument that persons of a particular
race are systematically excluded. 45 As will be discussed later,
some evidence suggests that the voir dire concerning sentencing
may affect the composition of the jury, making it more prone to
convict and sentence to death. The court, however, has not ad-
dressed this issue.
2. The Adjudication of Guilt
a. Murder and Malice Aforethought
The South Carolina statute focuses on the sentencing pro-
ceeding and provides virtually no explicit guidance concerning
the elements of the crime of murder. The South Carolina Code
simply provides that murder is "the killing of any person with
malice aforethought, either express or implied."46 Except for
provisions declaring that poisoning constitutes malice afore-
thought47 and that stabbing without provocation will be treated
as murder,48 the code provides no definition of malice afore-
thought. As a result, the common law is the source for determin-
into her deliberations. Id. at ..- , 283 S.E.2d at 181. This exclusion was improper. See
infra notes 248-49, 752 and accompanying text.
41. E.g., Gilbert II, - S.C. at , 283 S.E.2d at 180-81. State v. Gilbert, [hereinaf-
ter cited as Gilbert I], 273 S.C. 690, 258 S.E.2d 890 (1979), was an appeal of defendants'
original convictions and death sentences. See infra note 194. Gilbert II was an appeal of
the defendants' second death sentences resulting from the sentencing remand order of
Gilbert I.
42. State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 313, 278 S.E.2d 335, 340 (1981); Tyner I, 273 S.C.
at 650-51, 258 S.E.2d at 562.
43. State v. Plath, - S.C. at , 284 S.E.2d at 224-45.
44. State v. Hyman, - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 212.
45. State v. Thompson, - S.C. at ., 292 S.E.2d at 586.
46. § 16-3-10 (1976).
47. § 16-3-30 (1976).
48. § 16-3-40 (1976).
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ing what constitutes malice aforethought.
"Malice" is a legal term of art which has been refined over
many years. In common usage, "malice" suggests hatred, ill-will,
or hostility."" The legal concept, however, is much broader and is
used to describe an extreme antisocial attitude and lack of con-
cern for the physical well-being of other persons ° An obvious
example of "malice" is the intentional killing of another without
a just cause, such as self-defense, or an excuse, such as extreme
provocation. In South Carolina, malice is also evidenced under
three other circumstances: (1) the use of a deadly weapon in an
assault where there is no legal justification or excuse;51 (2) the
commission of a dangerous felony;52 and (3) the outrageously
reckless endangerment of the life of another.53
"Aforethought" is also a term of art and does not require
premeditation, design, or a period of reflection prior to the act of
killing. Indeed, the term may be mere surplusage today because
malice "may be conceived at the very moment the fatal blow is
given.""
b. The Burden of Proof
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant killed with malice aforethought"5 because it is one of
the elements of the crime of murder.56 In cases involving an in-
tentional killing or an assault with a deadly weapon, malice is
defined in part by the absence of justification or excuse. When a
49. State v. Harvey, 220 S.C. 506, 514, 68 S.E.2d 409, 412 (1951).
50. Id. at 514-15, 68 S.E.2d at 412.
51. See State v. Crocker, 272 S.C. 344, 251 S.E.2d 764 (1979); State v. Arnold, 266
S.C. 153, 221 S.E.2d 867 (1976); State v. Fields, 264 S.C. 260, 214 S.E.2d 320 (1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975); State v. Henderson, 74 S.C. 477, 55 S.E. 117 (1906); State v.
Byrd, 72 S.C. 104, 51 S.E. 542 (1905).
52. Gore v. Leeke, 261 S.C. 308, 199 S.E.2d 755 (1973). It is likely that the felony-
murder rule will only be applied in circumstances where the felony is inherently danger-
ous to life. See id. at 316-17, 199 S.E.2d at 758-59. It is interesting to note that only one
case, State v. Levelle, 34 S.C. 120, 13 S.E. 319 (1890), involved a set of facts such that
malice could only be based upon the application of the felony-murder rule. W.
McANINCH & W. FAIREY, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 65 (S.C. Bar, CLE Div.
1982).
53. State v. Mouzon, 231 S.C. 655, 99 S.E.2d 672 (1957).
54. State v. Milam, 88 S.C. 127, 131, 70 S.E. 447, 449 (1911).
55. State v. Fuller, 229 S.C. 439, 445, 93 S.E.2d 463, 466 (1956).
56. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
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justification such as self defense exists, the defendant is not
guilty of any criminal homicide.57 When the defendant kills be-
cause of a legally adequate provocation, he is guilty of man-
slaughter rather than murder because the killing results from
the heat of passion, not from malice.58 Many cases suggest that
lack of excuse or justification is an integral part of the definition
of malice and thus an element of the crime of murder.59 How-
ever, whether the State must prove the absence of some justifi-
cation or excuse, or whether the defendant must show their exds-
tence is unclear.
In State v. Bolton,60 the defendant appealed a manslaughter
conviction. One ground of appeal was that the trial court re-
quired him to prove the elements of self-defense by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.8 1 The defendant argued that since lack
of justification was part of the definition of malice, the State was
constitutionally required to grant him due process by proving
the existence of this element beyond a reasonable doubt.62 The
South Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court had not
erred in treating self defense as an affirmative defense and re-
quiring the defendant to prove its existence.63
There are several reasons why it is not clear whether Bolton
can be viewed as authority for the proposition that the State
need not prove absence of justification in order to show malice.
First, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter, not murder.
Consequently, the jury did not find malice, and the court's dis-
cussion is dictum to this extent. Second, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court appears to have held that the State must prove
lack of adequate provocation;64 it would be inconsistent to treat
the absence of provocation differently from lack of justification.
Finally, unless South Carolina clearly determines that the ab-
sence of justification is not part of the definition of malice-one
of the elements of the crime of murder-Bolton may be
57. State v. Hendrix, 270 S.C. 653, 244 S.E.2d 503 (1978).
58. State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 308, 278 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1981).
59. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
60. 266 S.C. 444, 223 S.E.2d 863 (1976).
61. Id. at 449, 223 S.E.2d at 865-66.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
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The issue of the burden of proof of self-defense was raised
again in State v. Linder.66 Linder, convicted of murdering a po-
lice officer, asserted at trial that the killing was either in self-
defense or the result of the provocation of excessive force in ar-
resting him. On appeal, the defendant requested the court to re-
consider Bolton, but the court indicated it would "adhere to [its]
reasoning as expressed in Bolton.' '6 7 Since Linder was convicted
of murder, it is tempting to assume that if the State can show an
intentional killing, then the defendant has the burden of show-
ing that there was justification for the killing. Linder, however,
does not resolve the uncertainty underlying this issue because
Linder's murder conviction was reversed, and the case was re-
manded on the ground that the jury had not been instructed
that he should be found guilty of voluntary manslaughter if
there was legally adequate provocation."8
The South Carolina Supreme Court has considered the
question of burden of proof concerning provocation in several
cases and apparently has concluded that the State must show
lack of provocation.69 For example, in State v. Crocker,"0 the de-
fendant stabbed and killed his wife. The State argued at trial
that malice was present because the killing was intentional and
without cause or because a deadly weapon was used without
cause.71 The defendant was convicted of murder. On appeal, he
argued, inter alia, that the homicide was committed in the heat
of passion resulting from provocation and that the trial court
erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the State must prove
the absence of heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt.72 The
supreme court concluded that the denial of such an instruction
was not error because the charge as a whole indicated that the
state had the burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a
65. See infra notes 755-62 and accompanying text.
66. 276 S.C. 304, 278 S.E.2d 335 (1981).
67. Id. at 313, 278 S.E.2d at 340.
68. Id. at 308, 278 S.E.2d at 337. The court did not say anything about the burden
of proof concerning provocation.
69. State v. Hyman, - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 213; State v. Mattison, 276 S.C.
235, 237-38, 277 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1981); State v. Crocker, 272 S.C. at 345, 251 S.E.2d at
765.
70. 272 S.C. 344, 251 S.E.2d 764 (1979).
71. Id. at 345-46, 251 S.E.2d at 765-66.
72. Id. at 345, 251 S.E.2d at 765.
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reasonable doubt and did not shift any of the burden of proof to
the defendant.73 Although Crocker suggests that the State must
prove lack of excuse, the cases are not particularly clear on this
point.74 In addition, the trial court's charge in Crocker was ex-
tremely ambiguous. The trial court not only refused to state ex-
pressly that the State had the burden of showing absence of
provocation, it also explicitly charged that the "use of a deadly
weapon presumes malice but the presumption may be rebut-
ted .... ,,75 The supreme court's approval of this reference to
rebuttal suggests that the burden of persuasion had shifted to
the defendant.
When the killing occurs during the perpetration of a felony
inherently dangerous to life, then malice aforethought exists as a
matter of substantive law.76 In other words, one definition of
malice aforethought is the intentional commission of such a fel-
ony. Consequently, the problems of burden of proof do not arise
because commission of the felony itself defines malice afore-
thought rather than serving merely as a presumption that it ex-
isted at the time of the homicide."
c. Capital Murder
The South Carolina statute does not distinguish among the
various types of malice aforethought and declares that only cer-
tain murders-e.g., intentional killings-are capital murders.
Because of its statutory power and duty to determine when a
death sentence is disproportionate to the crime and the charac-
73. Id. at 345-46, 251 S.E.2d at 765-66.
74. E.g., State v. Plath, - S.C. -, 284 S.E.2d 221 (1981). The court interpreted
Crocker as holding that the trial judge need not charge that absence of heat of passion
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as long as the jury is charged that the State
must prove murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 229. However,
the court then added, "heat of passion is not one of the elements of murder." Id. at ,
284 S.E.2d at 229. The import of this sentence is unclear. Perhaps there has been a
typographical error and it should refer to lack of heat of passion. But, if this were done,
it would contradict the court's interpretation of Crocker that the instructions were not
erroneous because the jury was charged that the State must prove all the elements (in-
cluding lack of provocation) beyond a reasonable doubt.
75. Record at 93, Crocker.
76. E.g., Gore v. Leeke, 261 S.C. 308, 199 S.E.2d 755 (1973).
77. Id. at 316-17, 199 S.E.2d at 757. The constitutionality of this approach is sup-
ported by the reasoning in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). See infra notes
755-62 and accompanying text.
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teristics of the defendant 7 8 the South Carolina Supreme Court
could develop such distinctions judicially. The court, however,
has not addressed this issue.
Insofar as unintentional killings are involved, the statute
implicitly indicates that such persons can be sentenced to
death. 9 In addition, dicta in at least two cases suggest that the
South Carolina Supreme Court would not only hold a defendant
vicariously liable for killings by co-felons but would also uphold
the death sentence even when the defendant did not intend that
a homicide occur.80 These cases were decided before the United
States Supreme Court determined that capital punishment can-
not be imposed for certain unintentional killings, however.8 1
Thus, it is likely that future cases will hold that such killings are
not capital murders in South Carolina.8 2 However, as later dis-
cussion will indicate,83 it is not clear how capital murder will be
defined.
d. Other Issues
(1) Traditional Role of Trial Judge and Jury
The South Carolina Supreme Court has consistently empha-
sized that the traditional judge-jury relationship should be fol-
lowed in the guilt phase of a capital trial. Thus, the following are
committed to the trial judge: (1) motions for change of venue,
severence, sequestering of witnesses, directed verdict, and mis-
trial;s' (2) evidentiary matters (including rulings on the admissi-
bility of confessions, photographs and physical evidence); 5 (3)
78. § 16-3-25(B)(3)(Supp. 1981). See infra notes 273-302, 936-49 and accompanying
text for discussion of this section.
79. See infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
80. State v. Thompson, - S.C. -, 292 S.E.2d 581 (1981). See, e.g., Woomer (1),
276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696. See also infra notes 151-58, 190-93 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 655-68 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 712-20 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 676-79, 706-36 and accompanying text.
84. Plath, - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 226 (change of venue, severance); Tyner I,
273 S.C. at 650, 258 S.E.2d at 561 (sequestering of witnesses). See Tyner, id. at 657, 258
S.E.2d at 565 (directed verdict); State v. Goolsby, 275 S.C. 110, 123, 268 S.E.2d 31, 38
(1980) (mistrial).
85. Tyner I, 273 S.C. at 656, 258 S.E.2d at 564 (admissibility of confessions, physical
evidence); Goolsby, 275 S.C. at 119-20, 268 S.E.2d at 36 (photographs).
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scope of examination of witnesses;8 6 and (4) jury instructions.7
(2) Coordinating the Two Phases of the Trial
(a) Questioning of Defendant
In State v. Adams,88 the defendant elected to testify during
the guilt phase of his trial. The South Carolina Supreme Court
held that a defendant who makes such an election waives his
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination only as to is-
sues relating to his innocence or guilt and may still exercise his
privilege in the sentencing phase. Thus, it was error for the pros-
ecution to explore sentencing issues in cross-examination of the
defendant during the guilt stage. Moreover, the particular line of
questioning involved in Adams not only involved fifth amend-
ment problems but also violated fundamental fairness because
the solicitor was allowed to question the defendant as to his
thoughts on the just deserts of murder and to browbeat him into
admitting that one who committed the acts alleged against him
deserved to die. This line of questioning resulted in the intro-
duction of an "arbitrary factor" intolerable in capital cases.89
(b) Instructions to the Jury
In giving the jury instructions at the conclusion of the guilt
phase, the trial court must keep the guilt issue separate from the
sentencing issue. Thus, it is error for the jury charge at the close
of the guilt phase to include portions of the sentencing sections
of the statute.90
(c) Separate Trials
The South Carolina statute grants the defense the right to
86. See Goolsby, 275 S.C. at 119, 268 S.E.2d at 36.
87. See Plath, - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 230.
88. - S.C. -, 283 S.E.2d 582 (1981).
89. Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 585.
90. In Goolsby, the court held that the error was cured by a subsequent instruction.
Id. at 124, 268 S.E.2d at 39. In State v. Adams, - S.C. -, 283 S.E.2d 582 (1981), the
trial court charged the jury with the previously repealed 1974 death penalty statute and
this was held to be reversible error. Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 585.
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make the last argument in the sentencing phase of the trial. In
State v. Plath,91 the defendants argued that this provision re-
quired that each be tried separately so that each would have the
last argument. The court rejected this argument because it
would "preclude co-defendants from ever being tried together"
and concluded that the decision to grant separate trials rested
within the discretion of the trial judge. 2
(d) Waiver of the Right to Trial by Jury or Sentencing by
Jury
The sentencing portion of the South Carolina statute
provides:
The sentencing proceeding shall be conducted by the trial
judge before the trial jury as soon as practicable after the
lapse of twenty-four hours unless waived by the defendant. If
the trial jury has been waived by the defendant and the State,
or if the defendant pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceedings
shall be conducted before the court.93
The italicized language suggests that there is no way for the jury
to determine only guilt or only sentencing. As a result, the stat-
ute is generally interpreted as requiring that, when a defendant
waives his right to trial by jury by pleading guilty or by electing
to be tried by the judge, he must be sentenced by the judge.
Similarly, when he elects to be tried by the jury, he must be
sentenced by the jury. 4
However, this interpretation was challenged in State v. Pat-
terson"5 and State v. Truesdale.98 In each case, the defendant
agreed to plead guilty after the jury was impaneled if the trial
judge would allow the jury to determine the sentence.97 The
91. - S.C. -, 284 S.E.2d 221 (1981).
92. Id. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 226.
93. § 16-3-20(B)(Supp. 1981)(emphasis added).
94. See, e.g., McAninch, Legal Status of the Death Penalty in South Carolina, in
THE DEATH PENALTY IN SOUTH CAROLINA 60, 71 (B. Pearson ed. 1981). The lack of cases
involving this issue suggests that this interpretation has been followed by trial courts.
95. No. 21788, slip op. (S.C. Sept. 13, 1982).
96. No. 21799, slip op. (S.C. Oct. 19, 1982).
97. Patterson initially offered to plead guilty in return for the solicitor's recommen-
dation of mercy, but his offer was rejected. Record at 773 (Patterson). His attorneys then
offered to submit a guilty plea if the trial judge would allow Patterson to be sentenced by
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judge agreed to this procedure and the pleas were entered 5 The
juries recommended death in both cases and both defendants
were sentenced to death by the trial judge.99 On appeal, the is-
sue of the jury sentencing was raised in both cases.100
This sentencing procedure raises two different issues: (1)
whether it was improper to allow the defendant the option of
jury sentencing and (2) if it is improper, whether it is a ground
for a reversal when the defendant elected to be sentenced by the
jury. The answer to the first question is not clear. The statutory
language apparently forbids such a sentencing process, and there
is good reason to believe that the statutory prohibition is consti-
the jury, which had already been impaneled and which would decide the guilt or inno-
cence of his two co-defendants who had pleaded not guilty. Id. The solicitor argued that
such a procedure was contrary to what he regarded as the literal meaning of the statute
and should not be allowed because it would taint the entire proceedings. Id. at 779. De-
fense counsel argued that the statute was open to interpretation and could be read as
allowing a defendant the option of pleading guilty without waiving jury sentencing. Id. at
780. Counsel stressed that any other interpretation would raise constitutional difficulties.
rd. at 784. The trial judge discussed the divergent interpretations of the "waiver provi-
sions" of § 163-20(B) with the attorneys at length, and after noting the inefficiency in-
volved in forcing the defendant to have a jury trial in order to have jury sentencing, he
ruled that such a procedure was acceptable. Id. at 792-93.
Truesdale pleaded guilty to murder and armed robbery after the jury had been im-
paneled. Record at 934 (Truesdale). This plea was based on an agreement with the solic-
itor that Truesdale would be sentenced by the jury rather than the judge. Id. at 957.
98. Patterson pleaded guilty to murder and armed robbery. Record at Statement,
Patterson. Truesdale pleaded guilty to murder, kidnapping and rape. Record at State-
ment, Truesdale.
99. Patterson's two co-defendants were convicted of murder in the first phase of the
trial, and the jury recommended life imprisonment sentences for the co-defendants. Re-
cord at Statement, Patterson.
100. In Patterson, the defendant did not raise the sentencing process as a ground
for appeal. The South Carolina Supreme Court raised the issue sua sponte at the oral
argument of the appeal. Reply Brief for Appellant to Respondent's Supplemental Brief
at 6, Truesdale. Truesdale's appellate defense counsel raised the issue and argued that
the jury sentencing violated § 16-3-20(B) (Supp. 1981), and that the death sentence was,
therefore, invalid. Brief for Appellant at 2-6, Truesdale. The State initially condeded the
point and agreed that a reversal and remand was in order. Brief for Respondent at 2-4,
Truesdale. However, after oral argument the State submitted a supplemental brief in
which it reversed its previous position and argued that allowing Truesdale to be sen-
tenced by the jury was harmless error since Truesdale had been accorded a greater right
than he was entitled to under the statute. Supplemental Brief for Respondent at 1-2
Truesdale. The State also maintained that a defendant should not be allowed to profit
from error resulting from his own trial strategy. Id. at 2. The State argued further that,
where the defendant pleaded guilty, there was no constitutional or statutory right to jury
sentencing. Id. at 1.
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tutional.10 1 However, there is room for interpretation0 " and the
South Carolina Supreme Court has shown a very flexible ap-
proach to interpretation of the statute in other contexts.0 3
Moreover, granting the defendants an additional option in the
proceedings would be consistent with the goal of providing every
feasible procedural protection to a capital defendant.104 Finally,
granting the option would avoid potential constitutional chal-
lenges. 05 Even if the proceeding was improper, such impropriety
may not require reversal in these cases for several reasons. First,
there are other possible grounds for such a reversal.'" Second, a
defendant seems unharmed by being granted an additional op-
tion to that granted by a narrow, literal interpretation of the
statute. Finally, granting reversal would allow the defendants to
take advantage of an error resulting from their own efforts. 07
In Patterson, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
the statute prohibited sentencing by the jury in cases in which
the defendant pleads guilty to murder and that this prohibition
is constitutional.10 7 .1 Since jury sentencing is an inducement for
the plea, the court also held that both the plea and the sentence
must be vacated.107 2 Although Truesdale is currently pending,
there is no reason to expect its outcome to differ from Patterson.
101. See infra notes 743-50 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., supra note 97 for an argument that the mandatory language is not
meant to bind the defendant, who still has an option. These arguments are perhaps but-
tressed by § 16-3-25(E)(2)(Supp. 1981), which provides that when the South Carolina
Supreme Court remands a case for resentencing, "the new jury, if the defendant does not
waive the right of a trial jury for the resentencing hearing, shall hear" certain evidence
(emphasis added). This provision arguably gives the defendant a right to sentencing by a
judge even though he was convicted by a jury. If interpreted in this way, the section
indicates two things. First, the statutory scheme is ambiguous even though § 16-3-
20(B)(Supp. 1981), may not appear so when read alone, and such ambiguity results in
the need for interpretation. Second, § 16-3-25(E)(2)(Supp. 1981), indicates a legislative
choice to grant the defendant an option, at least where he was tried and sentenced by a
jury in the first trial. This legislative policy would support an interpretion of the scheme
granting defendant an option.
103. See, e.g., supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text, and infra notes 941-46 and
accompanying text for instances where the literal wording of a statutory section is not
followed.
104. See infra notes 884-935 and accompanying text.
105. See infra ngtes 743-50 and accompanying text.
106. See generally, Brief for Appellant Patterson; Brief for Appellant Truesdale.
107. In addition, the proceeding was resisted by the solicitor in Patterson, supra
note 97.
107.1. State v. Patterson, No. 21788, slip. op. at 3-4 (S.C. Sept. 13, 1982).
107.2. Id. at 4.
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3. The Sentencing Proceedings
a. Introduction-Structuring Sentencing Discretion
The sentencing phase of a capital case involves an awesome
decision: the determination of when the State should deliber-
ately take the life of a particular human being.10 This decision
should not be made mechanically because we must determine
whether a particular defendant deserves the death penalty for a
particular crime.109 Due to the serious nature of such a discre-
tionary decision, South Carolina has long had the policy of pro-
viding every possible safeguard to insure that the death penalty
is not imposed improperly.110 In accordance with this tradition
and with the requirements of the United States Constitution,"1
the present statutory scheme utilizes three different approaches
to insure that the death penalty is only imposed when there is a
meaningful basis for concluding that the defendant clearly de-
serves such punishment.
112
First, to insure that the choice between life imprisonment
and death is fully informed, the statute provides that the jury
(or the judge in a nonjury case) shall consider the evidence from
108. There are no other sentencing choices because the statute provides simply that
murder "shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life." § 16-3-20(A)(Supp.
1981).
109. See, e.g., State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 278 S.E.2d 335 (1981), wherein the court
stated that: "[t]he purpose here is to assure that each sentence rendered in a capital case
results from the attention of the sentencing authority having been drawn to the particu-
larized circumstances of each case." Id. at 311, 278 S.E.2d at 339. In State v. Shaw, 273
S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979), the court stressed the need to determine whether death
is the appropriate punishment in a specific case and noted that the statutory procedures
"focus on the sentencing authorities' attention on the particularized nature of the crime
and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant." Id. at 203, 255 S.E.2d
at 804.
110. This policy was clearly stated in State v. Sharpe, 239 S.C. 258, 122 S.E.2d 622
(1961), as follows:
The power of law to take the life of human beings for a violation thereof is
one which should be and is exercised with extreme caution. The frailties of
human nature are so manifest and manifold until the law should and does
place around the defendant, whose life would be taken for a violation of the
law, every safeguard to enable such defendant to secure a fair and impartial
trial.
Id. at 274, 122 S.E.2d at 630.
111. See infra notes 436-80, 487-507 and accompanying text.
112. For a discussion of these approaches as ways of improving discretion in general,
see K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1909).
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the guilt stage as well as "additional evidence in extenuation,
mitigation or aggravation of the punishment."11 The purpose of
this provision is to allow the introduction of evidence which
would normally be irrelevant in determining guilt. 1 When the
defendant pleads guilty, evidence which might have been intro-
duced in the guilt phase of the trial is admissible in the sentenc-
ing stage.11 5 Similarly, if the case is remanded by the supreme
court for resentencing, evidence from the guilt stage is admissi-
ble in the new sentencing proceeding. 6 Full development of the
evidence is also assured by the statutory right of the defendant
to fully qualified counsel, experts, and other necessary ser-
vices.117 In addition, the supreme court has approved a detailed
form to be filled out for the purpose of assisting the trial court
in its sentencing decision and to assist the supreme court in its
review.
l 8
A second way of preventing abuse of discretion is to impose
procedural and substantive safeguards to guide and limit the
way decisions are made and thus insure that rational and consis-
tent decisions are made and that there will be a meaningful ba-
sis for the review of discretionary decisions.119 The statute and
cases have explicitly structured the introduction and considera-
tion of evidence in the sentencing phase in a variety of ways.
First, as indicated above in the discussion of the pretrial pro-
ceedings, evidence concerning a statutory aggravating factor is
not admissible unless the state notified the defendant of the evi-
dence in writing prior to the trial.1 20 Second, the evidence must
not have been secured in violation of federal or state law.
121
Third, the State and the defense may make arguments concern-
ing the sentence. The defendant and his counsel are entitled to
the closing argument,1 22 but only if these arguments are fairly
113. § 16-3-20(B)(Supp. 1981). See also § 16-3-20(C) (Supp. 1981).
114. State v. Horace Butler, - S.C. -.___, 290 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1982); Shaw, 273 S.C.
at 208, 255 S.E.2d at 806.
115. See Shaw, 273 S.C. at 208-09, 255 S.E.2d at 806.
116. § 16-3-25(E)(2)(Supp. 1981).
117. § 16-3-26 (Supp. 1981).
118. Shaw, 273 S.C. at 201, 209, Appendix B, Appendix C, 255 S.E.2d at 803, 806,
Appendix B, Appendix C.
119. Id. at 202-03, 255 S.E.2d at 803-04.
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related to the sentencing issue. 123 Fourth, certain considerations
are irrelevant to the sentencing decision and the jury cannot
consider them.12 Finally, the statute lists specific aggravating
and mitigating circumstances which must be given to the jury in
writing if supported by the evidence. 125
To prevent the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty,
the consideration of these circumstances is biased toward life
imprisonment in two ways. First, the jury (or judge in a nonjury
case) cannot impose the death penalty unless at least one aggra-
vating circumstance is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.126
Second, the jury is given broad discretion concerning the imposi-
tion of life imprisonment. The jury or judge may consider miti-
gating circumstances not listed in the statute;12 7 and there is no
requirement of an affirmative finding of any specific mitigating
circumstances in order to impose life imprisonment, 12 even if an
123. See infra notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 244-46, 252-54 and accompanying text.
125. § 16-3-20(C)(Supp. 1981). The statutory requirement is satisfied by simply
charging the circumstances as set forth in the statute. State v. Adams, - S.C. - -
283 S.E.2d 582, 587 (1981). Where the evidence supports an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, it must be submitted to the jury and the judge must not comment on the
weight of the evidence. E.g., Horace Butler, - S.C. at -, 290 S.E.2d at 4. See infra
notes 255-57 and accompanying text. The statutory system of aggravating and mitigating
factors was upheld in Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799, which was the first case to
consider the constitutionality of the new death penalty scheme. The court found the lists
of circumstances to be relevant for evaluating the particularized circumstances of the
defendant and the crime. Id. at 205, 255 S.E.2d at 804. The failure of the statute to
assign numerical values to the enumerated circumstances to enable the jury to determine
whether mitigation "outweighs" aggravation did not render the statute constitutionally
defective. Id.
126. § 16-3-20(C)(Supp. 1981). The relevant portion of this section provides:
The statutory instructions as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances
shall be given in charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation. The jury,
if its verdict be a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, and
signed by all members of the jury, the aggravating circumstance or circum-
stances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. In nonjury cases the judge
shall make such designation. Unless at least one of the statutory aggravating
circumstances enumerated in this section is so found, the death penalty shall
not be imposed. Where a statutory aggravating circumstance is found and a
recommendation of death is made, the court shall sentence the defendant to
death. The trial judge, prior to imposing the death penalty, shall find as an
affirmative fact that the death penalty was warranted under the evidence of
the case and was not a result of prejudice, passion, or any other arbitrary
factor.
127. § 16-3-20(C)(Supp. 1981); Shaw, 273 S.C. at 200, 255 S.E.2d at 802.
128. § 16-3-20(C)(Supp. 1981).
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aggravating circumstance is present. 12 9
The third way the statute prevents possible abuse of the
discretion to sentence to death is by imposing checks or "vetoes"
on the imposition of the death penalty. The first such check is
the requirement that the death penalty only be imposed if the
jury recommends it by a unanimous verdict. If the jury cannot
agree, the jury is dismissed and the defendant is sentenced to
life imprisonment.," Thus, if a single juror is in doubt concern-
ing the propriety of the death penalty in a particular case, it will
not be imposed. A further check on jury discretion is the re-
quirement that the trial judge not impose the death penalty un-
less he affirmatively finds that the jury recommendation of
death was warranted and not the "result of prejudice, passion, or
any other existing factor.""" A final check on discretion is the




(1) The Statutory Circumstances
The statute lists seven aggravating circumstances:
(1) Murder was committed while in the commission of the fol-
lowing crimes or acts: (a) rape, (b) assault with intent to ravish,
(c) kidnapping, (d) burglary, (e) robbery while armed with a
deadly weapon, (f) larceny with use of a deadly weapon, (g)
housebreaking, and (h) killing by poison and (i) physical
torture;
(2) Murder was committed by a person with a prior record of
conviction for murder;
(3) The offender by his act of murder knowingly created a
great risk of death to more than one person in a public place
by means of a weapon or device which would normally be haz-
129. Woomer (2), - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 359; Woomer (1), 276 S.C. at 267,
277 S.E.2d at 701; State v. Goolsby, 275 S.C. 110, 128, 268 S.E.2d 31, 41 (1980); Tyner I,
273 S.C. at 660, 258 S.E.2d at 566.
130. § 16-3-20(C)(Supp. 1981). The trial judge has discretion to determine whether
to conduct a poll to see if the verdict is unanimous in fact. However, if a request is made,
a poll must be taken. State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 309, 278 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1981).
131. § 16-3-20(C)(Supp. 1981).
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ardous to the lives of more than one person;
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself
or another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other
thing of monetary value;
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, so-
licitor, former solicitor, or other officer of the court during or
because of the exercise of his official duty;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder
or committed murder as an agent or employee of another
person;
(7) The offense of murder was committed against any peace
officer, corrections employee or fireman while engaged in the
performance of his official duties.
13
3
(2) Aggravating Circumstances not Listed in the Statutory
Scheme
The statute provides that the death penalty should not be
imposed unless there is at least one statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance.1 34 In addition, it provides that the jury shall be in-
structed to consider the list of aggravating factors while also
providing that the jury should consider not only the statutory
mitigating factors but also additional mitigating factors other-
wise authorized or allowed by law. 13 5 When read together, these
provisions indicate first, that only the statutory factors should
be considered as aggravating circumstances and second, that evi-
dence should not be admissible to show aggravation unless it, is
relevant to one of these factors.
The South Carolina Supreme Court appeared to adopt this
position in State v. Shaw,136 by asserting that the statute
"makes no provision for the consideration.., of any nonstatu-
tory aggravating circumstances."1 37 However, Shaw also held
that photographs showing post mortem mutilation of the vic-
tim's body were admissible. "The evidence.., was... admis-
sible not only as a circumstance of the crime, but also as evi-
dence of Shaw's character. The acts of post-mortem abuse were
133. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(Supp. 1981).
134. § 16-3-20(C)(Supp. 1981).
135. Id.
136. 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979).
137. Id. at 201, 255 S.E.2d at 802.
[Vol. 34
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of a violent sexual nature and bore a logical connection to the
earlier rape of. . . [the victim]. 13 Because of this broad inter-
pretation of the "circumstances" of the crime and the character
of the defendant, it appears that South Carolina does not re-
quire that evidence in aggravation of the sentence be relevant to
the statutory factors. Instead, Shaw, and other cases, 9 suggest
that the statutory circumstances function as a "threshold" re-
quirement. In other words, if the State can show that the defen-
dant has exceeded a basic threshold of wrongfulness by proving
that at least one statutory circumstance exists, the jury may
consider other aggravating circumstances in deciding to impose
the death sentence.
A review of the transcripts of the trials reveals an even
broader approach to aggravating circumstances. For example, in
State v. Tyner," °0 two expert witnesses testified that the defen-
dant was the type of "criminal" who would continue to commit
crimes.14 In addition, one of these experts testified that the de-
fendant had the same criminal profile as Charles Manson. 42 No
objection was raised concerning this testimony, so the jury may
have considered it in deciding to recommend the death penalty
for the defendant. This penalty was reversed and remanded for
resentencing on other grounds" 3 and the testimony was ex-
cluded at the second hearing.'" Nevertheless, it is still impor-
tant to note that the defense attorneys, the trial judge, and the
South Carolina Supreme Court seemed unconcerned with such
testimony at the first sentencing hearing.'
4 5
138. Id. at 209, 255 S.E.2d at 806.
139. In Gilbert II, - S.C. -, 283 S.E.2d 179, the court upheld the admission of
allegedly irrelevant photographs because they were demonstrative of the circumstances
of the crime. Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 181. In addition, the court seemed to hold that
after one aggravating circumstance has been established, the others are merely cumula-
tive. See infra notes 194-204 and accompanying text, for further discussion of Gilbert II.
In Woomer (1), 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696, evidence of aggravating acts of a co-con-
spirator was held admissible. Id. at 265, 277 S.E.2d at 699. See infra notes 190-93 and
accompanying text for discussion of Woomer (1).
140. 273 S.C. 646, 258 S.E.2d 559 (1979).
141. Record at 1108, 1184, Tyner I.
142. Id. at 1108.
143. Tyner I, 273 S.C. at 659-60, 258 S.E.2d at 566.
144. Record at 885-90, Tyner II.
145. Recidivism has been implicitly approved as an aggravating circumstance by the
United States Supreme Court. See infra note 470 and accompanying text. However, the
consideration of recidivism offends the proportionality test used in many United States
1982]
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This broad approach to aggravation is questionable for sev-
eral reasons. First, it appears to conflict with the statute, which
explicitly limits the aggravating circumstances sufficient to sup-
port the death penalty to those listed.146 Second, it may not be
possible to satisfy the policy underlying the right to notice of
statutory aggravating circumstances1 47 if other circumstances
can be shown. Third, this approach makes it difficult to deter-
mine what role the nonstatutory aggravating factors played in
the sentencing decision. It may provide inadequate structure
and checks on sentencing decisions, and this inadequacy is con-
trary to the basic policy of the statute and raises potential con-
stitutional problems.1 4 8 The lack of limitation on statutory con-
siderations also raises doubts about the justice of the scheme
because it is not possible to be confident that the sentencing au-
thority made a careful, individualized consideration.14 9 Finally,
the adoption of the threshold approach apparently influences
the South Carolina Supreme Court in related areas and results
in questionable decisions. 150
(3) Overlapping Aggravating Circumstances
The first statutory aggravating factor is that the murder was
committed while in the commission of one of nine serious crimes
or acts,151 which considerably overlap with the crime of murder.
For example, when an unintentional homicide occurs during an
armed robbery, the armed robbery has two roles. First, the unin-
tended killing is murder-referred to as "felony-murder" -be-
cause malice aforethought is implied in law when a death results
Supreme Court opinions, see infra notes 495-98, 515, 523-27 and accompanying text, be-
cause it is not relevant to the legitimate goal of punishment since it is irrelevant to
retributivism, see infra notes 792-826, 853-54, 870-72 and accompanying text. There is
no need to deter the defendant since he will be imprisoned for life. See infra note 873
and accompanying text. Moreover, given the exclusion of this evidence at the resentenc-
ing hearing, see supra note 144 and accompanying text, it is not clear what the law is in
South Carolina on this issue. See infra note 268.
146. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 112-32 and accompanying text, and infra notes 201, 397-411,
436-56, 487-506, 622-54, 769-73 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 884-935 and accompanying text.
150. See infra notes 203-04, 296-302 and accompanying text.
151. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(Supp. 1981).
420 [Vol. 34
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while such a dangerous felony is committed. 52 Second, the
armed robbery is an aggravating circumstance.153 In State v.
Thompson,1 5 4 the supreme court considered the overlap between
aggravating circumstances and felony-murder and concluded
that "a statutory aggravating circumstance would remain a cir-
cumstance of the murder in a death penalty case regardless of
whether the crime charged is murder or felony-murder. '1 5 Be-
cause the jury was not given a felony-murder charge in Thomp-
son, this language is mere dictum. The murder was an inten-
tional homicide and the finding of malice was based on this
intent.156 Future cases will likely narrow this approach to some
extent 57 because a subsequent United States Supreme Court
case has clearly indicated that the death penalty cannot be im-
posed in cases where the defendant was not present at the kill-
ing and the death was not intended. '
A second type of overlap is inherent in the first aggravating
factor because some of the nine listed crimes are similar to one
another.15 9 Moreover, the theft crimes listed in the first factor all
involve a killing for pecuniary gain,1e° which is the fourth aggra-
vating factor listed in the statute.161 Such overlaps were involved
in State v. Woomer [hereinafter cited as Woomer (2)].62
Woomer was sentenced to death for a murder committed while
carrying out the theft of the victim's coin collection. The trial
152. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text, and infra notes 656, 676 and
accompanying text.
153. § 16-3-20(C)(1)(e)(Supp. 1981).
154. - S.C. -, 292 S.E.2d 581 (1982).
155. Id. at -, 292 S.E.2d at 585.
156. Id.
157. The exact nature of future developments on this issue is not clear. See infra
notes 676-679, 706-736 and accompanying text.
158. Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982). See infra notes 655-79 and accom-
panying text for further discussion of this case.
159. The statute lists armed robbery with a deadly weapon and larceny with a
deadly weapon as aggravating circumstances. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(e),(f)(Supp. 1981). The
court recognized the overlap between these two crimes in Gilbert II, - S.C. -, 283
S.E.2d 179 and noted that robbery is defined as larceny by force. Id. at , 283 S.E.2d at
182. Burglary and housebreaking are also listed as aggravating factors, § 16-3-
20(C)(a)(1)(d),(g) (Supp. 1981), and these could overlap with robbery and larceny.
160. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(e),(f)(Supp. 1981), Theft offenses are also potentially in-
volved in burglary and housebreaking, which are also listed in the first factor. § 16-3-
20(C)(a)(1)(d), (g) (Supp. 1981).
161. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(4)(Supp. 1981).
162. - S.C. -, 284 S.E.2d 357 (1981).
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judge submitted and the jury found three aggravating circum-
stances: (1) robbery with a deadly weapon; (2) larceny with a
deadly weapon; and (3) murder for the purpose of pecuniary
gain. Because of the overlap and redundancy in the instruction
and finding, the defendant argued that the jury may have con-
sidered him as having three aggravating circumstances even
though there was only one theft. With a disappointing lack of
discussion and analysis, the supreme court simply concluded
that there was no error since "all three circumstances are in-
cluded in... [the statute] and thus are proper as determined
by the general assembly.
'163
The court's lack of analysis is unfortunate because there
were two important points to consider. First, the defendant ar-
gued that the fourth aggravating circumstance-murder for pe-
cuniary gain-should be limited to "murder-for-hire situa-
tions.16 4 Second, even if the fourth circumstance should be
interpreted more broadly, it is plausible to assume that the rea-
son the legislature included multiple theft-type crimes Was to
eliminate any gaps in its listing of aggravating circumstances,
rather than to increase artificially the number of aggravating cir-
cumstances in a particular case and thus increase the likelihood
of an unconstitutional and unjust abuse of discretion. If this is
the legislative concern, then theft should only function once as
an aggravating circumstance."1 5 Unfortunately, these concerns
are not addressed in the Woomer (2) opinion even though they
were raised in the defendant's brief.1""
163. Id. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 358.
164. Brief for Appellant at 27, Woomer (2). The statute is arguably broader than
murder-for-hire situations because it includes situations where the murderer commits
"the offense of murder for himself or another. . . ." § 16-3-20(C)(a)(4) (Supp. 1981)(em-
phasis added). In addition, the sixth aggravating circumstance, § 16-3-20(C)(a)(b)(Supp.
1981), also could be viewed as addressed to murder for hire since it addresses killing as
"an agent or employee of another person." The concern is not that the Woomer (2) inter-
pretation is necessarily wrong but that arguments for a narrow reading are simply ig-
nored in the court's opinion even though raised in the defendant's brief.
165. See, e.g., State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979), in which the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court should have instructed the jury
as to only one aggravating circumstance when two circumstances overlapped. The court
noted that an instruction as to both "amounted to an unnecessary duplication of the
circumstances enumerated in the statute, resulting in an automatic cumulation of aggra-
vating circumstances against the defendant." Id. at 29, 257 S.E.2d at 587. Accord, e.g.,
Provence v. Florida, 337 So.2d 783, 786 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969 (1977).
166. Brief for Appellant at 25-30, Woomer (2).
422 [Vol. 34
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The court's superficial treatment of the problem of overlap
is important because armed theft is the most common aggravat-
ing circumstance,1 67 and viewing it as multiple circumstances
will likely affect sentencing. Some solicitors, juries, and judges
may occasionally place undue weight on the number of factors
involved. It is interesting to note that the empirical study con-
ducted as part of this article indicates that the decision of the
solicitor to seek the death penalty is related to the treatment of
armed theft as more than one circumstance."8 Juries' decisions,
however, do not seem affected by this treatment of armed
theft.1 19 (Judges sentence to death so rarely that it is impossible
to make any generalizations concerning the effect of the treat-
ment of armed theft on their sentencing.) 170 While these statis-
tics are subject to considerable skepticism because of the under-
lying problem with the data used in completing the study, 71 the
statistics clearly indicate that persons may be wrongfully sen-
tenced to death because of the court's treatment of overlapping
theft circumstances. The lack of reliable data only serves to rein-
force a lack of confidence in those sentences.
(4) Construction of "Robbery," "'Larceny With a Deadly
Weapon," and "While in the Commission of the Following
Crimes on Acts"
In State v. Hyman,17 2 the court construed the statutory ag-
gravating circumstance of robbery with a deadly weapon, stating
that: (1) a gun used in a robbery is a deadly weapon even if it is
not operable; and (2) intent to steal need not have existed at the
time the defendant obtained possession of the stolen goods.1 73
These statements may be valid in terms of the substantive
crimes in South Carolina.174 However, they raise serious doubts
167. See infra notes 335-37 and accompanying text.
168. Id.
169. See infra Tables III, IV and V following note 347.
170. See infra Table III and text accompanying notes 341-46.
171. See infra notes 326-27 and accompanying text.
172. - S.C. -, 281 S.E.2d 209 (1981).
173. Id. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 213.
174. See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 273 S.C. 467, 470, 257 S.E.2d 231, 233 (1979)(un-
loaded gun as deadly weapon); State v. Craig, 116 S.C. 440, 442, 107 S.E. 926, 926
(1921)(intent to steal formed after obtaining possession); but see, e.g., W. McANINCH &
G. FAiREY, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 139-41 (S.C. Bar, CLE Div. 1982),
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about the wisdom 175 and constitutionality76 of the scheme of ag-
gravating circumstances because it is questionable whether the
use of an empty gun or the formation of an intent to steal after
the murder constitutes sufficiently serious additional wrongdo-
ing to justify the death penalty.
Because of conflicting jury decisions on robbery and larceny,
these problems were raised more explicitly in State v. Smart
[hereinafter cited as Smart 11].177 Robbery and larceny with a
deadly weapon were given as aggravating circumstances in the
jury instructions, and the jury found only larceny as an aggra-
vating circumstance.17 8 The jury recommended the death pen-
alty, and the defendant was so sentenced. 79 On appeal, the de-
fendant argued that the failure to find robbery indicated that
there was no intimidation and that, therefore, the jury impliedly
found that the taking and the intent to steal occurred after the
homicide since the victims would have been intimidated had the
theft occurred prior to their death.1 80 The defendant further ar-
gued that these statutory aggravating circumstances should not
be interpreted to include situations where the intent to steal was
formed after the homicides because this subsequent act did not
form a meaningful basis for sentencing this particular defendant
to death.1 81
Although the court has not yet ruled on this appeal, it
should hold in the defendant's favor and rule that a murder does
not occur "while in the commission of' a crime unless that ag-
gravating crime was meaningfully related to the murder rather
than to a subsequent act such as destruction of evidence or facil-
itation of escape.18 2 Such a ruling would be consistent with the
statutory purpose of insuring that only persons who clearly de-
serve execution should be sentenced to death.1 83 Moreover, a de-
which criticizes the reasoning of Craig.
175. See infra notes 887-89, 918-23 and accompanying text.
176. See infra note 767 and accompanying text.
177. No. 21812 slip op. (S.C. Nov. 23, 1982), Brief for Appellant at 70-86.
178. Record at 2480-83 Smart II.
179. Id.
180. Brief for Appellant at 74-75 Smart II.
181. Id. at 75-82.
182. See, e.g., People v. Green, 27 Ca. 3d 1, 59-62, 609 P.2d 460, 504-506, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 37-39 (1980).
183. See supra notes 108-32, 136-38 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
role that these aggravating circumstances play in determining which persons might justly
Vol. 34
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cision on this issue favorable to Smart would avoid serious ques-
tions about the constitutionality""' and justice 85 of the South
Carolina scheme.
(5) Vicarious Liability for the Aggravating Conduct of
Others
There are a variety of doctrines that make a person vicari-
ously liable for the acts of another-for example, a conspirator is
liable for the foreseeable acts of a co-conspirator committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy.88 The South Carolina Supreme
Court has never determined whether such doctrines can be used
to establish a statutory aggravating circumstance. Since the pur-
pose of the sentencing phase is to focus on the characteristics of
the particular defendant, using such doctrines in the sentencing
phase is questionable from the perspectives of basic policies,187
constitutional law,188 and justice.189
Nevertheless, the South Carolina Supreme Court approved
an approach that came very close to imposing such vicarious lia-
bility in State v. Woomer [hereinafter cited as Woomer (1)].190
During the guilt phase of the trial in this case, the judge admit-
ted evidence of conduct by a co-conspirator despite defendant's
objection that this evidence was highly imflammatory and preju-
dicial.' 91 The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that this was
not error because it was relevant to proof of the kidnapping of
the rape victim and because the defendant was "liable criminally
for everything done by his confederate incidental to the execu-
tion of the common design and purpose." 192 However, the opin-
be sentenced to death, see infra notes 884-85 and accompanying te t. For a discussion of
acts subsequent to the homicide that serve as nonstatutory aggravating circumstances,
see supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
184. See infra note 767 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 887-89, 918-23 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES 431-33 (S. Kadish & M. Paulsen, 3d ed. 1975); 16 AM. JuR. 2D Conspiracy
§§ 19, 20 (1979).
187. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text, and infra notes 436-80 and
accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 397-411, 436-506, 655-79, 768 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 888, 921 and accompanying text.
190. 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696 (1981).
191. Id. at 263, 277 S.E.2d at 699.
192. Id. at 264, 277 S.E.2d at 697.
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ion does not indicate how the commission of this rape relates to
the elements of kidnapping. As a result, although the rape was
not one of the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the
jury in sentencing Woomer to death, 193 it may have had some
influence on the sentencing decision while making no contribu-
tion to the guilt determination.
(6) Resentencing and the Prohibition of Double Jeopardy
In State v. Gilbert [hereinafter cited as Gilbert 1],194 the
jury was directed to consider whether one or more of the follow-
ing aggravating circumstances were supported by the evidence:
(1) armed robbery while armed with a deadly weapon; and (2)
larceny with use of a deadly weapon. The jury found that armed
robbery had occurred" 5 and indicated this pursuant to the stat-
utory requirement that it "designate in writing . . the aggra-
vating circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a
reasonable doubt."196
The sentencing decision was reversed on an unrelated
ground and the case was remanded for resentencing. At the re-
sentencing trial, the jury was once again asked to consider both
aggravating circumstances. This time the jury specifically found
that both existed and sentenced the defendant to death.197 The
defendant appealed and argued that the jury's failure to desig-
nate larceny as an aggravating circumstance in the first trial
constituted an implicit finding that the circumstance did not ex-
ist. The defendant argued that the resubmission of larceny with
use of a deadly weapon as an aggravating circumstance consti-
tuted double jeopardy.198
In State v. Gilbert [hereinafter cited as Gilbert II] the su-
preme court rejected this argument for three reasons. First, the
larceny finding was merely cumulative since the death penalty
could have been supported by only a finding of armed robbery.
Second, since robbery is essentially the commission of larceny by
force, the first jury's decision necessarily involved a finding of
193. Id. at 260, 277 S.E.2d at 697.
194. 273 S.C. 690, 258 S.E.2d 890 (1979).
195. Gilbert II, - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 182.
196. § 16-3-20(C)(Supp. 1981).
197. Gilbert II, - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 182.
198. Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 181.
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larceny with use of a deadly weapon even though they desig-
nated robbery alone as an aggravating circumstance. Third, the
interpretation and application of the double jeopardy clause
should be undertaken with a concern both for the rights of the
accused and for the social interest in punishing wrongdoers199
Justice Harwell dissented and criticized the majority's rea-
soning on two points. First, he argued that the failure to desig-
nate larceny in the first trial necessarily indicated an acquittal
on that issue.200 (His argument on this point does not address
the position that larceny is a lesser included offense in robbery.)
Second, he pointed out that additional aggravating circum-
stances are not simply redundant or cumulative because the jury
is given considerable discretion under the South Carolina pun-
ishment scheme. As a result, the
contention that the error is harmless since one other aggravat-
ing circumstance was found to exist beyond reasonable doubt
is without merit. The jury can recommend life even if an aggra-
vating circumstance is properly established. Thus, we can only
speculate as to whether this jury would have recommended
death had only the armed robbery circumstance been submit-
ted to it for consideration. This speculation is the sort of arbi-
trary factor which is intolerable in a case of this nature.201
Justice Harwell's position is preferable to the majority opin-
ion for two reasons. First, it is a more accurate reflection of the
underlying statutory policy of insuring that the death penalty is
only imposed where it is clearly justified.0 2 Second, the majority
opinion reflects the view that the statutory aggravating circum-
stances function as a "threshold" requirement-i.e., if one cir-
cumstance exists, then the death penalty is valid regardless of
whether other, perhaps improper, aggravating factors were con-
sidered.2 03 This view is subject to serious objections in terms of
the requirements of the statute, the constitution, and justice.20 4
199. Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 182.
200. Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 182-83 (Harwell, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 184, n.3.
202. See supra notes 108-32 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text, and infra notes 397-411, 436-
56, 487-506, 622-54, 766, 887, 918-23 and accompanying text.
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c. Mitigating Circumstances
(1) The Statutory Circumstances and the Broad Discretion
of the Sentencing Authority
The statute lists nine mitigating circumstances which must
be submitted to the jury if they are supported by the
evidence:
20 5
(1) The defendant had no significant history of prior criminal
conviction involving the use of violence against another person.
(2) The murder was committed while the defendant was under
the influence of mental or emotional disturbance;
(3) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or
consented to the act;
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder committed
by another person and his participation was relatively minor;
(5) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination
of another person;
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law was substantially impaired;
(7) The age or mentality of the defendant at the time of the
crime;
(8) The defendant was provoked by the victim into committing
the murder;
(9) The defendant was below the age of eighteen at the time of
the crime.2 6
These mitigating circumstances function differently than aggra-
vating circumstances because the trial court is given broader dis-
cretion where mitigation is concerned.
This broad discretion is reflected in two ways. First, the
statute provides that the jury (or the trial judge in a nonjury
case) shall consider not only the statutory mitigating circum-
stances but also "any mitigating circumstances otherwise au-
thorized or allowed by law. '207 The South Carolina Supreme
Court has interpreted the quoted language to mean a considera-
tion of "any aspect of defendant's character or record and any
205. § 16-3.20(C)(Supp. 1981).
206. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(Supp. 1981).
207. § 16-3-20(C)(Supp. 1981).
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circumstances of the offense proferred as a basis for a sentence
less than death which are supported by competent evidence."20 8
To implement this broad interpretation, the judge's instructions
must clearly indicate that the jury has such discretion and his
instructions concerning the statutory mitigating circumstances
must not imply that only these factors may be considered. How-
ever, nonstatutory mitigating factors need not be specifically
charged2 9 or submitted to the jury in writing as the statutory
circumstances must be.21 0 Second, in addition to its wide discre-
tion in finding mitigating circumstances, the jury must also be
instructed that it can recommend a life sentence even if no miti-
gating circumstances are found and even if aggravating circum-
stances exist.
2 11
(2) Circumstances Relating to the Mental, Psychological, or
Emotional Condition of the Defendant
Three of the statutory factors refer to the diminished capac-
ity of the defendant resulting from some mental, psychological,
or emotional condition.2 2 Since a person cannot be convicted of
murder if he satisfies the M'Naghten test of legal insanity,213
these circumstances apparently refer to some diminished capac-
ity rather than to the total lack of capacity referred to in the
M'Naghten test. In State v. Goolsby,1 4 this distinction was ap-
parently followed because the trial court refused to instruct the
jury on the defense of insanity2 5 but did instruct the jury on the
second and sixth statutory mitigating circumstances. 216 The dis-
tinction is also supported by State v. Shaw,2 17 which implied
that mental incapacity short of legal insanity is relevant to
208. State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 311, 278 S.E.2d 335, 339 (1981).
209. See State v. Plath, - S.C. -, -, 284 S.E.2d 221, 230 (1981).
210. Linder, 276 S.C. at 312, 278 S.E.2d at 339.
211. Woomer (2), - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 359; Woomer (1), 276 S.C. at 267,
277 S.E.2d at 702; Tyner I, 273 S.C. at 660, 258 S.E.2d at 566.
212. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(2), (6), (7)(Supp. 1981). See § 16-3-20(C)(b)(9)(Supp. 1981).
These subsections are quoted in the text accompanying note 133 supra.
213. State v. Cannon, 260 S.C. 537, 547-48, 197 S.E.2d 678, 682 (1973).
214. 275 S.C. 110, 268 S.E.2d 31, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1037 (1980).
215. Id. at 125, 268 S.E.2d at 39.
216. Record at 1794 Goolsby.
217. 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 957 (1979), reh'g denied,
444 U.S. 1027 (1980).
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sentencing."'
Unfortunately, however, the sentencing phase of capital
cases does not always reflect an appreciation of the distinction.
For example, in Tyner 1,219 there was evidence that the defen-
dant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his act or to con-
form his conduct to law was substantially impaired.120 However,
testimony on this question was phrased in terms of an all-or-
none knowledge of right and wrong or ability to obey the law.221
In addition, the trial court refused to charge the jury on sub-
stantial impairment 2 2 and this refusal was upheld on appeal.
223
Despite these rulings, the precise impact of Tyner is not clear
because the case was remanded for resentencing on other
grounds. At the second sentencing trial, the jury charge included
an instruction on impairment,22 but the testimony was still
phrased in all-or-none terms.2 2 5
Another unsettled issue is whether the reason for an impair-
ment or disturbance is relevant to these mitigating factors. In
particular, it is not clear whether two South Carolina rules have
been changed in capital sentencing. The first rule is that in-
sanity is a defense only if the defendant was suffering from a
mental disease or defect.2 26 If a person has an impairment but it
is not the result of a disease or defect, could this be charged as a
mitigating circumstance? The second rule is that voluntary in-
toxication is irrelevant to the determination of guilt of a
crime.227 If voluntary intoxication resulted in an impairment or
disturbance, would this be sufficient to require that the jury be
charged concerning the impairment or disturbance? The form
attached as an appendix to State v. Shaw suggests that a broad
interpretation will be used in both circumstances.228 Such an in-
218. Id. at 219 (Item A-8), 225 (Items D-4, -5), 231 (Item A-8), 237 (Items D-4, -5),
255 S.E.2d at 811 (Item A-8), 815 (Items D-4, -5), 820 (Item A-8), 824 (Items D-4, -5).
219. 273 S.C. 646, 258 S.E.2d 559 (1979).
220. Record at 1146-47, 1170-89 Tyner I.
221. Id. at 1170-89, 1190-92.
222. Id. at 1190-92.
223. 273 S.C. at 657-58, 258 S.E.2d at 565. The jury was charged as to the seventh
statutory circumstances. Record at 1190-92 Tyner I.
224. Record at 1074 Tyner II.
225. E.g., id. at 880-81, 883.
226. State v. Bundy, 24 S.C. 439 (1885).
227. See, e.g., State v. Vaughn, 268 S.C. 119, 125, 232 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1970).
228. The form used in State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 219 (Item A-8), 231 (Item A-8),
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terpretation is clearly the best approach to satisfy the require-
ments of policy, the constitution, and justice that the death pen-
alty only be imposed where it is appropriate.229
(3) Vicarious Liability
The fourth mitigating circumstance addresses circumstances
where an accomplice is vicariously liable for a murder commit-
ted by another.2 30 Although this factor is obviously relevant to
sentencing, it should be remembered that even if a jury is
charged with this circumstance, it could still impose the death
penalty. As a result, the inclusion of this circumstance can be
viewed as a legislative indication that a person can be sentenced
to death even if he did not commit the murder or even if he did
not intend the death of another. This result is clearly unjust
231
and probably unconstitutional.2 32 Consequently, this circum-
stance would either have to be stricken or construed very
narrowly.
(4) Burden of Proof
The South Carolina Supreme Court has never decided
whether the prosecution or the defense has the burden of show-
ing the absence or presence of mitigating circumstances.233 Since
the statute explicitly provides that the State must prove aggra-
vating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt,2 34 the lack of
such a provision for mitigating circumstances arguably indicates
255 S.E.2d 799, 811 (Item A-8), 820 (Item A-8) (1979), refers to "character or behavior
disorders" and suggests a broad interpretation of the cause of impairment or distur-
bance. Similarly, the facts indicate voluntary intoxication, id. at 197, 255 S.E.2d at 801,
and yet the form indicates that this intoxication was relevant to sentencing. Id. at 225
(Items D-4, -5), 226 (Item E-1), 237 (Items D-4, -5), 238 (Item E-1), 255 S.E.2d at 815-16
(Items D-4, -5), 816 Item E-1), 824 (Item D-4, -5), 825 (Item E-1).
229. See supra notes 108-32 and accompanying text, and infra notes 395-421, 436-
80, 487-507, 582-609, 774, 886, 911 and accompanying text.
230. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(4)(Supp. 1981).
231. See infra notes 736, 888-93, 922 and accompanying text.
232. See infra notes 706-36 and accompanying text.
233. In State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 278 S.E.2d 335 (1981), the court stated that
the "burden is upon the jury to weigh the evidence submitted and determine whether
the mitigating factor exists and, if so, the significance to be accorded it." Id. at 311, 278
S.E.2d at 339.
234. § 16-3-20(C)(Supp. 1981).
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an intent to place the burden as to these factors on the defense.
Moreover, the defendant will be presenting evidence as to miti-
gation and urging the jury to consider the mitigating circum-
stances. It makes sense, therefore, to at least place the burden of
going forward with the evidence on him. Imposing the burden of
going forward or of persuasion on the defense does not raise con-
stitutional problems because the lack of mitigating circum-
stances is not an element of the crime of murder. Consequently,
they are relevant only to sentencing and, like true "affirmative"
defenses, due process rights are not denied by requiring the de-
fense to prove their existence.2 35 Based on these considerations,
the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that the defense has
the burden of proving the existence of mitigating circumstances
by a preponderance of the evidence.23 6
Two problems arise with the approach adopted by North
Carolina. First, it could result in the jury adopting an overly
mechanical approach to the exercise of its discretion. For exam-
ple, an instruction that the defendant must prove the existence
of some mitigating circumstance might confuse the jury and
cause it to lose sight of the fact that it can recommend life im-
prisonment even if no mitigating circumstances exist. The likeli-
hood of such confusion is increased by the fact that the trial
judge need not explicitly instruct the jury as to nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances. 237 Consequently, the only way to in-
struct as to the burden of proof will be by a general charge,
which is likely to result in confusion. Second, one fundamental
concern underlying the South Carolina statute is to insure that
the death penalty is imposed only when the defendant clearly
deserves this punishment.23 8 This concern is best served by im-
posing life imprisonment when there is doubt as to the existence
of mitigating circumstances. Because of these problems, the best
instruction would include the following:
You should always remember that you may consider any
mitigating circumstances, even if they have not been specifi-
cally mentioned in this charge, so long as the mitigating cir-
235. See supra notes 55-77 and accompanying text, and infra note 758 and accom-
panying text.
236. State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 75-76, 257 S.E.2d 597, 617-18 (1979).
237. See State v. Plath, - S.C. -, -, 284 S.E.2d 221, 230 (1981).
238, See supra notes 108-32 and accompanying text.
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cumstances seem relevant to you. You should also remember
that you can recommend life imprisonment even if there are no
mitigating circumstances. If, however, your verdict will be af-
fected by a mitigating circumstance and if you are not sure
whether that circumstance was in fact present, then you should
consider it to be present unless the evidence clearly indicates
otherwise.
d. Relationship Between Aggravating and Mitigating
Circumstances
The South Carolina statute does not indicate how aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances are to function in the jury's
sentencing decision. No guidelines exist for weighing circum-
stances or for comparing mitigating circumstances with aggra-
vating circumstances. This lack has been challenged on the
ground that it provides the jury with an unconstitutionally large
amount of untrammelled discretion, but the supreme court has
rejected these attacks.2 39
This rejection and the court's failure to articulate such
guidelines on its own, are consistent with the basic model of sen-
tencing in South Carolina. One underlying concern of this model
is that the sentencing authority be given broad discretion to im-
pose life imprisonment to insure that the defendant clearly de-
serves death.24 0 This concern would be frustrated by some guide-
line such as: "The State must show that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances." Such an in-
struction provides less protection than the present South Caro-
lina rule that life imprisonment can be imposed despite the
presence of aggravating circumstances and the absence of miti-
gating circumstances.2 1
e. The Burden of Proof on the Ultimate Issue: Is the Death
Penalty Appropriate?
The statutory scheme and the cases do not discuss the bur-
239. State v. Thompson, - S.C. -, -, 292 S.E.2d 581, 584 (1982); State v. Shaw,
273 S.C. 194, 205, 255 S.E.2d 799, 804 (1979).
240. See supra notes 108-32 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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den of proof on the ultimate issue of whether the defendant de-
serves the death penalty. In order to avoid possible questions of
justice2 2 and comply with South Carolina's basic policy of assur-
ing that no person is sentenced to death unless he clearly de-
serves it,214 the State should be required to show beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant be sentenced to death.
f. The Role of the Jury
The sole task of the jury is to consider the relevant aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances in determining whether the
defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.
The need to limit the jury's consideration to this question while
also granting it the information and latitude necessary to make
an individualized decision has resulted in a number of issues.
(1) Effects of Decision
Several cases have addressed questions concerning whether
the jury should be informed concerning the effects of its decision
and all have held that the jury should not be so informed. For
example, the jury is not to be told life imprisonment will be im-
posed if it fails to reach a unanimous verdict. Such concerns are
for the trial judge, not the jury.24 Similarly, the jury should be
told nothing concerning eligibility for parole when the defendant
is sentenced to life imprisonment. 245 Finally, the jury should
never be told that its decision can be set aside by the trial judge
or the South Carolina Supreme Court because this may cause it
to place insufficient weight on the enormity of its task.246
242. See infra note 929 and accompanying text.
'243. See supra notes 108-32 and accompanying text.
244. State v. Adams, - S.C. , 283 S.E.2d 582, 587 (1981). At least one state,
taking the opposite position, required that the jury be told of the result of disagreement.
State v. Williams, 392 So. 2d 619, 633 (La. 1980).
245. Plath, - S.C. at , 284 S.E.2d at 229; State v. Goolsby, 275 S.C. 110, 124-25,
268 S.E.2d 31, 39 (1980).
246. Plath, - S.C. at , 284 S.E.2d at 230; Woomer (1), 276 S.C. 258, 267-70, 277
S.E.2d 696, 701-702; Gilbert I, 273 S.C. 690, 698, 258 S.E.2d 890, 894; Tyner I, 273 S.C.
646, 658-60, 258 S.E.2d 559, 565-66. The use of the statutory word "recommend" in the
judge's charge or the solicitor's closing argument to characterize the jury's sentencing
function sufficiently impresses upon the jury its heavy burden in deciding whether the
defendant should live or die. State v. Hyman, - S.C. , -, 281 S.E.2d 209, 214
(1981); State v. Linder, 276 S.C. at 310, 278 S.E.2d at 338-39.
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(2) The Propriety of Capital Punishment
The trial judge and jury must decide, based upon the evi-
dence relevant to the crime and the particular defendant,
whether the death penalty is appropriate in the specific case
before them.2 4 This discretionary decision should be based on
cultural and philosophical views concerning the circumstances
when capital punishment is appropriate. 248 Consequently, if the
evidence is not merely cumulative, persons who have studied the
question, such as ministers and professors of philosophy, should
be allowed to share their expertise. Social scientists should also
be allowed to testify regarding statistically reliable polls con-
cerning public opinion and studies of whether the death penalty
has a significant deterrent impact. To provide the jury with a
fuller understanding of the nature of its task, testimony con-
cerning executions and aspects associated with prisoners serving
life sentences should be admissible. The purpose of this evidence
is not to help the jury decide whether capital punishment is le-
gitimate, but to assist them in deciding whether this particular
defendant should be sentenced to death.
Only a few South Carolina cases contain any reference to
the admissibility of this type of evidence, and they do not reflect
a consistent pattern. Some suggestions have been made that
such evidence is irrelevant,24'9 but it is not clear whether these
247. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
248. One of the principal concerns in a line of Supreme Court cases considering the
constitutionality of the death penalty is the role of the jury in reflecting social attitudes
toward the death penalty both in general and in the circumstances of a particular case.
See, e.g., infra notes 483, 487-89, 513, 522, 661, 669 and accompanying text. As a result of
this concern, it is unconstitutional to exclude a juror on the basis of his beliefs unless
they would affect the juror's impartiality. See infra note 752 and accompanying text.
249. See State v. Thompson, - S.C. -, 292 S.E.2d 581 (1982); Gilbert II, - S.C.
-, 283 S.E.2d 179. There are two ways in which Gilbert II suggests a lack of concern for
the role of philosophical attitudes in making the individual sentencing decision. First,
the court held that a juror was properly excluded because she had spoken with her priest
about the Catholic Church's views on capital punishment. This exclusion was held not to
be an- abuse of the trial court's discretion because the "possible seating of this person
would have introduced an outside influence into the deliberations of this jury." Id. at
-, 283 S.E.2d at 181. Second, although the record did not indicate an offer of witnesses
to testify as to the propriety of the death penalty, the court held that such testimony
would have been irrelevant. To do so would be to "sacrifice judicial resources in consid-
ering the philosophical correctness of capital punishment since it has been legislatively
approved in a statutory complex we have previously examined and found to be constitu-
tional." Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 181. Unfortunately, Gilbert II does not consider the role
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indications are addressed to the use of the evidence in making
an individual decision or in making an improper decision con-
cerning the propriety of the death penalty. In general, as indi-
cated above, such expert evidence should be admitted250 to assist
in making the individual decision.251 On the other hand, ques-
tions about the death penalty as a general matter are not within
the discretion of the trial judge and jury. So long as the scheme
is constitutional, this broad question is for the legislature. Evi-
dence concerning the abstract propriety of the death penalty
2 52
that the cultural views of the church and other "experts" should play in deciding
whether a particular individual should be sentenced to death. As a result, the rule un-
derlying the Gilbert holding is so broadly based that it is probably unconstitutional. See
infra note 752 and accompanying text.
In Thompson, the court held that the trial judge did not err in quashing a subpoena
duces tecum directing the Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections to
bring the electric chair into the courtroom. The court stated that "the manner or nature
of capital punishment has been removed from consideration of juries." Thompson, -
S.C. at -, 292 S.E.2d at 587. This statement is correct so long as it is limited to the
general question of the method of execution. However, the jury should be informed con-
cerning the manner of execution if the evidence is not too inflamatory and if the jury is
clearly instructed that the information is only to be used to determine whether this par-
ticular defendant should be executed in this manner.
Cases in other jurisdictions are in conflict on this issue. Compare State v. Shriner,
386 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1980); Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 263 S.E.2d 666 (1980), cert.
denied 447 U.S. 930 (1980) reh'g. denied 448 U.S. 913 (1980); Irving v. State, 361 So. 2d
1360 (Miss. 1978); Johnson v. State, 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752 (1979); with, e.g., Mes-
ser v. State, 330 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1976); Commonwealth v. Moody, 476 Pa. 223, 382 A.2d
442 (1977), cert. denied sub nom Pennsylvania v. Moody, 438 U.S. 914 (1978).
250. See supra note 248. Numerous problems can arise if such evidence is ruled
inadmissible. For example, if evidence concerning the deterrent impact of the death pen-
alty is irrelevant, the trial judge will have to be extremely careful to insure that the
penalty is irrelevant, the trial judge will have to be extremely careful to insure that the
State is not allowed to refer to deterrence; and this could be impossible if such references
occurred during voir dire or during the closing arguments in the guilt stage. See SouTH-
ERN PovERTY LAW CENTER, TRIAL OF THE PENALTY PHASE 26 (1981). Similarly, if evidence
of the "brutality" of the murder is introduced and if the prosecutor stresses this "brutal-
ity," it seems only fair that the jury should also be aware of the possibly "brutal" nature
of the executions so that the jury can determine whether the particular defendant de-
serves such a death.
251. See, e.g., State v. Plath, - S.C. ., . 284 S.E.2d 221, 228-29 (1981). For
cases in other jurisdictions, see supra note 249.
252. Gilbert II, - S.C. -, .- , 283 S.E.2d 179, 181. The distinction between the
individualized decision to sentence a particular defendant to death and the general deci-
sion as to the propriety of any defendant being sentenced to death is reflected in § 16-3-
20(E)(Supp. 1981), which has been interpreted to mean that a prospective juror's views
on the death penalty are not a ground for exclusion unless they constitute a general
decision to reject the death penalty that will prevent him from following the statutory
scheme of sentencing. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
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or electrocution 53 is irrelevant, and jurors should be dismissed if
they cannot vote in accordance with the statute.' 5
(3) Commenting on the Evidence
If there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of ag-
gravating or mitigating circumstances, the judge must submit
this evidence to the jury,25 5 but he may not comment on the
weight of the evidence. 256 However, where there is no doubt
about whether a mitigating circumstance is present, the judge
must find the existence of that factor as a matter of law.
2 57
g. Closing Arguments
A basic principle of the criminal system is that, although
the solicitor should prosecute vigorously, his goal is not to con-
vict a particular defendant, but to accomplish justice. Thus, his
conduct during the trial and his closing arguments in particular,
must not mislead or confuse the jury or appeal to personal pas-
sions or prejudices. The trial judge is given broad discretion to
insure that the solicitor does not violate this standard. If the
trial judge upholds the solicitor's argument, then the defendant
on appeal has the burden of showing that, based on the record
as a whole, he was denied a fair hearing because of the solicitor's
closing argument.25 8
The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that the clos-
ing argument in the sentencing phase denies the defendant a fair
hearing if:
253. Thompson, - S.C. at -, 292 S.E.2d at 587. See discussion of Thompson at
supra note 249; Plath, - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 228. See State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194,
206, 255 S.E.2d 799, 805 (1979).
254. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
255. § 16-3-20(C)(Supp. 1981). Where the evidence does not support a mitigating
circumstance, it should not be submitted to the jury. State v. Hyman, C .. ,
281 S.E.2d 209, 214 (1981); Tyner I, 273 S.C. 646, 657-58, 258 S.E.2d 559, 565.
256. Plath, - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 228; State v. Adams, - S.C. at -, 283
S.E.2d at 587; State v. Linder, 276 S.C. at 311-12 S.E.2d at 339.
257. State v. Gill, 273 S.C. 190, 193, 255 S.E.2d 455, 457 (1979). The defendant in
Gill had an earlier conviction for statutory rape, and the court held that it was error for
the trial judge to refuse to find as a matter of law that this was not a crime involving the
use of violence against another so that the first mitigating circumstance would exist as a
matter of law.
258. Linder, 276 S.C. at 312, 278 S.E.2d at 339.
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(1) The solicitor informs the jury that the trial judge can im-
pose life imprisonment even if the jury recommends the death
penalty.
259
(2) The solicitor asserts that he will never again seek the death
penalty if the jury does not impose it in this case.260
(3) The solicitor injects his personal opinion into the jury's de-
liberation by arguing that in seeking the death penalty, he is




1. The Framework for Review of Capital Cases
When the death penalty is imposed, the normal appellate
process is altered in two ways.262 First, the review of a capital
case is not limited to errors preserved or asserted by the appel-
lant. Instead, the South Carolina Supreme Court has adopted
the doctrine of in favorem vitae and reviews the entire record to
determine whether any substantial error has been committed.2 3
This preference for life does not mean that errors cannot be
259. Plath, - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 230; Woomer (1), 276 S.C. at 269, 277
S.E.2d at 702; Gilbert I, 273 S.C. at 698, 258 S.E.2d at 894; Tyner I, 273 S.C. at 658-60,
258 S.E.2d at 565-66.
260. Plath, - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 230.
261. Woomer (2), - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 359-60.
262. Another significant difference in death sentence cases is that the South Caro-
lina Commission on Appellate Defense is often involved formally as counsel for the ap-
pellant or as amicus curiae or informally. In this way, appellants in capital cases often
have the advantage of institutional experience in preparing their appeal.
263. E.g., State v. Adams, - S.C. -, _ 283 S.E.2d 582, 584 (1981); State v.
Goolsby, 275 S.C. 110, 125, 128, 268 S.E.2d 31, 39, 41 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1037
(1981). In Goolsby, the court noted that:
[niormally, this Court will not consider on appeal any issue not raised and
preserved in the record of the court below.. . . However, in view of the doc-
trine of in favorem vitae which pervades this Court's review of all capital cases,
we have considered appellants argument on this question [even though it was
not raised in the trial]....
Id. at 125, 268 S.E.2d at 39. In addition, the court stated that:
[t]wo of the nineteen exceptions raised by the appellant were abandoned.
We have nevertheless considered the points and issues presented by them, and
concluded no error is present .... The transcript of proceedings in this case
exceeds 1800 pages. We have carefully reviewed the entire record for prejudi-
cial error apparent, but overlooked by counsel, and find none.
Id. at 128, 268 S.E,2d at 41.
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cured 26 or that the defendant may "create" errors by failing to
object at the trial level.265 Nor does it alter the usual rules that
discretionary rulings by the trial court are presumed correct,
266
and that evidence of factual issues resolved in favor of the State
will be viewed in the light most favorable to the state. 67 In other
words, in favorem vitae does not reflect a requirement that the
defendant be given a perfect hearing since it is always possible
to discover shortcomings after any trial. Rather, the goal is to
effectuate South Carolina's basic policy of taking every step to
insure that no person is sentenced to death without a hearing
that satisfies basic standards of fairness and rationality.
Despite the laudable goals of in favorem vitae, it presents
serious problems. For example, if a point might have been raised
on appeal but was not, does the affirmance of a death penalty
mean that the court has ruled adversely to the defendant on this
issue? 268 Another problem is that courts should not rule on an
issue without giving the parties notice that the issue will be de-
cided and an opportunity to brief the issue. These omissions
raise problems of both fairness and the reliability of judicial
decisionmaking.
The second difference in capital cases is that, although the
South Carolina Supreme Court normally reviews convictions and
sentences only when an appeal is filed, the sentence in all capital
punishment cases must be reviewed and this review must ad-
dress the concerns and follow the procedures set forth in the
statute.26 9 While this mandatory sentence review is in addition
264. See, e.g., Goolsby, 275 S.C. at 125, 126, 268 S.E.2d at 39, 40.
265. See, e.g., Plath, - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 228; Gilbert 1, 273 S.C. at 69697,
258 S.E.2d at 894.
266. E.g., Linder, 276 S.C. at 312, 278 S.E.2d at 339.
267. E.g., State v. Horace Butler, - S.C. -, .. 290 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1982).
268. An example of this type of problem is indicated by Tyner I and Tyner II. At
the first sentencing hearing, evidence concerning the defendant's "criminal character"
was admitted without objection, see supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text, but was
not discussed as a ground for reversal. See Tyner I, 273 S.C. 646, 258 S.E.2d 559. Thus,
it can be argued that the court approved the admission of such evidence. However, at the
second sentencing hearing, the trial judge refused to allow such testimony to be admit-
ted. Record at 890 Tyner II. Consequently, it is not clear what the law is on the issue of
evidence concerning recidivism and "psychopathic personalities."
269. § 16-3-25(A)(Supp. 1981) provides:
Whenever the death penalty is imposed, and upon the judgment becoming
final in the trial court, the sentence shall be reviewed on the record by the
Supreme Court of South Carolina. The clerk of the trial court, within ten days
43919821
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to review by direct appeal, both reviews are consolidated if the
defendant appeals.
2 7 0
This mandatory review of the death sentence is structured
by the statute in several ways. First, both the defendant and the
State are entitled to submit briefs and present oral arguments in
connection with this review.271 Second, the supreme court is au-
thorized to affirm the death penalty or to remand for resentenc-
ing. When a case is remanded, certain procedures are speci-
fied.2 7 2 Finally, the statute provides that in addition to the
correction of other errors,73 the court must determine the
following:
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the in-
fluence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and
(2) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or judge's find-
ings of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in
§ 16-3-20, and
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or dispropor-
tionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the crime and the defendant.
274
In fulfilling its responsibility to consider proportionality under
subsection (3) above, the court must "include in its decision a
reference to those similar cases which it took into
consideration."
27 5
after receiving the transcript, shall transmit the entire record and transcript to
the Supreme Court of South Carolina together with a notice prepared by the
clerk and a report prepared by the trial judge. The notice shall set forth the
title and docket number of the case, the name of the defendant and the name
and address of his attorney, a narrative statement of the judgment, the offense,
and the punishment prescribed. The report shall be in the form of a standard
questionnaire prepared and supplied by the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
270. § 16-3-25(B),(F)(Supp. 1981) provides:
(B) The Supreme Court of South Carolina shall consider the punishment
as well as any errors by way of appeal.
(F) The sentence review shall be in addition to direct appeal, if taken, and
the review and appeal shall be consolidated for consideration. The court shall
render its decision on all legal errors, the factual substantiation of the verdict,
and the validity of the sentence.
271. § 16-3-25(D)(Supp. 1981).
272. § 16-3-25(E)(Supp. 1981).
273. Id.
274. § 16-3-25(C)(Supp. 1981).
275. § 16-3-25(E)(Supp. 1981). This section also provides that when the court sets a
sentence aside and remands for resentencing- "The records of those similar cases re-
[Vol. 34440
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There are two possible views of the court's responsibility to
determine whether the death penalty is disproportionate in a
particular case.17 e First, it could mean that the court should
adopt a "relative" model of proportionality and insure that like
cases are treated alike. Under this view, a death sentence would
be disproportionate if other murderers similar to the defendant
were not sentenced to death. Second, it could mean that the
court should use an "objective" model and insure that the crime
and the criminal are sufficiently offensive so death is appropri-
ate. From this perspective, it does not matter that similar mur-
derers are not sentenced to death so long as the defendant and
his conduct are sufficiently wrongful in some "objective" or "ab-
solute" sense. However, it is important to consider cases when
death has been imposed and affirmed because they provide ex-
amples of cases in which the death penalty is deserved in this
objective sense.
Several reasons indicate that South Carolina has adopted
the second model of proportionality review. First, in complying
with its duty to refer to similar cases which it took into consider-
ation, the court only cites cases in which the death penalty was
imposed and affirmed on appeal. In addition, the court has
shown little concern with monitoring decisions of prosecutors or
juries in favor of life imprisonment. 27 1 Thus, the court appar-
ferred to by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in its decision, and the extracts pre-
pared as hereinafter provided for, shall be provided to the resentencing judge for his
consideration." The meaning of the phase "extracts prepared as hereinafter provided
for" is somewhat unclear since there is no later provision for such extracts. The phrase
was apparently left inadvertently when the Georgia statute was modified for use in
South Carolina. See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537 (Supp. 1975).
276. See infra notes 936-52 and accompanying text for further discussion of
proportionality.
277. State v. Thompson, - S.C. at -, 292 S.E.2d at 584 n.1. See State v. Horace
Butler, - S.C. at -, 290 S.E.2d at 4; Gilbert II, - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 182;
State v. Hyman, - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 213. The imposition of the death penalty
was also upheld in State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979), but no compari-
sons were made because Shaw was the first case to be decided by the court under the
new statute. Id. at 211, 255 S.E.2d at 807. In Thompson, the court held that this focus on
death penalty cases for proportionality review is constitutional. - S.C. at -, 292
S.E.2d at 584.
278. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of prosecutorial
discretion. The court's lack of concern with life imprisonment cases is reflected both in
its failure to consider these cases in its proportionality review, see cases cited in notes
279-81 infra, and in its possible failure to adopt administrative mechanisms for such
review. See infra notes 305-06 and accompanying text. It should be noted that the stat-
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ently does not compare death penalty cases with cases in which
the death penalty was not imposed.279 Second, the approach of
the court's opinions reflects a focus on the objective wrongful-
ness of the defendant and his act. For example, in State v. Hy-
man,280 the court simply states: "The record clearly reflects ap-
pellant planned, prepared and committed a brutal crime for the
purpose of obtaining money. The death penalty is proportionate
to a crime of this nature and to the crime and defendant in this
case. ' 281 Third, when the court considered an argument that the
death penalty was not imposed in a manner that reflected rela-
tive proportionality, it rejected the challenge because there was
no showing of purposeful discrimination.28 2
While there are valid reasons for the adoption of the second
model of proportionality review,283 there are nevertheless several
problems involved in the way the court applies this model. First,
the South Carolina Supreme Court has never reversed a convic-
tion for lack of proportionality, and its decisions upholding the
death penalty contain only brief, conclusory discussions of pro-
ute also reflects a similar indifference since it provides no mechanisms for automatic
review or monitoring of life imprisonment sentences.
279. In Thompson, - S.C. -, 292 S.E.2d 581, the defendant argued: "that the
scope of review of death penalty cases is too narrow (comparing only prior capital cases
tried under the present death penalty statute) and therefore unconstitutional." Id. at
-, 292 S.E.2d at 584. The court rejected this challenge. It also rejected an asserted right
of access "to the cases with which the Supreme Court compares each death sentence."
Id. at -, 292 S.E.2d at 584. However, the court also indicated in a footnote that the
death penalty had been compared to three specific cases-all of which involved an af-
firmance of the death penalty-and noted that: "[tihe transcripts, briefs, and opinions in
those cases used for comparison purposes are public records; thus, the defendant in fact
has access to the same information available to the Court." Id. at _, 292 S.E.2d at 584
n.1.
280. - S.C. -, 281 S.E.2d 209 (1981).
281. d. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 215. A similar focus on the crime and criminal and the
lack of concern with relative sentencing patterns is reflected in State v. Horace Butler,
- S.C. -, 290 S.E.2d 1 (1982), by the Court's statement that: "[the record clearly
reflects appellant maliciously and purposefully committed a brutal murder accompanied
by rape. The death penalty is proportionate to a crime of this nature and to the crime
and defendant in this case." Id. at -, 290 S.E.2d at 4.
282. In State v. Hyman, - S.C. -, 281 S.E.2d 209 (1981), the appellant chal-
lenged the South Carolina statute as unconstitutional because it is disproportionately
imposed on persons who killed white persons. The court denied the challenge because
the appellant had made no showing of purposeful discrimination. Id. at , 281 S.E.2d
at 213.
283. See infra note 298 and accompanying text.
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portionality.84 Consequently, it is impossible to determine how
such decisions are made. Furthermore, it is unclear what, if any,
theory of objective proportionality was used. Second, the South
Carolina Supreme Court, unfortunately, has no way of knowing
whether offensive patterns that reflect improper relative dispro-
portionality are developing-for example, patterns based on
race. 2 5 Finally, since the court does not fully monitor all murder
cases,28 6 it has no systematic way of learning prosecutors' and
jurors' views concerning these crimes and criminals which are
not sufficiently wrongful to warrant the death penalty. This lack
of data on cultural views of proportionality raises questions
about the constitutionality and justice28 7 of the South Carolina
scheme, particularly since the South Carolina Supreme Court
seems to lack a noncultural model of objective proportionality
and has indicated disinterest in philosophical views of
proportionality. s
The inadequacy of the court's approach to objective propor-
tionality review is also reflected in cases where the death sen-
tence was reversed on grounds unrelated to proportionality and
the case was remanded for resentencing. For example, in State
v. Tyner,8 the court implicitly approved the death penalty for
an eighteen year old black youth who was mentally retarded and
whose ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act was im-
paired.29 0 This inability distinguishes him from the serious
284. See supra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
285. See Jacoby & Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity and Jury Packing: Further
Challenges to the Death Penalty, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379 (1982). See infra
notes 950-52 and accompanying text.
286. See infra notes 305-06 and accompanying text.
287. See infra notes 780-85, 864-69, 931-32, 947-49 and accompanying text.
288. Gilbert II, - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 181. See supra note 249. While the
Gilbert II opinion refers to the philosophical and constitutional validity of the scheme as
opposed to the validity of an individual decision, proportionality review cannot be done
justly without an underlying view as to the purposes of capital punishment. See infra
notes 820-949 and accompanying text. Thus, the court's rejection of the need to consider
why capital punishment is just results in the lack of a philosophical framework to guide
proportionality review.
289. 273 S.C. 646, 258 S.E.2d 559 (1979).
290. See supra notes 219-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of these handi-
caps. On September 12, 1982, Tyner was killed in prison by a bomb. Six persons have
been indicted for his murder. The State (Columbia, S.C.), Oct. 6, 1982, at 1-A. At the
second sentencing, Tyner was again sentenced to death. His appeal from this sentence
was pending at the time of his death.
1982]
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wrongdoer without such an impairment.29 1 He cannot be de-
terred more by the threat of death than by life imprisonment
because he lacks the mental capacity to make such distinc-
tions.292 His inability to appreciate his wrongdoing may indicate
a need to restrain him for life in order to protect society,9 3 but
this goal could be accomplished by life imprisonment. Conse-
quently, there is good reason to say that the death penalty is
disproportionate in his case. The court's failure to even consider
this problem in its remand decision strongly suggests that the
court either has no model of objective proportionality or that its
model is inadequate to satisfy the requirements of justice29 4 and,
perhaps, the Constitution.
295
The significance of these problems becomes clear upon con-
sidering the facts of the cases in which the South Carolina Su-
preme Court has upheld the imposition of the death penalty.
Three defendants committed crimes that involved brutality and
rape,96 while the four defendants in the remaining cases were
guilty of a murder committed with armed theft as the only ag-
gravating circumstance.2 7 Perhaps good reason exists to adopt
the view that murderers who commit brutal rapes are the kind
of "bad" criminals who "should" be sentenced to death.29 8 How-
ever, murderers who commit armed robbery do not so clearly ap-
pear to deserve death.2 99 The doubt about the propriety of death
in these circumstances is supported by the large number of
291. See infra notes 878-83, 894-935 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the
importance of a person's wrong-doing.
292. See infra notes 820-77 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the impor-
tance of such a deterrent impact.
293. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 291, 293 and accompanying text.
295. See infra notes 774, 780-85, 936-49 and accompanying text. The constitutional
problem results primarily from the lack of a retributive or a deterrent rationale to justify
the death penalty in such a case. See supra notes 291, 293 and accompanying text, and
e.g., infra notes 495, 515, 522-24, 664-68 and accompanying text.
296. State v. Horace Butler, - S.C. -, 290 S.E.2d 1 (1982); State v. Shaw, 273
S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979). Armed robbery was also involved. Since Shaw involved
two defendants, three such death sentences have been upheld.
297. State v. Thompson, - S.C. -, 292 S.E.2d 581 (1982); Gilbert II, - S.C. -,
283 S.E.2d 179; State v. Hyman, - S.C. -, 281 S.E.2d 209 (1981). Since Gilbert II
involved two defendants, four such death sentences have been upheld.
298.See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 601-604 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
See infra notes 484, 910 and accompanying text.
299. See infra note 668 and accompanying text.
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South Carolina cases where persons who commit murder while
engaged in an armed robbery have not been sentenced to
death.300 The sheer number of these cases suggests a cultural
view that the death penalty is proper only in particular types of
armed robbery situations. Consequently, even if the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court is not concerned with relative proportional-
ity, it should at least articulate reasons for holding that capital
punishment is proper for only a small proportion of those mur-
derers who commit armed robbery. However, only one of these
decisions contains even a slight indication of the reason for view-
ing the murder committed during an armed robbery as particu-
larly wrongful.301 As a result, the court appears to have adopted
a mechanical approach to proportionality review-i.e., so long as
the facts reveal that one statutory aggravating circumstance was
shown, the defendant's sentence is not disproportionate. Such a
"threshold" type approach to review of sentencing is clearly
inadequate.3
0 2
2. Administrative Mechanisms for Monitoring Sentencing
Patterns
In addition to considering cases pursuant to the statutory
review process, the South Carolina Supreme Court has adopted
administrative procedures for monitoring capital cases. 30 3 When
the solicitor thinks he may seek the death penalty, he must fill
out a form and send it to the South Carolina Court Administra-
300. See infra notes 337, 348 and accompanying text.
301. In the proportionality review portion of State v. Thompson, - S.C. -, 292
S.E.2d 581 (1982), the court noted that: "[u]pon entering Mr. Toubia's store to rob him,
appellant immediately shot him once. Before leaving the store with the fruits of the
crime, appellant shot him again." Id. at -_ 292 S.E.2d at 584. In State v. Hyman, -
S.C. -, 281 S.E.2d 209 (1981), the court referred to a "brutal crime for the purpose of
obtaining money," id. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 215, but it is not clear whether the term
"brutal" adds something to the armed robbery and if so, what renders an armed robbery
brutal is not clear. In Gilbert H, - S.C. -_ 283 S.E.2d 179 (1981), the court simply
states that the death penalty is proportionate to a crime of this nature. Id. at ., 283
S.E.2d at 182.
302. See supra notes 146-50, 203-04 and accompanying text.
303. The information about monitoring of cases by the South Carolina Supreme
Court staff is based on interviews with staff attorneys of the court and on a review of
reports concerning that monitoring. In addition to the summary sheets and the case
summaries discussed in the text, the staff at one time began to develop a file based on
aggravating circumstances to determine if sentencing patterns were developing.
1982] 445
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tor advising of this fact.30 4 A copy of each form card is then for-
warded to the South Carolina Supreme Court. The court staff
monitors these cases and periodically prepares summary sheets
indicating the following information for all the cases that have
been tried: (1) the case name; (2) the trial date; (3) the trial
judge; (4) the plea; (5) the sentence sought; (6) the sentence re-
ceived; (7) the aggravating circumstances established; (8) the ap-
peal taken, if any; and (9) the post conviction relief sought.
These summaries are available to the public, but individual case
summaries, also prepared by the staff, are for the exclusive use
of the court.305
The role of these administrative mechanisms in the cout's
review process is not clear, 06 but two conclusions seem logical.
First, the court is not monitoring cases in which life imprison-
ment is sought since the form cards and the summary sheets do
not address such cases. Second, the court's administrative review
process focuses on whether aggravating circumstances were es-
tablished; mitigating circumstances are not stressed.
It is tempting to criticize these administrative procedures
because of the apparent lack of interest in all noncapital murder
cases and mitigating circumstances. However, while this lack of
304. These forms are usually sent in as required.
305. Attempts to subpoena these summaries or to question the Chief Staff Attorney
of the Court concerning their compilation or use have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Roach
v. Martin, No. 81-1907-1 (D.S.C. May 7, 1982)(order denying deposition of Clyde Davis,
Staff attorney to South Carolina Supreme Court). Because of this resistance to produce
the reports, it is not clear whether summaries are prepared for cases in which the defen-
dant was sentenced to life imprisonment.
306. There are two reasons for this uncertainty. First, the court has successfully re-
sisted attempts to use discovery procedures to investigate its decision processes. See
supra note 305. Second, the decisions have not provided any meaningful guidance. For
example, in State v. Thompson, - S.C. -, 292 S.E.2d 581 (1982), the court held that
the defendant's death penalty was proportional to similar cases and cited State v. Shaw,
273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 957 (1979) and State v. Hyman, -
S.C. -, 281 SE.2d 229 (1981). The court then noted: "The transcripts, briefs and opin-
ions in those cases used for comparison purposes are public records; thus the defendant
in fact has access to the same information available to the Court." Thompson, - S.C. at
-, 292 S.E.2d at 584 n.1. This note suggests that these administrative mechanisms are
not used. However, at another point in Thompson, the court rejected the defendant's
assertion that he had "a right of access to the cases with which the Supreme Court com-
pares each death sentence." Id. at -, 292 S.E.2d at 584. This rejection seems unneces-
sary if the defendant does indeed have the same access. Moreover, it seems unlikely that
the court has directed its staff to collect data which it never uses.
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interest is unfortunate,0 it can be defended on several grounds.
First, the focus on established aggravating circumstances is un-
derstandable since the statute requires an explicit finding that
one of these circumstances be found by the sentencing authority.
Second, the model of proportionality review used by the South
Carolina Supreme Court focuses on very bad defendants3 0 8 not
on relative proportionality, so it is not surprising that the ad-
ministrative procedures focus primarily on cases in which the
death penalty is imposed. Third, the statute does not require
such administrative efforts, so these efforts indicate the court's
willingness to look more deeply into death penalty cases. Finally,
the supreme court and its staff lack the resources to undertake
the kind of statistical analysis necessary for a meaningful survey
of the patterns in all murder cases.
E. Certiorari, Post Conviction Relief, and the Lengthy
Nature of Capital Proceedings
Although all convicted criminals are entitled to petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court" 9 and to petition
for post conviction relief,310 the availability of this right is par-
ticularly important in capital cases for two reasons. First, be-
cause the death penalty is so extreme and irrevocable, post con-
viction remedies are virtually always pursued and stays of
execution are virtually automatic during these post conviction
307. See supra notes 283-88 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 278-82 and accompanying text.
309. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
310. Post conviction relief may be pursued both in the South Carolina state courts,
see §§ 17-27-10 to -120 (1976), and in the federal courts through a petition for habeas
corpus, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 to 2255 (1971). For general discussions of post conviction
relief, see, e.g., R. POPPER, POsT-CoNVICTON REMEDIES (1978); L. YACKLE, PosT-CoNwc-
TION REMEDIES (1981); Note, Administering the Death Penalty, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
101 (1982). Although there are limits on successive collateral attacks, see, e.g., R. POPPER,
supra at §§ 10.1-10.6, a single unsuccessful use of post-conviction proceedings would in-
volve at least the following six steps: (1) Petition to South Carolina circuit court for
post-conviction relief; (2) appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court; (3) petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court; (4) petition for writ of habeas corpus to
the United States District Court (which is usually referred to a magistrate for an initial
review before consideration by the court); (5) appeal to the Federal Court of Appeals;
and (6) petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. For any claim,
steps (4), (5), and (6) cannot precede steps (1), (2), and (3) because the federal court will
not consider a decision until state remedies are exhausted. Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct.
1198 (1982).
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proceedings. 311 Second, given this pattern of stays and the
length of time involved in completing these proceedings, 12 the
execution usually cannot occur until at least several years after
the murder. If any of the petitions are successful, then a retrial
may be necessary, and it could take even more years to complete
the process of conviction, appeal, post conviction proceedings,
and finally, execution.
The time involved is important because it is relevant to sev-
eral considerations raised in discussing the death penalty. First,
to the extent we are concerned with the "badness" of the defen-
dant,3 13 the person who is executed is very likely to have
changed considerably since the crime. 31 4 Second, despite its lack
of legitimacy as a justification, community outrage has been
given as a reason for the death penalty.31 5 Such outrage is likely
to have dissipated considerably by the time of execution. Fi-
nally, the death penalty is surprisingly expensive, considering
the cost of the proceedings and the accompanying incarceration
pending those proceedings. Thus, even if it were legitimate to
justify the death penalty on the ground that it is cheaper than
life imprisonment,1 6 it appears the death penalty may be com-
paratively more expensive than life imprisonment.3 1 7
311. See, e.g., Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487, 490-92 (4th Cir. 1980).
312. See supra note 310 for a discussion of the steps involved. Each step will involve
time tables, for example, time tables for filing notices of appeal and briefing. Conse-
quently, even unsuccessful proceedings are lengthy. For an example of the delay involved
and criticism of the length of this delay, see Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 956-64
(1982)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Note, Administering the Death Penalty, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 101 (1982).
313. See supra notes 276-302 and accompanying text, and infra notes 894-910, 941-
49 and accompanying text.
314. See infra notes 901, 904 and accompanying text.
315. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-84 (1976); W. BERNS, FOR CA'ITAL
PUNISHMENT. CRIME AND THE MORALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1979); Berns, Defending
the Death Penalty, 26 CRIME AND DELINQ. 503 (1980). However, outrage is not a legiti-
mate basis for capital punishment. See infra notes 521, 526, 803-16, 854, 871 and accom-
panying text. In Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949 (1980), Justice Rehnquist dissented
from the denial of certiorari and argued that the solution is to expedite the process. Id.
at 963. For a criticism of this proposal and a review of the problem and of other propos-
als, see Note, Administering the Death Penalty, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 101 (1982).
316. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 355, 357-58 (1972) (Marshall, J. con-
curring), for a consideration and rejection of this justification. The basic problem with
the justification is that it does not grant persons the respect to which they are entitled.
See infra notes 862-63, 872 and accompanying text.








A full consideration of the death penalty in South Carolina
includes the Governor's authority "to grant reprieves and to
commute a sentence of death to that of life imprisonment. '318
Petitions for a reprieve may be referred by the Governor to the
Probation, Parole, and Pardon Board for recommendations.3 19
The Governor need not refer the petition to the Board or follow
its recommendation.3 20 However, when he does not follow its rec-
ommendation, he must submit his reasons to the General As-
sembly.321 Due to the absence of petitions for clemency in recent
years, it is not possible to say anything about the practice of
commutation in South Carolina.
3 22
G. Patterns of Sentencing - An Empirical Study
323
1. The Data Base
Murder cases are administratively monitored in two ways in
South Carolina. First, as indicated above,21 solicitors submit a
form when they expect to seek the death penalty and send a
copy of the forms to the supreme court. The supreme court's
staff updates these cards to indicate the trial date, judge, plea,
sentence received, aggravating circumstances established at trial,
and status of the case on the appellate level.3 24Second, the South
Carolina Attorney General's Office periodically generates a com-
puter printout updating the status of all indictments, including
murder indictments, issued in the State during a designated
time period. Although this printout contains basically the same
318. S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 14. Because the Probation, Parole, and Pardon Board has
the right of granting all other clemency, the language quoted in the text encompasses all
the clemency power of the governor. § 24-21-920 (1976). See S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
319. § 24-21-910 (1976).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. For a recommendation concerning the possible future exercise of this power,
see infra note 904 and accompanying text.
323. The data for this study was compiled exclusively by Brent Burry. A copy of the
data sources and of various tabulations by Mr. Burry is on file with the South Carolina
Law Review.
323.1. See supra notes 303-08 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 303-08 and accompanying text.
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information as the South Carolina Supreme Court records, it
does not contain information on aggravating circumstances.
During the fall of 1981, the form cards on file at the South
Carolina Supreme Court were reviewed to determine the pat-
terns of sentencing that might be developing in the state. 25 The
forms on file during this time contained data on 128 cases and
this information formed the initial data base for this study. The
information on the forms was verified by cross-referencing each
case with the information available from the Attorney General's
Office and with published opinions of the South Carolina Su-
preme Court.
Comparisons based on the forms for these cases are subject
to a number of problems. First, the number of cases involved is
small, particularly when subcategories are considered. Second,
murder cases in which the death penalty was not considered are
not included because the solicitor would not be required to send
in a card. Third, the form cards do not list the mitigating cir-
cumstances offered by defendants. Consequently, all compari-
sons are based solely on statutory aggravating circumstances.
Fourth, data concerning prosecutorial decisions not to seek the
death penalty after submitting the forms is often inadequate. 2
Finally, because of limitations of time and resources, trial court
records were not consulted to augment or verify the information
contained in the Attorney General's computer records or the
South Carolina Supreme Court files. This lack of further investi-
gation had two results. First, thirty-one cases were eliminated
because there were insufficient data to include them in a valid
comparison.3 27 Second, in some of the remaining ninety-seven
cases, it was necessary to assume that the form cards were a
complete and reliable indication of the relevant data.
2. Summary of Data
The data base contains ninety-seven cases in which the
death penalty was considered.3 28 The following illustration indi-
325. See supra note 323.
326. See, e.g. infra notes 333, 336 and accompanying text.
327. Seventeen cases lacked sufficient data because they were decided so recently or
because no report was filed. In the remaining fourteen cases, the report failed to indicate
the sentence received or the aggravating circumstances established at trial.
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cates the disposition of these cases:
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329. The disposition of these eleven cases was as follows:
(1) Eight defendants were convicted of lesser offenses:
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(b) Timothy Brown; Anderson Co./Apr. 1980; voluntary
manslaughter.
(c) Debby Dover; Spartanburg Co./Aug. 1980; accessory after the
fact to murder.
(d) Joseph Geter; Lee Co./Oct. 1978; voluntary manslaughter,
armed robbery.
(e) John Hoffman, Jr.; Georgetown Co./Nov. 1977; accessory before
the fact to murder.
(f) Isiah James, Jr.; Sumter Co./June 1979; voluntary manslaughter,
armed robbery.
(g) Joseph Moultrie; Beaufort Co./Mar. 1978; voluntary
manslaughter.
(h) Melvin West; Edgefield Co./Feb. 1978; accessory after the fact
to murder, armed robbery.
(2) Two defendants' trials ended in a mistrial:
(a) Washie Allen; Dorchester Co./Oct. 1980
(b) Roosevelt Bryan; Aiken Co./Mar. 1980
(3) One defendant was acquitted on retrial:
(a) Michael Linder; Colleton Co.Nov. 1981
330. The seven persons whose death sentence have been affirmed are: (1) Shaw, (2)
Roach, (3) Butler, (4) Hyman, (5) Gilbert, (6) Gleaton, and (7) Thompson. See supra
notes 277, 296-97 and accompanying text.
331. Because of the time span involved in the study, some of the same persons and
crimes are treated as more than one case. For example, two defendants, Gilbert and
Gleaton, are counted in both the "reversed and remanded for retrial and sentencing"
category and in the "affirmed" category. They are also counted twice in cases in which
the death penalty is sought. The study treats these defendants as separate cases because
all of these proceedings involved prosecutorial and jury discretion and because this treat-
ment is necessary for a consistent tabulation of cases.
The following list indicates the cases remanded for a retrial on sentencing and the
disposition of each: State v. Plath, - S.C. -, 284 S.E.2d 221 (1981)(two defendants,
Plath and Arnold, status unknown); State v. Goolsby, 275 S.C. 110, 268 S.E.2d 31 (1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1037 (1981)(jury could not reach a unanimous decision; sentenced
to life imprisonment by judge; not appealed); Gilbert 1, 273 S.C. 690, 258 S.E.2d 890 (two
defendants, Gilbert and Gleaton, resentenced to death, sentences affirmed in Gilbert II,
- S.C. -, 283 S.E.2d 179; Tyner I, 273 S.C. 646, 258 S.E.2d 559 (resentenced to death,
appeal pending in Tyner II, - S.C. -, - S.E.2d - (argued Oct. 6, 1981)); Woomer
(1), 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696 (resentenced to death, appeal filed March 9, 1982).
The following list indicates the cases remanded for a retrial on guilt and the disposi-
tion of each: State v. James Butler, - S.C. -, 290 S.E.2d 420 (1982)(status unknown);
Woomer (2), - S.C. -, 284 S.E.2d 357 (status unknown); State v. Adams, - S.C. -,
283 S.E.2d 582 (1981)(convicted of murder; sentenced to death; status unknown); State
v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 278 S.E.2d 335 (1981)(acquitted). State v. Gill, 273 S.C. 190, 255
S.E.2d 455 (1979) (convicted of murder; sentenced to life imprisonment; appeal dismissed
at appellant's request).
332. The three pending cases are: Woomer (1), No. - (S.C. filed March 9, 1982);
Smart II, No. 21812 slip op. (S.C. Nov. 23, 1982); Tyner II, No. - (S.C. argued Oct.
6, 1981). Tyner II will soon be dismissed because of Rudolph Tyner's death. See supra
note 290.
62




Because no forms were submitted for cases in which the
prosecution never seriously considered seeking the death pen-
alty, precise conclusions about the exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion are not possible. In addition, when the solicitor submits
a card, the form contains no indication of the factors that might
affect a subsequent decision not to seek the death penalty."
With these limitations in mind, the ninety-seven cases in the
data pool can be considered to determine whether they indicate
possible patterns of prosecutorial discretion.
The solicitor considered but did not seek the death penalty
in thirty of the ninety-seven cases in the data base. The follow-
ing illustration indicates the disposition of these cases.
ILLUSTRATION II - DISPOSITION OF CASES
WHERE DEATH CONSIDERED BUT NOT SOUGHT
The forms indicate that a plea bargain was involved in fourteen
333. See infra text accompanying note 336, for an indication of similar problems
concerning the initial decision to seek the death penalty.
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of the twenty-two cases in which the defendant pled guilty to
murder.
Solicitors sought the death penalty in sixty-seven of the
ninety-seven cases in which the death penalty was initially con-
sidered. The table below suggests the relationship between the
number of aggravating factors and the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in these ninety-seven cases.
TABLE I - PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
AND NUMBER OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Number of aggravating Death sought Death not sought Totals
circumstances
3 5 133 6
2 15 4 19
1 46 23 69
0 0 1 1
No information available 1 1 2
Totals .67 30 97
Because the data base is subject to the basic flaws listed above,
these tabulations should be viewed with considerable skepticism.
The following table indicates the possible relationship be-
tween the South Carolina Supreme Court's treatment of over-
lapping circumstances33 5 and prosecutorial discretion.
334. This case is the result of a plea bargain in State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255
S.E.2d 799 (1979). For a discussion of this exercise of prosecutorial discretion, see supra
notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 159-71 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 34
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The above table suggests that the treatment of armed robbery
and larceny with a deadly weapon as different circumstances
may be related to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. When
they are treated as two circumstances, the death penalty always
has been sought regardless of whether other aggravating circum-
stances exist. When they are treated as one circumstance and
there are no non-theft aggravating circumstances, the death pen-
alty is sought in only 55 percent of these cases. However, the
forms provide the only data for some cases, and they may not
provide accurate and complete data on this question. Moreover,
given the limitations of the data base, it is not possible to deter-
mine whether the decision to seek the death penalty results in
the treatment of the theft offense as two circumstances, whether
the causal basis of the correlation is reversed, or whether some
unrelated factors cause the relationship.3 6 In any event, the cor-
relation is so substantial that it may be important to the system
of capital punishment, because armed robbery is the most com-
mon aggravating circumstances in death penalty cases. Table II
also indicates three other points concerning the ninety-seven
cases in the data base: (1) theft was involved in sixty-nine of the
cases in which solicitors considered the death penalty (71 per-
cent of the total); (2) theft was the only aggravating circum-
stance in fifty-six of the cases (59 percent of the total); and (3)
prosecutors sought the death penalty in forty-one of the fifth-six
cases in which theft crimes were the only statutory aggravating
circumstance (73 percent). Despite the flaws in the data base,
these tabulations indicate both the important role that armed
theft plays in deciding who is sentenced to death in South Caro-
lina and the need for care in treating overlapping
circumstances.8s
336. See supra text accompanying note 333. For an indication of similar problems
concerning the decision not to seek the death penalty after it was initially considered.
See supra note 297 and accompanying text. The study based the percentage of cases in
which the State sought the death penalty when a theft crime was treated as one circum-
stance and no non-theft aggravating circumstances were present on the comparison of
the following figures: (1) The 33 cases in which theft was considered to be one circum-
stance, no other aggravating circumstances were indicated, and death was sought; and (2).
the 59 cases in which theft was considered as only one circumstance. If these 33 cases are
compared with all cases in which theft was regarded as one circumstance and no addi-
tional circumstances existed, then the percentage would be 69%.
337. This role is indicated also by the seven cases in which the death penalty was
upheld, because four involved only armed theft as one or more aggravating
[Vol. 34
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The defendant was convicted of murder in fifty-six of the
sixty-seven cases in which solicitors sought the death penalty.
The following table indicates the relationship between the num-
ber of aggravating circumstances and sentencing in these fifty-
six cases.
TABLE III - SENTENCING DISCRETION AND NUMBER OF AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES
Number of
Aggravating Death Penalty Life Imprisonment Totals
Circumstances
Judge Jury Total Judge Jury Total Judge Jury Total
3 2 1 3 2 0 2 4 1 5
2 0 7 7 1 738 8 1 14 15
1 0 12 12 12 12'3 24 12 24 36
Totals 2 20 22 15340 19 34 17 39 56
No relationship appears to exist between the number of cir-
cumstances and sentencing. Once again, however, due to the
small number of cases and the lack of complete, reliable data on
this and other factors, it is difficult to determine whether a rela-
tionship exists.
Table III also suggests that juries are far more likely to im-
pose the death penalty than are judges. Judges imposed the
death penalty in only two of seventeen cases considered. Juries,
on the other hand, imposed death in twenty of thirty-nine cases.
This disparity is even more pronounced in light of the fact that
the judge-imposed death sentences occurred in the shocking cir-
circumstances.
338. In one of these cases, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. This
case is included in this total because it was in effect a jury decision against the death
penalty.
339. In three of these cases, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict.
These cases are included in this total since they were in effect a jury decision against the
death penalty.
340. In nine of these cases, the defendant pleaded guilty and no trial was held on
guilt. In four cases, the defendant pleaded guilty after the start of the trial. Thus, only
two of these life imprisonment sentences were imposed after a full trial on guilt. The two
death sentences imposed by judges were also imposed without a trial on guilt because
they involved guilty pleas made prior to trial. State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799
(1979).
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cumstances set forth in State v. Shaw.34 1
It is difficult to conclude from these patterns of sentencing
whether the death penalty is acceptable to South Carolina soci-
ety.34 2 One problem is that it is not clear what would constitute
an acceptable percentage of cases in which death is imposed.
3 43
Another problem is that the pattern of sentencing by judges
could reflect only a lenient response to guilty pleas 344 and a care-
ful limiting of the death penalty to extreme cases like Shaw.
45
On the other hand, the jury sentencing patterns do not necessa-
rily reflect acceptance of the death penalty. Instead, the patterns
may indicate only that South Carolina juries do their best to im-
plement the statutory scheme even if they personally disagree
with it. The voir dire is certainly designed to insure such a
result.
346
The following tables indicate the relationship between sen-
tencing decisions and the treatment of armed theft as more than
one aggravating circumstance. The two variables do not appear
to be correlated; however, skepticism is in order because of the
problems with the data base.
341. Id. The facts of Shaw indicated a premeditated plan to rob, murder, and rape
that was cold bloodedly executed, resulting in robbery, two deaths, rape and other sexual
assaults, torture, and postmortem mutilation.
342. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
343. Compare, e.g., infra note 483 with infra note 485 and infra note 661 with infra
note 669.
344. See supra note 340.
345. See supra notes 10-12, 136-38, and accompanying text and infra notes 541-42,
669 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 34
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5. The Need for Further Empirical Study
The data base for this study has so many shortcomings that
the information presented above is not sufficiently reliable to
help us understand the system. Nevertheless, the study is im-
portant for two reasons. First, it provides at least a rough view
of the patterns of sentencing, and this rough tabulation casts
doubt on several factual assumptions that are implicit in opin-
ions of the South Carolina Supreme Court. For example, this
study suggests either that a cultural reluctance to view simple
armed theft as an aggravating circumstance exists or that some
unknown (and perhaps improper) factor is involved in determin-
ing which armed robbers should be executed.-" The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court, however, has not considered either of these
alternatives in its opinions.4 Second, the shortcomings them-
selves are important because they indicate how little is known
about the system. As a result, further empirical study clearly is
needed to insure that the sentencing process provides a mean-
ingful basis for imposing the death penalty. This need is also
evidenced by other empirical studies, both in South Carolina350
and other states. 51 In particular, it is important to determine
348. The study indicates the following pattern concerning cases in which armed
theft was the only aggravating circumstances:
56 cases in which death considered
15 cases in which death not sought
41 cases in which death sought
7 cases in which defendant not found guilty of murder
34 cases in which defendant guilty of murder and armed theft
21 cases in which defendant sentenced to life imprisonment
13 cases in which defendant sentenced to death
By eliminating the seven cases in which the defendant was not convicted of murder,
49 cases remain in which the defendant might have been sentenced to death because of
the presence of the single aggravating circumstance of armed theft. Yet, only about one-
fourth of these defendants were sentenced to death. This percentage becomes even more
striking upon including the eleven cases in which theft was only one of the aggravating
circumstances and death was either not sought or not imposed. (See Tables II and IV).
When these cases are included, a total of sixty cases in which theft was an aggravating
circumstance results, and death was ultimately imposed in only 22% of these cases.
349. See supra notes 159-71, 299-302 and accompanying text.
350. See, e.g., Jacoby & Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity and Jury Packing: Fur-
ther Challenges to the Death Penalty, 73 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379 (1982).
351. See, e.g., Ziesel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The
Florida Experience, 95 HARv. L. REv. 456 (1981); Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and
Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980).
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the extent, if any, to which racial discrimination is involved in
the system.5 2
H. Summary and Conclusion - The Emerging South
Carolina Model of Procedural Fairness in Imposing the Death
Penalty
The basic structure for imposing the death penalty in South
Carolina is established by statute, but the development of this
statutory framework has proceeded in a common-law fashion.
Typically, such development proceeds on a case by case basis
and this approach has several effects: (1) the underlying theoret-
ical model in the area emerges slowly and haltingly; (2) some
decisions are made, particularly in the early stages of this pro-
cess, that do not comport with the basic principles; and (3) these
anomalous decisions are gradually eroded and eliminated so the
law is consistent.358 Where the initial sentencing decisions are
concerned, the first two effects are clearly evidenced in the cases,
while the third stage has not yet begun. In the case of appellate
review, however, the underlying theoretical model is much less
clear. Nonetheless, when sentencing and review are considered
together, it is clear that South Carolina has adopted a model
which can be summarized as follows: The death penalty will be
imposed only in those cases in which there is no doubt that the
defendant deserves the death penalty.
1. Sentencing Discretion
Building on the statute and on the United States Supreme
Court opinions in this area, the South Carolina Supreme Court
has developed an approach to sentencing that balances the need
for flexibility and discretion in individualizing sentencing with
the need to limit, guide, and check discretion to insure the death
penalty is clearly deserved. 3" When the complexity of the sen-
tencing decision necessitates choices between these competing
needs, doubts are resolved in favor of life imprisonment. Thus,
for example, the prosecutor's discretion to seek life imprison-
352. See infra notes 950-52 and accompanying text.
353. See generally, e.g., E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING (1948).
354. See supra notes 108-32 and accompanying text.
462 [Vol. 34
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ment is virtually unlimited,35 5 but his decision to seek the death
penalty is subject to all the limitations of the statutory scheme.
Similarly the jury has very broad discretion to impose life im-
prisonment,3 56 but its discretion to impose death is much more
constrained.
57
There are, however, a number of decisions on particular is-
sues that contradict this underlying model of procedural fairness
and bias toward life imprisonment and show little, if any, con-
cern for the complexity of the sentencing decision. Some cases
appear excessively mechanical and unconcerned with limiting
and guiding the jury's discretion to impose the death penalty -
for example, cases which treat the same facts as constituting
several aggravating circumstances.358
Hopefully, the development of the South Carolina common
law of death sentencing will evidence the third effect of case by
case decision making, and the decisions which are inconsistent
with the emerging model will be construed narrowly, distin-
guished, or overruled. In this way, the cases will first, consist-
ently reflect a sentencing model that is based on the statutory
scheme and the policies underlying capital punishment in South
Carolina,35 9 and second, avoid serious questions about the con-
stitutionality60 and justices"1 of the death penalty in South
Carolina.
2. Appellate Review
The South Carolina Supreme Court's view of appellate re-
view is much less developed than its model of the initial sen-
tencing decision. This may be partly due to the fact that the
United States Supreme Court opinions and the South Carolina
statute say very little about the details of appellate review. How-
ever, it is also due to the South Carolina Supreme Court's ap-
proach to decisions in this area. The court's decisions reflect
that proportionality review focuses on the wrongfulness involved
355. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 126-29, 207-11 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 126, 130-32, 271-75 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 151-66 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
360. See infra notes 698-785 and accompanying text.
361. See infra notes 870-952, 964-79 and accompanying text.
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in each case rather than on the relative treatment of similar per-
sons.3 62 However, this is only implicit in the decisions, since the
court has never explicitly articulated this approach to appellate
review. Moreover, the brevity of the court's proportionality re-
view decisions36 3 and its expressed disinterest in philosophical
concerns 36 4 make it virtually impossible to determine how the
court decides when a criminal and crime are so wrong that the
death penalty is appropriate. Indeed, there is good reason to be-
lieve that the court lacks a legitimate model of
proportionality.
36 5
The lack of a clear, legitimate model of appellate review is
disquieting. The statutory,3 66 constitutional, 367 and philosophi-
cal368 validity of capital punishment is based in part on the no-
tion that the discretionary process of imposing the death penalty
will be subject to appellate review so that any abuse of sentenc-
ing discretion will be reversed. One reason so much weight is
placed on this review process is the belief that review will be
undertaken carefully, thoughtfully, rationally, and consist-
ently.36 9 One traditional way that courts have assured that this
faith is not misplaced is to give reasons that indicate how and
why decisions are made.370 Thus, the failure of the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court to articulate a theoretical model for its pro-
portionality review casts doubt on the legitimacy of the death
penalty in this State. The resulting lack of assurance in the re-
view process is particularly troubling since its proportionality
decisions in at least three cases appear to be contrary to cultural
views of proportionality. 371 However, it is still early in the devel-
362. See supra notes 277-88 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 277, 284 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 284-302 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 132, 263-75 and accompanying text.
367. See infra notes 704, 780-85 and accompanying text.
368. See infra notes 893, 923, 931-32, 938-49 and accompanying text.
369. See infra notes 449, 507, 642-54, 782-85 and accompanying text. Compare
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 201 (1976) with Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 422-23,
428-33 (1980).
370. See, e.g., Hubbard & Larsen, "Contract Cohabitation:" A Jurisprudential Per-
spective on Common Law Judging, 19 J. FAM. L. 655, 700-704 (1981). A similar point is
often made concerning administrative decisions. See, e.g., K.C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE (1969).
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opment of the South Carolina common law of capital punish-
ment, and future cases may provide further development of a
just model of appellate review.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Constitutional challenges to legislative schemes for imposing
capital punishment present the United States Supreme Court
with a dilemma. On the one hand, the statute under review re-
flects the "popular will" as determined by the state's elected leg-
islature. Consequently, if the Court holds the statute unconstitu-
tional, its decision would raise serious questions about the
legitimacy of the court's interference with the democratic pro-
cess and with the values implicit in a federal system. This is par-
ticularly true when vague requirements such as the prohibition
of "cruel and unusual punishment" are involved. Thus, it is not
surprising that the Court grants state legislation a generous pre-
sumption of validity in death penalty cases. On the other hand,
it is a well-accepted tenet of our political system that judicial
review of the constitutionality of statutes is necessary to prevent
the improper exercise of legislative power. As a result, the Court
cannot simply defer to the legislature.
Because of the difficulty in striking a balance between these
two conflicting concerns, there is no consensus on the Court con-
cerning the constitutionality of capital punishment. Stable ma-
jorities have emerged on some issues - for example, a majority
of the Court agrees that capital punishment is not per se uncon-
stitutional. However, many important underlying issues - for
example, the conditions under which capital punishment is con-
stitutional - have never been decided by a clear majority.
When these disagreements occur, viewing the Court in terms of
three groups or "blocs," representing fairly consistent patterns
of decisions may prove helpful. One group - Justices Brennan
and Marshall - has rejected capital punishment as cruel and
unusual per se and thus prohibited under the eight amendment.
The remaining Justices can be divided - albeit very roughly -
into two blocs. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Rehnquist, White,
and Blackmun grant much greater deference to legislative deci-
sionmaking and usually hold capital punishment schemes to be
constitutional. Justices Powell, Stewart, and Stevens take an in-
termediate position and uphold the imposition of capital punish-
1982] 465
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ment so long as it is imposed only for extreme crimes such as
premeditated murder and only in accordance with substantial
procedural protections against arbitrariness. It is too soon to de-
termine the position of Justice O'Connor in terms of these blocs.
The Justices do not fit neatly into "blocs," particularly
when an issue such as capital punishment is involved. Instead,
views may merge on one case or series of cases, but diverge on
others. Consequently, the cases in this area should also' be
viewed in terms of a chronological development. The following
discussion will consider the basic positions of the three groups of
Justices within the context of such a chronological development.
It also will propose alternative perspectives for dividing the
Court into groups. The concluding section will use this back-
ground to consider briefly the constitutionality of the South Car-
olina scheme for imposing capital punishment.
A. The Development of the Current Standard of Adequate
Procedural Safeguards
1. The Evolution of the Basic Framework
a. Upholding the Death Penalty Against Due Process
Challenges - McGautha v. California
The historical development of the current position on the
Supreme Court begins with McGautha v. California,7 2 in which
the death penalty was challenged on two grounds. First, it was
contended that leaving the sentencing decision to the absolute
discretion of the jury violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Second, it was argued that due process re-
quired bifurcation of capital punishment proceedings so that the
question of sentencing was addressed in a hearing separate from
the trial of guilt. The Court denied both challenges and upheld
the death penalty.
The issue of sentencing discretion centered on whether the
jury must be given standards to guide their decision. The Court
briefly reviewed the history of capital punishment in England
372. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). The Court consolidated this case with Crampton v. Ohio,
which focused on the asserted constitutional right to a bifurcated trial.
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and the United States,37' concluding that "[t]his history reveals
continual efforts, uniformly unsuccessful, to identify before the
fact those homicides for which the slayer should die."3 74 The
Court further noted that recent studies supported the conclusion
that such a task was beyond present human ability.
75
The defendant offered an alternative view of the history of
capital punishment. 7 He argued that absolute sentencing dis-
cretion was initially introduced to deal with the rare case in
which the death penalty was thought unjustified.37 He further
noted that far less than half of present-day capital offenders are
sentenced to death. Therefore, he concluded that the role of sen-
tencing discretion has changed from dispensing mercy to impos-
ing death and that the states and the federal government have
implictly accepted this change. He argued that this change is
constitutionally impermissible without standards to guide the
identification of those extraordinary cases which called for the
death penalty. The Court rejected this argument and concluded
its discussion of the issue as follows:
For a court to attempt to catalog the appropriate factors in
this elusive area could inhibit rather than expand the scope of
consideration, for no list of circumstances would ever be really
complete. The infinite variety of cases and facets to each case
would make general standards either meaningless "boilerplate"
or a statement of the obvious that no jury would need.378
The alleged right to a bifurcated trial rested on two
grounds. First, the defendant argued that bifurcation was re-
quired so that evidence relevant solely to the issue of punish-
ment would not prejudice his case on guilt.37 9 Second, a single
373. Id. at 197-203.
374. Id. at 197.
375. Id. at 204-08.
376. Id. at 203-04.
377. The Court accepted this view of the history of capital punishment but charac-
terized it as a response to jury nullification. Id. at 199.
378. Id. at 208. The court later noted that the McGautha facts indicated that
standardless sentencing discretion worked because the jury sentenced McGautha to
death but gave his codefendant a life sentence, id. at 221, and because the facts reflected
relevant differences in their criminal roles. See id. at 187-91.
379. Id. at 209-10. This issue was raised only in the case of Crampton v. Ohio. Cali-
fornia already had bifurcated proceedings. Crampton also challenged the jury's unlimited
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trial creates an intolerable tension between defendant's four-
teenth amendment right to be heard on the issue of punishment
and his fifth amendment right not to testify at trial.380 The
Court did not address the argument based on the relevancy of
evidence 381 and rejected the "intolerable tension" argument in
both possible situations: (1) when the defendant is compelled to
testify on guilt in order to testify on punishment, and (2) when
the defendant is precluded from testifying on punishment be-
cause of his refusal to testify on guilt.
In rejecting the "compelled testimony" argument, the Court
relied on an analysis of the history, policies, and precedents of
the fifth amendment. 82 History offered no insight 3 83 and the
policies were too varied to offer meaningful guidance.38 Prece-
dent offered little support to the defendant because no defen-
dant had ever been allowed to take the stand for a limited pur-
pose under the fifth amendment.3 85 As a result, the Court
concluded that "[t]he relevant differences between sentencing
and determination of guilt or innocence are not so great as to
call for a difference in constitutional result. Nor does the fact
that capital, as opposed to any other, sentencing is in issue seem
...to distinguish this case.
'3 86
The Court's consideration of the second possible situation
began by noting that a due process right to be heard on sentenc-
ing issues had never been clearly recognized.8 7 The Court then
assumed that such a right existed and concluded that it had not
been violated. 88 Since the defendant's attorney was allowed to
argue for mercy in summation and allowed to present punish-
ment evidence at trial,389 the issue was narrowed to the possibil-
ity of evidence or information within the peculiar knowledge of
380. Id. at 210-11.
381. The Court again noted this argument for bifurcation in Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 190-92, 195 (1976).
382. 402 U.S. at 213-14.
383. Id. at 214.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 215.
386. Id. at 217. In later cases, the differences between capital and other sentences
was to become a cornerstone of constitutional analysis. See, e.g., infra notes 481-85 and
accompanying text.
387. Id. at 218.
388. Id. at 218-19.
389. See id. at 219.
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the defendant.390 The Court concluded that this possibility was
not sufficiently great to require reversal and that even if such
knowledge existed, the Constitution did not forbid requiring a
defendant to choose between disclosure of this information or
not to testify at all.391
Justice Black's concurring opinion accepted the majority's
judgment but warned that the Court's proper role was determin-
ing whether any express or implied federal rights had been de-
nied, not whether the trial had been fairly conducted.3 9 2 Justice
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented because they ac-
cepted the intolerable tension argument s93 and because they felt
that sentencing standards were required to insure consistency of
decision and government by law rather than government by
whim.3
94
b. Striking Down One Scheme for Imposing the Death
Penalty for Offending the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause - Furman v. Georgia
Despite the decision in McGautha, the Court struck down
the death penalty for murder and rape only a year later in
Furman v. Georgia.3 95 The Court was remarkably divided in
Furman and all nine Justices wrote separate opinions. Five Jus-
tices concluded that the death penalty in these cases constituted
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. Two of these Justices, Brennan and
Marshall, rejected capital punishment as per se unconstitutional
and have relied on this position in all later cases. Therefore, con-
sideration of their positions is deferred until the later analysis of
390. Id. at 220.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 225-26.
393. Id. at 239.
394. Id. at 250. The dissenting opinions are not considered in greater detail for three
reasons. First, Justice Douglas is no longer on the Court. Second, Justices Brennan and
Marshall have since concluded that capital punishment is per se unconstitutional. See
infra notes 508-30 and accompanying text. Third, later cases require sentencing stan-
dards and approve, if not require, bifurcated trials. Thus, it will be better to consider the
basis for these requirements when considering these later cases.
395. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The murder case was Furman v. Georgia and the two rape
cases were Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas.
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the three blocs on the Court,39 s and the present discussion will
address only the opinions of the other Justices.
(1) Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White - The Eighth
Amendment Right to Special Procedural Safeguards
Justice Douglas397 used notions of due process and equal
protection under the aegis of the eighth amendment 9 8 to sup-
port his reversal of the death penalties in Furman and its com-
panion cases. Based on a review of the history of the cruel and
unusual punishment clause and the use of the death penalty,3"
Justice Douglas concluded that it is "cruel and unusual" for so-
ciety to impose the death penalty only on politically weak, un-
popular minorities, when it would not approve general applica-
tion of the penalty.400 Justice Douglas conceded that no evidence
of such discrimination existed in the records of the individual
cases under consideration,'40 1 but found the statutory schemes to
be "pregnant with discrimination.' ' 02 The possibility of discrim-
ination resulting from unbridled sentencing discretion was
deemed sufficient to find these statutes unconstitutional.
Justice Stewart 0 3 prefaced his opinion by noting that the
death penalty is unique in several respects: its irrevocability, its
rejection of rehabilitation, and its "absolute renunciation of all
that is embodied in our concept of humanity.' 4 He did not
think it necessary to reach the issue of per se unconstitutional-
396. See infra notes 508-30 and accompanying text.
397. For Justice Douglas' opinion, see 408 U.S. at 240-57.
398. Justice Douglas concluded that the eighth amendment imposed the following
constraints on the means of imposing the death penalty
The high service rendered by the "cruel and unusual" punishment clause
of the Eighth Amendment is to require legislatures to write penal laws that are
evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it
that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopu-
lar groups.
Id. at 256.
399. Id. at 242-55. Justice Douglas also concluded that "[o]ne cannot read this his-
tory without realizing that the desire for equality was reflected in the ban against 'cruel
and unusual punishments' contained in the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 255.
400. Id. at 245.
401. Id. at 253.
402. Id. at 257. See id. at 249-52. Justice Douglas noted also that the sentencing
decision depended on the uncontrolled discretion of the sentencing authority. Id. at 253.
403. For Justice Stewart's opinion, see 408 U.S. at 306-310.
404. Id. at 306.
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ity, because the statistical evidence indicated that the particula,
statutory schemes before the Court were being imposed capri-
ciously. 0 5 Though noting that this capriciousness was perhaps
the result of racial discrimination, he did not base his opinion on
this possibility.408 Instead, Justice Stewart based his decision on
the broader notion that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments cannot tolerate the inffiction of a sentence of death under
legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly
and so freakishly imposed.
'407
Justice White40 8 also argued that the Court needed to de-
cide only the narrow issue of whether the death penalty is con-
stitutional when the judge and jury have unlimited discretion
and when the penalty is rarely imposed in practice.409 After dis-
cussing the relationship between the infrequency of imposing
the death penalty and the purposes of punishment - retribu-
tion and deterrence410 - he stated that "there is no meaningful
basis basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is im-
posed from the many cases in which it is not.
411
These three Justices emphasized the infrequency of capital
punishment and the lack of standards and procedures to insure
that the death penalty is not imposed discriminatorily, arbitrar-
ily, or capriciously. These concerns suggest that the Justices
based their opinions on the right to due process and equal pro-
tection; however, attacks on that basis had recently been re-
jected in McGautha, in which Justices White and Stewart joined
the majority. Consequently, Furman was based on an eighth
amendment right to special procedural protection when the
death penalty is imposed.
(2) The Dissenters
Although each dissenter wrote a separate opinion, their
opinions expressed considerable unanimity.412 The criticisms of
405. Id. at 306-10.
406. Id. at 310.
407. Id.
408. For Justice White's opinion, see 408 U.S. at 310-14.
409. Id. at 310-11.
410. Id. at 311-13.
411. Id. at 313.
412. With the exception of the brief dissenting opinion by Justice Blackmun, all
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the per se argument, contained in Chief Justice Burger's opin-
ion, will be discussed below. 413 As to the other majority opinions,
each dissent emphasized a different criticism. Chief Justice Bur-
ger 14 attacked two crucial assumptions. First, he argued that no
reason existed to conclude that the infrequency in imposing the
death penalty indicated arbitrariness rather than proper jury se-
lectiveness. 415 Second, he contended that the eighth amendment
does not address the equal treatment and procedural concerns
that were the focus of the opinions by Justices Douglas, Stewart,
and White.41e Justices Blackmun417 and RehnquistV28 focused on
the need for judicial restraint and deference to the legislature.
Justice Blackmun also indicated concern that the majority had
forgotten the victims 41 9 and expressed a fear that mandatory
death penalties would result from the emphasis on avoiding ar-
bitrary decisions.420 Justice Powell also emphasized the need for
judicial restraint in this area and argued that neither precedent
nor cultural standards provided a basis for the majority
position. 21
c. Upholding the Death Penalty only when Adequate
Procedural Safeguards Exist
Furman effectively negated all existing capital punishment
statutes and presented legislatures with a difficult task. Since
only two Justices had rejected capital punishment as per se tn-
constitutional, the legislatures could continue to utilize the
death penalty if they could draft a statute that would meet the
objections of Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White. This task
four dissenters joined each dissenting opinion. See infra notes 414, 417, 418, and 421.
413. See infra notes 531-51 and accompanying text.
414. For Chief Justice Burger's opinion, see 408 U.S. at 375-405. Justices Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist joined his opinion and filed separate dissents.
415. Id. at 388-90, 397-99.
416. Id. at 390 n.12, 397, 399. Chief Justice Burger also noted that only one year
earlier MeGautha foreclosed this due process argument. Id. at 399-400.
417. For Justice Blackmun's opinion, see 408 U.S. at 405-414. No other Justice
joined in his opinion.
418. For Justice Rehnquist's opinion, see 408 U.S. at 465-70. Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Blackmun and Powell joined this opinion.
419. Id. at 413-14.
420. Id. at 413.
421. For Justice Powell's opinion, see 408 U.S. at 414-65. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun joined Justice Powell's opinion.
[Vol. 34
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was complicated because these Justices did not support their
judgments with detailed analyses, and their opinions accounted
for only 28 pages of a 230 page decision. However, one point was
clear: all three agreed that unbridled sentencing discretion was
the major problem. The legislatures used a variety of approaches
to sentencing discretion, and a number of these were challenged
on constitutional grounds.
On July 2, 1976, the Court decided five cases that addressed
these new schemes. Justices Stewart, Stevens, and Powell deter-
mined the outcome of all five cases. They struck down
mandatory capital punishment schemes as a constitutionally im-
permissible response to the Furman mandate. In their view
Furman required that discretion be limited, but not eliminated.
Thus, the adequacy of procedural safeguards which limit and
channel sentencing discretion became the crucial question, and
the Court upheld the capital punishment schemes of three states
because the schemes provided these safeguards. Because of their
per se rejection of the death penalty,422 Justices Marshall and
Brennan concurred whenever a capital punishment statute was
struck down and dissented whenever one was upheld. Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, White, and Blackmun voted
to uphold the death penalty scheme in all five cases.423
(1) Mandatory Capital Punishment Prohibited
The defendant in Woodson v. North Carolina24 challenged
the North Carolina statute because it imposed a mandatory
death penalty for a broad category of homicides. 25 Justice Stew-
art, writing for himself and Justices Powell and Stevens, de-
clared the statute unconstitutional on three grounds: (1) con-
temporary standards indicated a rejection of mandatory capital
punishment as too harsh and rigid;4 26 (2) the scheme did not
limit jury discretion because many jurors might refuse to convict
when they felt that the mandatory death penalty was inappro-
422. For a discussion of the Justices' position, see infra notes 508-30 and accompa-
nying text.
423. For a discussion of the Justices' position, see infra notes 531-51 and accompa-
nying text.
424. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
425. Id. at 286.
426. Id. at 288-301.
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priate;217 and (3) the mechanical nature of mandatory schemes
prevented the consideration of the relevant personal characteris-
tics of the defendant involved. 28 Justice Stewart reserved opin-
ion on the constitutionality of mandatory death for an extremely
narrow category of homicides,' indicating a possible fourth
ground that the statute was overbroad.
The Louisiana statute involved in Roberts v. Louisiana
430
imposed mandatory death for first-degree murder, aggravated
rape, aggravated kidnapping, and treason.3 1 It specifically pro-
vided that any jury recommendation of mercy was without ef-
fect.432 Even though the Louisiana statute was more restrictive
in its list of capital offenses than the North Carolina statute,3 3
it still precluded the jury from considering the "circumstances of
the particular offense and the character and propensities of the
defendant.''113 As a result, the Court declared the Louisiana
statute unconstitutional for the same reasons as the North Caro-
lina statute. 35
(2) Capital Punishment Approved Where Adequate
Procedural Safeguards Exist
(a) Gregg v. Georgia
436
Following the Furman decision, the Georgia legislature
adopted a capital punishment statute based on the Model Penal
Code approach of bifurcated hearings and guidance of sentenc-
427. Id. at 302-03.
428. Id. at 303-05.
429. Id. at 287 n.7.
430. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
431. Id. at 331. Although slightly narrower than the North Carolina statute in defin-
ing first-degree murder, the Louisiana statute was not saved from constitutional infir-
mity. Id. at 331-32.
432. Id. at 331.
433. Id. at 331-33.
434. Id. at 333.
435. The Roberts judgment was cross-referenced to the Woodson judgment as fol-
lows: Historical rejection of mandatory capital punishment, id. at 332; legislative aban-
donment of mandatory capital punishment, id. at 332-33, 336; papering over of unbridled
discretion and jury nullification, id. at 334-35; and standardless sentencing and no mean-
ingful appellate review. Id. at 335-36.
436. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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ing discretion by aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 37
Under the new statute, the first stage of a capital case addressed
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. If he was found guilty of
a capital offense, a separate sentencing proceeding was held to
determine if the punishment would be life imprisonment or
death. 3 8 Sentencing discretion was checked and guided by the
requirement that the jury consider aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. 439 Except in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking,
the statute required the establishment of at least one aggravat-
ing circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt before the death
penalty could be imposed.440 The statute also required expedited
direct review by the Georgia Supreme Court to determine if the
death penalty had been properly imposed. 41 In Gregg v. Geor-
gia,442 the United States Supreme Court considered the consti-
tutionality of this scheme and rejected the argument that the
death penalty was unconstitutional.443 The Court also rejected
four challenges to the adequacy of Georgia's statutory standards
and procedures.
The first such challenge argued that opportunities for un-
bridled discretion remained under the statute in the form of
prosecutorial discretion, lesser included offenses, and executive
clemency. 444 The Court rejected these arguments as misinterpre-
tations of Furman. The challenged discretion removed defen-
dants from being subjected to possible capital punishment. This
437. Id. at 190-95.
438. Id. at 162-68.
439. For the aggravating circumstances, see id. at 165 n.9. The statute requires the
judge to consider, or include in his jury instructions any mitigating or aggravating cir-
cumstances authorized by the law. The statute does not delineate the scope of these
circumstances. Id. at 163-64. See id. at 196-206 for further discussion of the Georgia
statutory scheme.
440. Id. at 164-66. In addition, the statute requires a report of the trial judge. Id. at
167.
441. Id. at 166-67. The statute requires the Georgia Supreme Court to: (1) consider
all errors enumerated by appeal; (2) determine if the death penalty was imposed under
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factors; (3) determine if the evi-
dence supports any finding of a statutory aggravating circumstances; and (4) determine
if the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. Id.
442. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
443. For discussion of the per se position, see infra notes 508-30 and accompanying
text.
444. 428 U.S. at 199.
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removal did not violate Furman because Furman held only that
the imposition of capital punishment, not the granting of mercy,
had to be standarized.'"
Second, the statutory aggravating circumstances were chal-
lenged on the ground that they were too broad and vague to
limit and guide jury discretion.4 " In particular Gregg
challenged:
(1) the circumstance that the murder was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim;"4 47
and
(2) circumstances such as "substantial history of serious as-
saultive criminal convictions" and creating a "great risk of
death to more than one person.$"448
Justice Stewart agreed that this problem existed but concluded
that it probably would be resolved because the Georgia Supreme
Court had a history of concern for curing these deficiencies by
way of statutory construction.449
Third, the petitioner objected to the wide scope of evidence
and argument in the penalty phase of the trial.450 Justice Stew-
art summarily concluded that such a procedure was a wise
choice, provided it did not prejudice a defendant,451 because it
provided the jury with more sentencing information.452
Finally, Gregg argued that the Georgia statute failed to sat-
isfy Furman because the jury was empowered to give life impris-
onment even if the State established an aggravating circum-
stance beyond a reasonable doubt.453 Justice Stewart again
noted that Furman did not prohibit standardless grants of
mercy.454 In addition, he concluded that this argument ignored
the proportionality review provided by the Georgia Supreme
445. Id.
446. Id. at 200.
447. Id. at 201.
448. Id. at 202.
449. Id. at 201-02.
450. Id. at 203.
451. Id. at 203-04.
452. Id. at 204.
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Court.' 55 Justice Stewart summarized the Georgia proportional-
ity requirement as follows: "If a time comes when juries gener-
ally do not impose the death sentence in a certain kind of mur-
der case, the appellate review procedures assure that no
defendant convicted under such circumstances will suffer a sen-
tence of death. 56
(b) Proffitt v. Florida
457
The Florida statute also provided for bifurcated trials in
capital cases. At the sentencing hearing, the judge admitted any
evidence he deemed relevant to sentencing as well as evidence
relevant to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances listed in
the statute.458 The jury was instructed to weigh mitigation
against aggravation to determine whether to recommend life im-
prisonment or death. The verdict was determined by majority
vote and was only advisory; the trial judge determined the ac-
tual sentence.' 59 However, if the jury recommended life impris-
onment, "the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so
clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could
differ" before the trial judge could impose capital punishment.6 0
The trial judge must also put his findings in writing if he im-
posed death.4' 1 The statute provided for automatic review but
did not require any specific form of appellate review; however,
the Florida Supreme Court considered its function to be to pro-
455. 428 U.S. at 203.
456. Id. at 206. See also, id. at 204-06. The exact role of proportionality review re-
mains unsettled at this time and is discussed further at infra notes 780-85 and accompa-
nying text.
457. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
458. Id. at 248. For the statutory aggravating circumstances, see id. at 248 n.6. For
the statutory mitigating circumstances, see id. at 248 n.6. Petitioner challenged the stat-
ute as allowing the imposition of capital punishment solely on the basis of nonstatutory
aggravation only. Justice Stewart did not clearly address the argument, stating only that
it was unlikely that the Florida court would approve a death sentence based entirely on
nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. See id. at 250 n.8, 256 n.14.
459. Id. at 248-49. Justice Stewart noted that although the jury performs an impor-
tant role in sentencing decisions, jury sentencing never has been constitutionally re-
quired. In fact, Justice Stewart surmised that judicial sentencing should lead to greater
consistency due to the greater experience of trial judges. Id. at 252.
460. Id. at 249.
461. Id. at 250.
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vide the same type of review as the Georgia Supreme Court."2
Justice Stewart determined that this statutory scheme satis-
fied Furman6 3 and rejected several specific attacks on the stat-
ute for reasons that parellel those given to similar challenges in
Gregg. Thus, challenges to the following were rejected: (1)
prosecutorial discretion to seek the death penalty;46 (2) lack of
control of jury discretion resulting from vagueness in the statu-
tory aggravating and mitigating circumstances 4"5 and from the
subjectivity in the process of evaluating their relative weights;4"
and (3) inadequacy of proportionality review. 467
(c) Jurek v. Texas
4 "8
The Texas statute limited capital punishment to intentional
and knowing murders in five statutorily enumerated circum-
stances.4 69 When the jury found the defendant guilty of such a
murder, a separate sentencing hearing was conducted. At this
hearing, the statute directed the jury to consider two (and some-
times three) questions addressed to whether the defendant or
his crime indicated aggravation or lack of mitigation.47 0 If the
462. Id. at 250-51. See id. at 251-53, 258-60.
463. Id. at 251-53, 259-60.
464. Id. at 254.
465. Id. at 254-56. As in Gregg, see supra note 449 and accompanying text, Justice
Stewart noted that the Florida Supreme Court could and had cured these potential
problems by statutory construction.
466. Id. at 257.58. Stewart noted that the balancing process was no more difficult
than other tasks undertaken by juries and that the statute guided discretion by focusing
on the individual defendant and his crime. In his concurring opinion, Justice White con-
cluded that the death penalty recommendation was mandatory if the aggravating cir-
cumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, id. at 260, but Justice Stewart did
not address this argument. However, the Florida scheme required an individual decision
based on all the circumstances. This distinction was important to Justice Stewart's up-
holding the mandatory Texas statute in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). See infra
notes 47480 and accompanying text.
467. 428 U.S. at 258-60. See id. at 250-53, 259-60.
468. Id. at 262 (1976).
469. Id. at 268. See id. at 265 n.1.
470. Id. at 269. See id. at 267-69. The following questions were posed to the sentenc-
ing jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the
deceased was committed deliberately and which the reasonable expectation
that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit crimi-
nal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
88
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jury determined that each of these questions was affirmatively
answered beyond a reasonable doubt, they were to impose the
death sentence.71 If one question was answered negatively, they
were to impose a life sentence.7 2 When the jury imposed the
death penalty, the statute provided for an expedited appeal to
the Criminal Court of Appeals.473
In upholding this scheme, Justice Stewart focused on
whether given the requirement that the jury impose the death
penalty when all three questions were answered affirmatively
rendered the Texas statute subject to the same infirmities as the
mandatory schemes in Roberts and Woodson. He identified the
constitutional vice of mandatory capital punishment as prevent-
ing an individualized decision by prohibiting the consideration
of mitigating circumstances. 4 4 Even though the Texas statute
did not mention mitigating circumstances,4 5 Justice Stewart re-
lied on state court construction of the statute to conclude that
Texas did allow the defendant to present whatever evidence in
mitigation he could show. 476 Thus, the limitations of capital
punishment to the statutorily enumerated circumstances and
the requirement that the jury answer three broad questions
about the crime and defendant meant that the Texas scheme
was substantially the same as that used by Georgia and Flor-
ida.4 Like those schemes, the Texas system satisfied Furman47 8
even though it did not limit prosecutorial discretion47 9 and even
though the statutory circumstances would be difficult to
apply.
480
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in kill-
ing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased.
Id. at 269.
471. Id. at 269.
472. Id.
473. Id. See id. at 276.
474. Id. at 271. See supra note 428 and accompanying text.
475. 428 U.S. at 272.
476. Id. at 272-73, 276.
477. Id. at 270-74.
478. Id. at 276-77.
479. Id. at 274.
480. Id. at 274-76.
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d. Imposing the Death Penalty for Rape is Cruel and
Unusual Punishment - Coker v. Georgia
After Gregg, it was still not clear whether there were sub-
stantive as well as procedural limits on capital punishment.
Coker v. Georgia resolved this uncertainty.4 ' Coker was con-
victed of kidnapping, robbery, theft, housebreaking, escape from
prison, and rape. He was sentenced to death for the rape. He
appealed the sentence on the ground that the death penalty for
rape was unconstitutional. Justices Brennen and Marshall voted
in favor of his challenge because of their per se objection to capi-
tal punishment.8 2 Justice White, in an opinion joined by Jus-
tices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens, declared that the death
penalty was always unconstitutional when imposed for rape be-
cause both justice and cultural standards indicated that the
punishment was excessive and disproportionate to the crime.483
Justice Powell concurred in the holding because he viewed the
penalty as unconstitutional in Coker's case because Coker had
not physically harmed or tortured his victim. Justice Powell dis-
sented from the broader holding that death was per se a dispro-
portionate penalty for rape, however.484 Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the decision was
an unjustified interference with the judgement of the state
legislature.8 5
481. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
482. Id. at 600-01. See infra notes 508-30 and accompanying text.
483. 433 U.S. at 586-600. In reaching this conclusion, Justice White relied on his
own judgment, id. at 587-600, as well as a variety of sources indicating a cultural rejec-
tion of the death penalty for rape. First, he reviewed the history of rape legislation in
this country and concluded that this history, though conflicting on some points, strongly
indicates a cultural rejection of the death penalty for rape. Id. at 593-96. In addition, the
opinion noted that 57 of 60 major nations surveyed had rejected the death penalty for
rape. Id. at 596 n.10. Finally, a review of the sentencing patterns of Georgia juries indi-
cated that the death penalty had not been imposed in 9 out of 10 cases in which it could
have been imposed. Id. at 596-97.
484. Id. at 601-04.
485. Id. at 604-22. The basic points stressed by Chief Justice Burger's dissent are:
(1) The effect of the decision would be to prevent Georgia from imposing
additional punishment on life prisoners who escape, thus removing any deter-
rent restraints on their commission of any crime except murder, id. at 605-07;
(2) Justice White's use of data to determine public views was flawed and
misleading because it focused only on the immediate post-Furman legislative
experience, id. at 613-15;
(3) the decision did not respect the values implicit in a federal system in
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e. The Constitutionality of the Death Penalty - The
Positions of the "Groups" on the Supreme Court
Coker was the last case in the development of the basic po-
sitions of the groups on the Supreme Court concerning the con-
stitutionality of the death penalty. After Gregg and Coker, it
was clear that the death penalty for murder was constitutional
as long as the procedural safeguards were adequate to satisfy the
concerns of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens. When the
scheme did not satisfy those concerns, as in Woodson and Rob-
erts, the three Justices voted with Justices Marshall and Bren-
nan to strike the scheme down. When the scheme had adequate
procedures to control discretion, the three joined with the other
Justices in upholding the scheme. Because of the pivotal posi-
tion the intermediate group holds between the other two groups,
it is helpful to begin with then and use their framework as the
basis for developing and comparing the other two positions.
This mode of analysis is useful in understanding and pre-
dicting refinements in the notion of the eighth amendment right
to adequate procedural limitations. In addition, the analysis rec-
ognizes that two other well-reasoned approaches exist - the per
se approach and the deference to state legislation approach -
which together represent the views of perhaps a majority of the
Court. An awareness of these approaches and the reasons for
their adoption helps identify the issues involved and also pro-
vides a framework for understanding possible shifts in positions
and voting patterns of the justices in the future.486 Finally, the
arguments for and against each position provide a foundation
for the discussion of the philosophical issues in Part III and thus
are relevant to the development of one's views concerning the
proper role of legislators, prosecutors, the governor, and citizens.
which each state should be free to experiment, id. at 615-20;
(4) rape victims were denied the potential deterrent impact of capital pun-
ishment, id. at 616-18; and
(5) capital punishment is not excessive when imposed for a heinous crime
such as rape, especially when committed by a recidivist such as Coker, id. at
607-13, 619-21.
486. See infra notes 684-97 and accompanying text.
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(1) The "Intermediate Position": Justices Powell, Stevens
and Stewart
In considering challenges that the imposition of capital pun-
ishment offends the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment, the intermediate group has developed
a two-pronged test. The first prong focuses on cultural standards
of decency, as reflected in history, cross-cultural comparisons,
legislation, precedent, and jury behavior. 87 When the intermedi-
ate group has used this approach to evaluate capital punish-
ment, it has concluded that contemporary society clearly accepts
the death penalty488 as long as it is imposed for murder.489 One
advantage of this approach is that the Court's decision arguably
is based on something other than the personal views of the jus-
tices concerning the meaning of the eighth amendment. The
Court, however, cannot simply follow cultural standards of ac-
ceptable punishment because these may not adequately protect
the constitutional right. 90 Consequently, the intermediate group
also has adopted a second test: the challenged punishment must
comport "with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of
the amendment.' ' 49 1 In order to satisfy this second standard,
three questions must be considered: (1) whether the punishment
is imposed in order to achieve a legitimate purpose;492 (2)
whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the
crime;493 and (3) whether the punishment is imposed arbitrarily
and capriciously.
494
Punishment satisfies the first consideration if it is imposed
to achieve one of two purposes - retribution or deterrence. 9 5
Retribution is permissible and consistent with a respect for the
dignity of men because it expresses society's moral outrage at
crime and thus helps to maintain respect for law and to insure
that people will not feel the need to seek revenge through self-
487. See, e.g., Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-97; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175-82.
488. E.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175-82.
489. Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-97.
490. See, e.g., Coker, 433 U.S. at 597; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
491. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182.
492. E.g., Coker, 433 U.S. at 592; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
493. Id.
494. See supra notes 403-11, 424-80 and accompanying text.
495. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
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help. 96 Capital punishment achieves this retributive goal if it is
reserved for those extreme crimes that are "so grievous an af-
front to humanity that the only adequate response may be the
penalty of death.' 497 Given the inconclusive debate over the de-
terrent impact of the death penalty, the intermediate group con-
cluded that this issue is best addressed by state legislatures.'98
Proportionality was initially presented in Gregg when Jus-
tice Stewart simply concluded that it was not possible to say
that execution, even though severe and irrevocable, was not pro-
portional to a deliberate murder. 9 In Coker, Justice White,
joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens, considered
not only his personal judgment but also cultural attitudes, as re-
flected in sources such as statutes, in deciding that capital pun-
ishment was disproportionate to the crime of rape.50 0 Thus, pro-
portionality appears to be measured against cultural standards
and the Justices' view of the "core" of the eighth amendment.
The final consideration used by the intermediate group is
whether sufficient procedural safeguards have been adopted to
insure that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily and ca-
priciously, whether as a result of unlimited jury discretion 50 1 or
of rigidly mechanical mandatory sentences.502 These procedures
need not restrict decisions not to execute503 but must insure that
when the death penalty is imposed, it is appropriate for the par-
ticular defendant and the particular crime.504 Because of the
procedural emphasis of this concern, concluding that it is based
on the due process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment is
tempting. However, the Court decided Furman only a year after
rejecting due process challenges to the death penalty in Mc-
496. Id. at 183-84.
497. Id. at 184.
498. Id. at 186-87. Because the intermediate group perhaps relied unduly on an un-
published study, the group has been cricitized for misusing empirical studies to conclude
that the issue was unsettled. E.g., Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of
the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1177, 1206
(1981). However, apart from this criticism of the use of sociological research, good rea-
sons exist for viewing the debate as necessarily inconclusive. See infra notes 878-79, 881
and accompanying text.
499. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187.
500. See supra note 483.
501. See supra notes 403-11, 436-80 and accompanying text.
502. See supra notes 424-35, 466-74 and accompanying text.
503. See supra notes 444-45, 464, 479 and accompanying text.
504. See supra notes 424-29, 434-35 and accompanying text.
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Gautha v. California. As a result, the procedural concerns were
grounded in the eighth amendment.50 5 Thus, although it is open
to dispute and criticism,08 the intermediate position can be
summarized as follows:
Capital punishment for murder is not cruel and unusual, even
if the statutory scheme provides unlimited discretion not to ex-
ecute, so long as the decision to execute a particular defendant
is based on procedures which provide adequate information
and guidelines and sufficient checks on abuse to insure that the
imposition of the death sentence is based on a consideration of
the combined relevant circumstances of the particular crime
and the defendant to determine whether capital punishment in
a particular case satisfies both cultural standards of decency
and the two basic concerns central to the eighth amendment -
purposiveness and proportionality.
The intermediate group has been optimistic about the ability of
the states to satisfy this standard. However, the per se group has
been more pessimistic and has argued that subsequent cases in-
dicate that this pessimism is warranted.
507
(2) The "Per Se Position"
(a) Justice Brennan
Justice Brennan argued that the basic concept underlying
the eighth amendment is the concern for promoting the dignity
of man by prohibiting uncivilized and inhuman punishment.508
He then argued that four principles, reflected in the cases and
inherent in the amendment, could be used to determine whether
a particular punishment offends human dignity.50 9 First and
most important, the punishment must not be so severe, painful,
505. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 n.47, 196-97.
506. Even the intermediate group concedes that the procedural emphasis of Furman
"is clearly in substantial tension with a broad reading of McGautha's holding." Gregg,
428 U.S. at 195-96 n.47. The legislative deference group has severely criticized this eighth
amendment right to due process. See infra notes 547-49 and accompanying text.
507. See, e.g., infra note 598 and accompanying text.
508. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 228-29; Furman, 408 U.S. at 270.
509. Furman, 408 U.S. at 284-85. Justice Brennan believes that this use of princi-
ples is necessary because neither the Constitution, id. at 283-84, 284 n.29, 285 n.32, nor
the cases dictate a result. Id. at 284-85.
[Vol. 34
94
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss2/5
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
or demoralizing that it indicates that the person being punished
is regarded as a mere thing rather than a person.510 Torture im-
posed by the rack and screw is a clear example of such inhuman
treatment.5 11 The second principle requires regularity and fair-
ness in the imposition of severe punishments, thus prohibiting
the arbitrary imposition of such a punishment on some while
others escape punishment for no good reason. 513 Third, the pun-
ishment must be acceptable to contemporary society. 13 Whether
a particular punishment has been accepted or rejected by society
can be determined by considering objective indicators such as
legislation and patterns of sentencing in all the states.5 4 Finally,
punishment should not be more severe than is necessary to ac-
complish a legitimate purpose. 515
Justice Brennan's scheme of the essence of the cruel and
unusual punishment clause is in some respects similar to that of
the intermediate group both in its general concern for human
dignity56 and in its specific content. His third principle, like the
intermediate group's first prong, focuses on cultural acceptance
and, like the intermediate group, he is also unwilling to use so-
cial acceptance as the sole standard. In addition, Brennan's con-
cern with the prevention of arbitrariness and of purposeless
punishment is very similar to the second prong of the intermedi-
ate group's two part test.
Justice Brennan's four principles are, nonetheless, different
in two basic respects. First, the marked emphasis on human dig-
nity and the explicit focus on "inhuman" punishment are
unique. Second, Brennan argues that the punishment is to be
measured against the four principles as a systematic whole and
that a punishment which partially fails to satisfy all of them can
be stricken down even if it is not fatally offensive under any sin-
gle principle.517 These are important differences because the
vagueness in the notion of "degrading and inhuman" and the
flexibility in applying the principles as a system combine to pro-
510. Furman, 408 U.S. at 271-74. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 227-31.
511. Furman, 408 U.S. at 272.
512. Id. at 274-77.
513. Id. at 277-79.
514. Id. at 278-79.
515. Id. at 279-81.
516. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182, 183.
517. Furman, 408 U.S. at 281, 305.
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vide much greater potential for holding a particular punishment
unconstitutional.
Because of this greater potential, Justice Brennan found
that the death penalty fails to satisfy the four principles. Since
death is a total denial of status and rights and involves consider-
able mental and perhaps physical pain, it offends the first prin-
ciple.51 8 While it has a long history of use in this country, the
death penalty is now used so rarely that a strong probability ex-
ists that our procedures are not adequate to prevent arbitrari-
ness.519 Moreover, the present infrequency of use, combined with
a history of controversy, indicate substantial doubt in society
about the propriety of the death penalty.520 Finally, the assump-
tion that the death penalty provides any deterrent or retributive
impact greater than life imprisonment is implausible.521
(b) Justice Marshall
Justice Marshall developed four standards to be used in de-
termining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual: (1)
whether it is so painful that a civilized society would not tolerate
it; (2) whether it is unusual; (3) whether it serves a valid pur-
pose; and (4) whether it is acceptable to society.52 He focused
on the last two in his review of the death penalty and concluded
that it was unconstitutional.
Of the many purposes that might be asserted to justify the
death penalty,523 only deterrence and retribution are serious
candidates as a legitimate purpose. 5 4 Deterrence does not jus-
tify punishment because empirical studies indicate that life im-
prisonment is just as effective as a deterrent.52 5 Retribution does
not justify the' death penalty because life imprisonment is suffi-
518. Id. at 285-91.
519. Id. at 291-95.
520. Furman, 408 U.S. at 295-300.
521. Id. at 300-05.
522. Id. at 330-32.
523. In addition to the reasons given in the text, Justice Marshall also considered
and rejected four others: (1) prevention of recidivism, Furman, 408 U.S. at 355; (2) en-
couragement of guilty pleas and confessions, id. at 355-56; (3) eugenics, id. at 355, 356-
57; and (4) reduction of state expenditures. Id. at 355, 357-58.
524. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 233; Furman, 408 U.S. at 342-54 (rejecting both deterrence
and retribution as justification).
525. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 233-37; Furman, 408 U.S. at 345-54.
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cient to prevent self-help or to maintain respect for the law.5 26
Marshall also rejected the argument that the death penalty can
be imposed to achieve the retributive goal of imposing the only
penalty that is proportional to the crime involved. The concern
for human dignity at the core of the eighth amendment involves
a right to be treated as more than a means to satisfy social de-
mand for a particular punishment.
52 7
Initially, Justice Marshall argued that an informed citizenry
would not accept the death penalty 28 and that, therefore, the
penalty was unconstitutional.529 Subsequently, he modified his
position somewhat because of more recent legislative enactments
of the death penalty and because of his uneasiness concerning
the antimajoritarianism implicit in his emphasis on an informed
electorate.530 Thus, his opposition to capital punishment is based
primarily on the assertion that it serves no legitimate purpose.
(3) The "Deference to Legislative Decisions Position"
The primary characteristic that identifies this "group" is a
strong commitment to judicial self-restraint and deference to
state legislatures, which is expressed as a strong presumption in
favor of the constitutionality of legislatively adopted punish-
ment schemes. 58 1 This approach is considered to be particularly
appropriate in reviewing challenges to capital punishment be-
cause the eighth amendment is so vague and because decisions
about "proper" punishment are so difficult.53 2 To fulfill their
duty to provide constitutional review while also avoiding the im-
position of their own subjective predilections on society,5 "3 this
group has identified three objective factors relevant to the re-
view of capital punishment legislation. The group has consist-
ently upheld challenges to the death penalty on the basis of
these factors.
526. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 237-39.
527. Id. at 239-41.
528. Furman, 408 U.S. at 362-69.
529. Id. at 360-69.
530. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232-33.
531. Furman, 408 U.S. at 375-76, 383-84, 403-05, 406-07, 410-14, 417-18, 431-34,
461-65, 465-70.
532. Id. at 375-76, 395-96, 403-05.
533. Id. at 376, 405-06, 431, 460-69.
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First, the intent of the drafters of the Constitution must be
considered.5 34 Since capital punishment existed at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution, arguing that the eighth
amendment was clearly intended to prohibit executions is not
possible.5 35 However, whether the intent was always to allow
capital punishment is not clear. This uncertainty exists because,
in all likelihood, the framers intended for the amendment to be
flexible so that its applicability would change as the basic mores
of society changed.
536
To provide for this concern, the second measure for review-
ing a punishment is cultural acceptance. 37 The primary evi-
dence of such acceptance in a given state is legislation: "in a de-
mocracy the legislative judgment is presumed to embody the
basic standards of decency prevailing in the society. This pre-
sumption can only be negated by unambiguous and compelling
evidence of legislative default. '538 No reason exists to believe
that the legislatures are not serving as a barometer of public
views on this issue. Given the overwhelming legislative adoption
of capital punishment it cannot be said that this is a punish-
ment adopted by only a few deviant states.539 Moreover, opinion
polls (for whatever they may be worth) do not indicate a social
rejection of the death penalty.
540
The argument that the infrequency of executions indicates
lack of acceptance does not withstand analysis.541 Infrequency is,
if anything, an indication of judgment and selectivity5 2 and
does not support the argument that this discretion is applied in
a way that reflects a pattern of racial or other discrimination
against the weak and powerless. 54 ' The argument that the pen-
alty is imposed randomly and arbitrarily is also unsupported by
534. See id. at 380-84.
535. Id. at 380. See id. at 419-20.
536. Id. at 382-83, 409, 420, 429-30.
537. Id. at 384, 420-21.
538. Id. at 384. See id. at 436-37.
539. Id. at 386. See id. at 411-13, 417-18, 437-39.
540. Id. at 385-86.
541. Id. at 386-87, 443-50.
542. Id. at 387-91, 439-41.
543. Id. at 389 n.12. See id. at 444-45, 449-50. Justice Powell noted that because the
underprivileged receive a criminal penalty more often than more wealthy persons is not a
constitutional issue. Id. at 447-48.
488 [Vol. 34
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empirical findings.5 " Moreover, even if the findings did not sup-
port the argument, the solution to this would be more execu-
tions, not fewer, 545 and mandatory death penalty schemes would
be constitutional. 46 In any event, even if evidence of discrimina-
tion or arbitrariness existed, the argument would raise a four-
teenth amendment issue, not an eighth amendment question.
5 47
The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is concerned
with the type of punishment, not the process of imposing it.5
4 8
The third objective measure of proper punishment is stare
decisis, and no precedent exists for the conversion of the eighth
amendment into a guarantee of procedural protections for de-
fendants.5 49 The novel notion that the amendment authorized
the Court to consider whether capita punishment accomplishes
a legitimate purpose is also unprecedented. 550 In addition, the
insurmountable problems involved in assessing matters such as
the incremental deterrent effect of execution vis-a-vis life im-
prisonment counsel against judicial intervention except in cases
in which the legislation clearly lacks justification.5 51
(4) Justice O'Connor
Although Justice O'Connor was not appointed until several
years after Coker, summarizing her position as it has emerged in
more recent cases will be helpful. She has written only two opin-
ions in the area;55 2 therefore, some degree of speculation is nec-
essary. Nevertheless, two points seem clear.
First, Justice O'Connor, like the Justices of the intermediate
group, based her approach in large part on insuring that careful,
individualized decisions are made concerning whether a particu-
lar defendant deserves the death penalty. Thus, when doubt has
existed concerning the consideration of relevant mitigating fac-
544. Id. at 389 n.12, 399.
545. Id. at 398.
546. Id. at 413.
547. Id. at 389 n.12, 449-50.
548. Id. at 397.
549. Id. at 421-28, 430-31.
550. Id. at 391-94, 451.
551. Id. at 395-96, 451-56.
552. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869, 877-79 (1982) (concurring); Enmund v.
Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3379-94 (1982) (dissenting). Her opinion in Enmund is dis-
cussed at infra notes 669-75 and accompanying text.
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tors, she has voted to reverse the death sentence and remand for
resentencing.55 3
Second, when substantive rules are involved she has taken a
position more like that of the deference to legislation group.
Thus, she has been very reluctant to find that some portion of a
statutory scheme offends cultural notions of proportionality. For
example, she requires that both legislative and jury decisions in-
dicate a rejection of the death penalty under the circumstances
contemplated by the scheme.5 " In determining whether such a
rejection is indicated, she interprets the data broadly in favor of
the death penalty.55 5 In addition, so long as the jury bases its
decisions upon the proper procedures, she is reluctant to assume
that their decisions indicate anything but a careful choice to
limit the death penalty to those cases in which it is appropri-
ate.5 56 When she measures the death penalty against noncultural
standards of proportionality, Justice O'Connor has been hesitant
to strike down a death sentence on the ground that it does not
adequately serve any legitimate purpose of punishment.
5 7
(5) Limitations on Group Analysis and Alternative
Perspectives on the Court's Divisions
Although the division of the Court into these three groups
can be helpful in a number of ways,558 it should be stressed once
again that the Court does not vote in "blocs." Each Justice has
his own views and Justices often change their position - for ex-
ample, a respect for precedent can support initial objection to a
new position, but once this position is established, that same re-
spect will result in support for the new position.55 9 Furthermore,
the analytical scheme used to divide the groups is somewhat ar-
553. Eddings, 102 S. Ct. at 877-79; Enmund, 102 S. Ct. at 3394.
554. Enmund, 102 S. Ct. at 3386, 3390.
555, Id. at 3386-90.
556. See id. at 3392.
557. See id. at 3386, 3390-92. This point is discussed further at infra note 674 and
accompanying text.
558. See supra note 486 and accompanying text.
559. This reason might explain, for example, the shift in position by Justice Black-
mun from voting to uphold the death penalty in Furman, Woodson, and Roberts, see
supra notes 417, 419, 423, 531-51 and accompanying text, to voting to strike it down for
procedural reasons in Lockett and for substantive reasons in Enmund. See supra notes
602, 609, 657 and accompanying text.
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bitrary. In later opinions, for example, the Court seems to be
composed of four groups which can be distinguished on their
views concerning both substantive and procedural limitations on
the death penalty.
If we take this perspective and consider shifts in the posi-
tion of individual Justices, the Court could be divided - albeit
very roughly - into four positions: (1) objecting to the death
penalty as absolutely, per se unconstitutional (Justices Marshall
and Brennan); (2) upholding the death penalty so long as certain
procedures are followed and it is limited to certain substantive
types of crimes that clearly satisfy cultural and noncultural
standards of proportionality (Justices White, Blackmun, and
Stevens);560 (3) upholding the death penalty so long as certain
procedures are followed and it is limited to certain types of
crimes that apparently satisfy cultural and noncultural stan-
dards of proportionality (Justices Powell"' and O'Connor);
56 2
and (4) upholding the death penalty if the democratically
elected legislature of the state adopted it, (Justices Burger
5 63
and Rehnquist). This analytical framework parallels the one de-
veloped above in the two extreme positions - per se objection
and strict legislative presumption. However, it involves a larger
intermediate group, which can be subdivided in accordance with
the strictness of their review of the substantive criminal conduct
for which death can be imposed.
560. Qualifications are, of course, in order. For example, Justice White wrote the
plurality opinions striking down the death penalty for substantive reasons in Coker and
Enmund. See supra note 483 and accompanying text, and infra notes 655-68 and accom-
panying text. However, he has often voted with the deference to legislation group. See
supra notes 531-51 and accompanying text. For example, he dissented in one of the re-
cent cases striking down the death penalty on procedural grounds, Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420 (1980). See infra notes 638-41 and accompanying text.
561. When the death penalty was struck down on substantive grounds, Justice Pow-
ell concurred on a narrow ground, in Coker, see supra note 484 and accompanying text,
and joined Justice O'Connor's dissent, in Enmund. See infra notes 669-75 and accompa-
nying text.
562. See supra notes 553-57 and accompanying text.
563. Most of Chief Justice Burger's decisions reflect this position of deference. See
supra notes 531-51 and accompanying text, and infra note 638 and accompanying text.
However, his deference to state legislatures has limits because he has voted to reverse
death sentences. See infra notes 568-74, 594, 607-26 and accompanying text.
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2. Refining the Standard of Adequate Procedural Safeguards
By 1977, the positions of the three groups had developed,
and the death penalty for murder clearly was constitutional so
long as its imposition was based on adequate procedural protec-
tion to insure that the defendant deserved the punishment. Sub-
sequent cases have addressed issues involved in refining this ap-
proach because cases like Gregg did not address a number of
details concerning the procedural adequacy of capital punish-
ment sentencing schemes. The following sections discuss this re-
finement, focusing first, on the adjudication of guilt and second,
on the sentencing process.
a. The Adjudication of Guilt
The use of lesser included offense instructions in capital
cases allows the jury to convict a defendant of a lesser included
offense; therefore, the instruction can be viewed as granting the
jury the discretion to avoid finding the defendant guilty of a
capital crime even if he committed that crime. For this reason,
the use of such instructions was challenged in Gregg,5" Prof-
fit,565 and Jurek"6 as contrary to the requirements of Furman.
However, these attacks were summarily rejected as misinterpre-
tations of Furman because Furman focused on the adequacy of
procedures in cases in which the death penalty was imposed
rather than on the discretion not to impose the penalty.
56 7
In Beck v. Alabama,6 8 the Court was presented with a case
which did raise Furman issues because the defendant in Beck
had been sentenced to death. The Alabama statute prohibited
the use of lesser included offense instructions even in a case such
as Beck's in which the facts would support such an instruc-
tion.56 9 The effect of the denial of the instruction was to force
564. 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 436-56
and accompanying text.
665. 428 U.S. 242, 254 (1976). For discussion of this case, see supra notes 457-67 and
accompanying text.
566. 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976). For discussion of this case, see supra notes 468-80 and
accompanying text.
667. See supra notes 501-04, 564-66.
568. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
569. Id. at 627. Under the Alabama statute, the death penalty could be imposed
only for intentional murder, and this intent could not be supplied by the felony-murder
492 [Vol. 34
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the jury to choose between convicting the defendant of a capital
offense or acquitting the defendant, thereby allowing him to es-
cape all punishment regardless of his crime. 570 Under some cir-
cumstances, this procedure may be an advantage to the defen-
dant.57 1 However,
when the evidence unquestionably establishes that the defen-
dant is guilty of a serious violent offense - but leaves some
doubt with respect to an element that would justify conviction
of a capital offense - the failure to give the jury the "third
option" of convicting on a lesser included offense would seem
inevitably to enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction.
5 72
This risk cannot be tolerated because of the constitutionally sig-
nificant difference between the death penalty and lesser punish-
ment.57 - Thus, the prohibition of the lesser included offense in-
struction is unconstitutional because it reduces the reliability of
the guilt determination with possibly serious adverse impact on
the defendant.7 4
The interrelated nature of the guilt and sentencing deci-
sions was also the basis of a constitutional attack on the death
penalty in Lockett v. Ohio.57 5 Under the Ohio statute, the sen-
tencing court had unlimited discretion to impose a life sentence
in the interest of justice if a defendant pleaded guilty or no con-
test.5 7 6 No such interest of justice discretion existed if the defen-
dant pleaded not guilty, 77 in which case the defendant had to
rely on a limited statutory list of mitigating circumstances in at-
doctrine. Id. at 627-28. Beck admitted that he was involved in the commission of a felony
which resulted in death, but denied he killed the victim or intended his death. Id. at 629-
30. Thus, he argued that he was entitled to an instruction concerning felony-murder,
which is a lesser included offense of capital murder in Alabama. Id.
570. Id. at 629.
571. Id. at 633-35.
572. Id. at 637.
573. Id. at 637-38.
574. Id. at 638. See also, id. at 633 for Alabama's argument in favor of its procedure,
and id. at 638-46 for the Court's response. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan,
Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell joined Justice Stevens' majority opinion. Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall wrote concurring opinions based on their per se position. Id. at 646.
Justice White joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent, which was based on the petitioner's
failure to raise the lesser included offense issue in the Alabama Supreme Court. Id. at
646-48.
575. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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tempting to convince the judge to sentence him to life imprison-
ment. 7 Lockett argued that this disparity in sentencing discre-
tion impermissibly interfered with her right to a trial by jury
under the sixth amendment and her right to plead not guilty
under the fifth amendment .5 7 9 Her death penalty was reversed
on other grounds, 580 and only Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion addressed this challenge. Justice Blackmun agreed that
the statutory difference was unconstitutional because the defen-
dant's rights were unnecessarily burdened by forcing her to
choose between "fully" discretionary sentencing and semi-
mandatory sentencing.5 1
b. The Sentencing Process
(1) Gardner v. Florida
582
The Florida death penalty statute authorized the judge to
overrule a jury recommendation of life imprisonment if he found
that the death penalty was clearly required.5 8 3 Acting pursuant
to this authority, the trial judge in Gardner v. Florida overruled
the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment and sentenced
the petitioner to death because the judge concluded that the pe-
titioner showed no mitigation.5 " In reaching this decision, the
trial judge considered not only the evidence presented at the
guilt and sentencing trials, but also factual information con-
tained in the presentence investigation report. 85 This report
contained a confidential portion, which was not revealed to de-
fense counsel, though the rest of the report was disclosed.5 8 De-
fense counsel made no request to see the confidential informa-
tion and the trial judge did not comment on the confidential
portion of the report.5 87 The Florida Supreme Court upheld the
578. Id. at 618-19.
579. Id. at 617-18.
580. See infra notes 607-13 and accompanying text.
581. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 619.
582. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
583. For further discussion of this issue, see supra notes 458-62 and accompanying
text.
584. 430 U.S. at 352-53.
585. Id. at 353.
586. Id.
587. Id. The Court held that this did not constitute a waiver of defendant's right to
[Vol. 34
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petitioner's death sentence without considering the confidential
information. 8
The defendant appealed this sentence to the United States
Supreme Court. Just*ice Stevens, joined by Justices Stewart and
Powell, concluded that the use of the confidential information
denied Gardner his right to due process oflaw and remanded
the case to the trial court for resentencing. 589 Stevens considered
and rejected four arguments by the State in support of the use
of the information. First, the State argued that confidentiality
was necessary to insure the obtaining of relevant but sensitive
information from persons unwilling to comment publicly. Justice
Stewart responded that the interest in accuracy was greater than
the interest in confidentiality.5 90 Second, the State's argument
that full disclosure would cause unnecessary delay was summa-
rily rejected because any delay which increased the probable ac-
curacy of a life-death decision could hardly be unnecessary." 1
Third, the Court rejected the argument that full disclosure will
occasionally disrupt rehabilitation because the death penalty
precludes rehabilitation.592 Finally, the State argued that trial
judges could be trusted to act responsibly even if acting on the
basis of secret information. The State premised this argument
on the assumption that the participation of adversary counsel is
superfluous, and Justice Stevens denied this premise because de-
bate between adversaries and full disclosure of all facts are es-
sential to finding the truth.5 3




concurred in the result but based their opinion on the eighth
amendment requirement of adequate procedures rather than on
the due process clause. Justice Brennan concurred but continued
due process. Id. at 349-50.
588. Id. at 353-54.
589. Id. at 362.
590. Id. at 358-59.
591. Id. at 359-60.
592. Id. at 360.
593. Id. at 360-61.
594. Chief Justice Burger concurred without an opinion. Id. at 362.
595. Id. at 362-64.
596. Id. at 364. Justice Blackmun simply noted that, given the eighth amendment
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to adhere to this per se position.5 97 Justice Marshall dissented
on the basis of his opposition to the death penalty and empha-
sized that the record in Gardner indicated that the states were
not in fact providing adequate procedural safeguards. 98 Justice
Rehnquist also dissented, stressing that the eighth amendment
imposed substantive, not procedural, standards and that the due
process clause had never been held to invalidate procedures like
those used in Gardner.
5 99
(2) Bell v. Ohio600 and Lockett v. Ohio601
On July 8, 1978, the United States Supreme Court rendered
two decisions invalidating the Ohio capital punishment scheme:
Bell v. Ohio and Lockett v. Ohio. Lockett, the central case, con-
tained a mixture of majority opinion and plurality judgment,
60 2
addressing a variety of issues including: (1) scope and nature of
evidence in mitigation; (2) exclusion of jurors; and (3) adequacy
of notice under the fourteenth amendment. 0 3 Before discussing
these issues, a review of the facts and trial proceedings of these
cases is appropriate.
In Bell, the defendant and Samuel Hall participated in the
kidnapping of Julius Graber, a 64 year-old man. Armed with a
597. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 364-65.
598. Id. at 365-70.
599. Id. at 371.
600. 438 U.S. 637 (1978).
601. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
602. Chief Justice Burger wrote the plurality opinion for himself and Justices Stew-
art, Stevens, and Powell. Justice Brennan did not participate in either decision. Justice
Blackmun concurred. Justice Marshall concurred in both judgments on the basis of his
per se position. Justice White concurred and dissented, and Justice Rehnquist dissented.
603. The plurality opinion also considered and rejected a claim of improper closing
remarks by the prosecution. Id. at 594-95. In addition, the plurality explicitly did not
address the following issues: (1) whether the death penalty is constitutionally dispropor-
tionate for one who has not taken, attempted to take, or intended to take life; (2)
whether the Constitution requires jury participation in the sentencing decision; (3)
whether the defendant's plea may affect the scope of sentencing discretion; (4) whether
placing the burden of proving mitigating circumstances on a capital defendant is consti-
tutionally permissible; and (5) whether meaningful appellate review is constitutionally
required. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 609, n.16; Bell, 438 U.S. at 642, n.*. Justices Blackmun
and White discussed the first issue. See infra notes 60913 and accompanying text. The
Court also addressed the issue in Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982). See infra
notes 655-79 and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun addressed the third issue in his
concurring opinion. See supra notes 575-81 and accompanying text.
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sawed-off shotgun, they forced Graber to surrender his car keys
and put him in the car's trunk. Bell, following Hall's directions,
drove the car to a cemetery. Graber then was taken from the car
and shot twice, fatally, with the shotgun. Bell and Hall accused
each other of the shooting, and there were no other
eyewitnesses. 04
In Lockett, the defendant participated in the planning and
execution of the armed robbery of a pawnshop. Her co-conspira-
tors committed the actual robbery, during which the owner was
fatally shot, while Lockett remained outside in the car. The trig-
ger-man plea-bargained for life imprisonment in exchange for
his testimony against Lockett and the other co-defendants.
Lockett rejected three plea-bargaining offers. 0 5
Bell and Lockett were sentenced to death pursuant to the
Ohio statute, which provided for a bifurcated capital punish-
ment trial. The guilt stage was held before a jury or a three
judge panel to determine if the defendant was guilty of capital
murder. If found guilty, a sentencing hearing was held before the
trial judge. The death penalty was mandatory unless the court
found that one of three mitigating circumstances was established
by a preponderance of the evidence. These circumstances were:
(1) whether the victim had induced or facilitated the offense; (2)
whether the defendant acted under duress, coercion, or strong
provocation; or (3) whether the offense was primarily the prod-
uct of the defendant's psychosis or mental deficiency. In deter-
mining the existence of these circumstances, the court was to
consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history, character, and condition of the defendant. 60
(a) Mitigating Circumstances
In Bell and Lockett, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices
Stewart, Stevens, and Powell, held that:
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sen-
tencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be pre-
cluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances
604. Bell, 438 U.S. at 639-40.
605. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 589-92.
606. Id. at 593-94.
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of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sen-
tence less than death.607
Chief Justice Burger concluded that the three statutory mitigat-
ing circumstances were too limited to provide the individualized
sentencing decision required in capital cases.6 0 8
Justices Blackmun and White took somewhat different posi-
tions in their concurring opinions. Justice Blackmun agreed that
the defendant's mental state and degree of participation should
be considered in mitigation, but he did not accept the plurality's
broad view that mitigating circumstances must be unlimited.60
Justice White also disagreed about unlimited mitigation but
adopted a per se position about unintentional homicides. He ar-
gued that because the penalty was disproportionate to the crime
and did not further any legitimate goal of punishment, the death
penalty was excessive under the eighth amendment unless the
defendant intended to cause the victim's death.610
Justice White based his position on a statistical analysis
similar to the one he used in Coker.61' He noted that only eight
nontriggermen had been executed for murder since 1954,
whereas seventy-two persons had been executed for rape during
the same time period. He recognized that almost half of the
state statutes still allowed capital punishment for nontriggermen
but considered the frequency of actual imposition to be of
greater weight. Justice White concluded that this recent history
revealed society's rejection of capital punishment for unintend-
ing defendants as grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
crime.612 He also concluded that the deterrent value of capital
punishment for unintended murders was extremely attenuated
and that the likelihood that capital punishment would serve any
legitimate penal purposes was questionable in light of the recent
sentencing history.
613
607. Id. at 604 (emphasis in original); Bell, 438 U.S. at 642 (emphasis in original).
608. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605-08.
609. Id. at 615-16.
610. Id. at 622-28.
611. For a discussion of Justice White's opinion in Coker, see supra note 483 and
accompanying text.
612. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 624-25.
613. Id. at 625.
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In Lockett, four veniremen were excluded on the basis of
their refusals to take an oath that they would truly try the case
despite the possibility of capital punishment. 14 The petitioner
contended that their exclusion violated her sixth and fourteenth
amendment rights under the principles established in Wither-
spoon v. Illinois6 15 and Taylor v. Louisiana,6 but the Court
concluded that her rights had not been violated. 17
In Witherspoon, veniremen were excluded because they
were opposed generally to capital punishment, 18 and the Court
held that "a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury
that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding ve-
niremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections
to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious
scruples against its infliction."' 1 9 The Court in Witherspoon
noted, however, that a veniremen could be excluded if his views
on capital punishment would interfere with his duty to deter-
mine the defendant's guilt in accordance with law.
62 0
Although the jury's sole function under the Ohio statute
was to determine the defendant's guilt, the Court assumed argu-
endo that Witherspoon provided grounds for challenging a con-
viction as well as a sentence . 21 The Court held the exclusions in
Lockett to be proper because the veniremen had made unmis-
takably clear that they could not be trusted to abide by existing
law or to follow the trial judge's jury instructions. Thus, their
opinions on capital punishment could interfere with their deter-
mination of guilt.6 22
Taylor upheld a defendant's right to a representative
jury,623 but the Court in Lockett held that this right had not
been denied because it does not include "the right to be tried by
614. Id. at 595-96.
615. 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 595.
616. 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 595.
617. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 596-97.
618. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 513; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 596.
619. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 596.
620. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522-23; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 596.
621. Id. at 596.
622. Id.
623. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 596.
19821
109
Hubbard et al.: A "Meaningful" Basis for the Death Penalty: The Practice, Constit
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
jurors who have explicitly indicated an inability to follow the
law and instructions of the trial judge.
'62
4
(c) Adequacy of Notice
In Lockett, the petitioner also challenged her conviction on
the ground of inadequate notice under the fourteenth amend-
ment, contending that the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation
of the statute was "so unexpected that it deprived her of fair
warning of the crime with which she was charged. 8 25 The Court
summarily concluded that the Ohio Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the complicity statute was consistent with prior state law
and the legislative history of the statute and, therefore, rejected
the challenge.
6 26
(3) Godfrey v. Georgia 
27
In Godfrey v. Georgia, the Supreme Court was forced to re-
consider the decision in Gregg that statutory construction by the
Georgia Supreme Court would resolve the potential problem
that several aggravating circumstances in the Georgia statute
were overbroad and vague.62 8 The Georgia statute provided that
a convicted capital offender could be sentenced to death if it was
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense "was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the vic-
tim. '829 Godfrey shot his estranged wife and mother-in-law at
point blank range with a shotgun, killing them both instantly.
The prosecution admitted that the crime did not involve torture
or aggravated battery. The trial judge concluded that the crime
did not involve torture or physical harm other than the actual
killing. The sentencing jury imposed death, specifying the find-
ing "that the offense of murder was outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible and inhuman." The Georgia Supreme Court upheld
624. Id.. at 596-97.
625. Id. at 597.
626. Id.
627. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
628. See supra notes 446-49 and accompanying text.
629. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 422.
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Godfrey's death sentence.30 Justice Stewart, joined by Justices
Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, held that the aggravating cir-
cumstance was unconstitutionally vague.
Justice Stewart's opinion reviewed the post-Gregg history of
death sentence cases construing the challenged section. These
cases revealed a narrow construction of the statute by the Geor-
gia Supreme Court, with a focus on pre-death torture of and ag-
gravated battery to the victim. 631 However, Godfrey's crime did
not include these elements and the Georgia Supreme Court sim-
ply had asserted that the verdict was "factually substanti-
ated."6 32 As a result of this broad application of the section, the
issue became the constitutionality of the phrase "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that [the murder] involved
... depravity of mind. .. ."3 Justice Stewart conclded that
no principled way existed to distinguish the application of the
phrase in Godfrey's case from the many cases in which the death
penalty had not been imposed.3 4 Therefore, the section was not
a sufficient restraint of sentencing discretion. In short, the Geor-
gia Supreme Court had not provided the safeguard of proper
statutory construction relied on in Gregg. 35
Justices Marshall and Brennan concurred on the basis of
their per se unconstitutional position.636 They also argued that
this case indicated the impossibility of eliminating the arbitrary
infliction of capital punishment and that, therefore, the death
penalty "must be abandoned altogether."637
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and White dis-
sented. Chief Justice Burger criticized the decision as being a
usurpation of both the jury's judgment and the state legisla-
ture's province. He warned that the Court was taking on an un-
warranted case-by-case workload.638 Justice White, joined by
Justice Rehnquist, characterized the Court's judgment as turn-
ing "a blind eye to the facts surrounding the murders.., and
630. Id. at 425-28.
631. Id. at 429-32.
632. Id. at 432.
633. Id.
634. Id. at 433.
635. Id. at 429, 432. See supra notes 446-49 and accompanying text.
636. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433.
637. Id. at 440, 441-42.
638. Id. at 443-44.
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to the constancy of the State Supreme Court in performance of
its statutory review function."63 His opinion contained a de-
tailed description of the murder scene, emphasizing the choice of
weapon and the "bloody mess" that it caused.' 0 He also noted
that Godfrey's mother-in-law, who was shot after Mrs. Godfrey,
was undoubtedly as terrified as humanly possible by the bloody
death of her daughter and such terror could be viewed as
torture. 4'
(4) Zant v. Stephens
42
The defendant in Zant v. Stephens was convicted of murder
in the guilt phase of his capital trial. The jury based the sen-
tence of death on three statutory aggravating circumstances:
(1) [t]hat the offense of murder was committed by a person
with a prior record of conviction of a capital felony, . . . (2)
that the murder was committed by a person who has a sub-
stantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions,...
and (3) that the offense of murder was committed by a person
who had escaped from the lawful custody of a police officer at a
place of lawful confinement. . .. "s
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court set aside the second stat-
utory aggravating circumstance as unconstitutional and affirmed
the death penalty.6 44 Thus, the appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court apparently raised the question of whether a review-
ing court could affirm a death penalty after striking down one of
the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the sentencing
jury. 45 In its per curiam opinion, the majority avoided this is-
sue. It noted that although the Georgia Supreme Court clearly
had decided that a death penalty could be affirmed even though
one of the aggravating circumstances was stricken, " the basis of
this rule was unclear. 647 Consequently, the majority utilized a
639. Id. at 447.
640. Id. at 449-50.
641. Id. at 450-51.
642. 102 S. Ct. 1856 (1982).
643. Id. at 1857.
644. Id.
645. Id.
646. Id. at 1857-58.
647. Id. at 1858.
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state statute authorizing the Georgia Supreme Court to decide
questions certified by the United States Supreme Court and re-
manded the case to the state court to answer the following ques-
tion: "What are the premises of state law that support the con-
clusion that the death sentence in this case is not impaired by
the invalidity of one of the statutory aggravating circumstances
found by the jury?,
84 8
Three justices dissented. 9 Justice Marshall, joined by Jus-
tice Brennan, argued that the sentence should have been re-
versed and the case remanded for resentencing because no post
hoc rationalization by the Georgia Supreme Court could avoid
the constitutional infirmity of basing the sentence at least in
part on an invalid aggravating circumstance. The State had ar-
gued that the requirement of establishing a statutory aggravat-
ing circumstance is a:
threshold determination that only allows the jury to consider
the death penalty, but has no impact on whether that penalty
should be imposed. After reaching this theshold determination,
the jury may consider any 'evidence in aggravation' or mitiga-
tion in reaching its conclusion as to whether the death penalty
should be imposed.650
Justice Marshall assumed arguendo the plausibility of this stat-
utory interpretation but found it uncontrolling because the trial
record indicated that the jury had not been told of such a
view.651 Consequently, the jury may have been influenced by the
invalid circumstances. Thus, no interpretation of the statutory
scheme by the Georgia Supreme Court could cure the taint in
the underlying jury determination. 52 Justice Powell, also dis-
senting, agreed with Justice Marshall's position that resentenc-
ing was necessary,653 but argued that it might be possible under
state law for the Georgia Supreme Court to resentence the
defendant.6 "
648. Id. at 1859.
649. Id. at 1859-65.
650. Id. at 1863.
651. Id. at 1862-65.
652. Id.
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(5) Enmund v. Floridas5
In Enmund v. Florida, the defendant was tried under the
felony-murder rule656 for two homicides committed by his co-
felons. At trial, he was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death; the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and
sentence even though there was no proof that Enmund killed,
attempted to kill, intended to kill, or contemplated that killing
would occur. Justice White, writing for the five to four major-
ity, 7 held that it was unconstitutional to sentence a person to
death without such proof, reversed the sentence, and remanded
the case. 5 8 Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissenters, dis-
agreed with this broad holding.
Underlying the disagreement in the Court is a basic dispute
over two points. First, although both opinions adopted and uti-
lized the proportionality test used in Coker v. Georgia,6 9 they
reached different results concerning its exact phrasing and ap-
plication. Second, there is a significant dispute over the facts of
the case. 6 0 Both agree that Enmund's two co-felons robbed and
killed the victims. Justice White asserts that the only evidence
of Enmund's participation was that he drove the getaway car.
655. 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
656. The felony-murder rule has two roles. First, the rule supplies the malice afore-
thought necessary for a conviction of murder. Id. at 3372. See supra notes 46, 52, 76 and
accompanying text. Second, the rule makes all the participants in the felony vicariously
liable for a homicide committed by a cofelon. Enmund, 102 S. Ct. at 3372. See supra
note 192 and accompanying text.
657. Justice White's majority opinion was joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens,
Marshall and Brennan. Justice O'Connor's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Powell and Rehnquist. However, this opinion was in effect another 3-2-4
decision since Justices Brennan and, presumably, Marshall continued to adhere to their
per so position. See Enmund, 102 S. Ct. at 3379.
658. Id. at 3379.
659. See supra notes 487-93 and accompanying text, for a general description of this
test.
660. This disagreement concerning Enmund's participation in planning the robbery
arose largely from the Florida Supreme Court's reversal of a factual finding by the trial
court. The trial judge found that Enmund had planned the armed robbery and that he
shot both victims to eliminate them as witnesses. Enmund, 102 S. Ct. at 3371 nn. 2, 3.
The Florida Supreme Court rejected that finding by concluding that it had not been
shown that Enmund was present at the shooting scene and this his only participation
was driving the getaway car. Id. at 3371 n.2. Justice White interpreted the Florida Su-
preme Court's decision as a rejection of the trial court's finding that Enmund had
planned the robbery, whereas Justice O'Connor concluded that the finding of planning
the robbery had been implicitly ajoved, Id. at 3384 n.24.
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There was no direct evidence that Enmund was present when
the plan to rob the victims was formulated, and he clearly was
not physically present at the shooting. Justice O'Connor agreed
that Enmund was not physically present at the shooting but
found that he had planned the robbery. Thus, she focused on
the issue of whether a person who plans an armed robbery may
be sentenced to death. Justice White phrased the issue more
broadly both because he disagreed concerning the facts and be-
cause the Florida Supreme Court had indicated that it was irrel-
evant whether Enmund had planned the robbery or had merely
been a participant.
Having phrased the issue in terms of a robber who did not
kill or intend to kill, Justice White, utilizing the framework de-
veloped in his concurring opinion in Lockett, found that the
death sentence was excessive. This disproportionality was evi-
denced by objective indicia of contemporary judgments which
suggested a general rejection of imposing the death penalty on
such a person."6 1 In addition, the death penalty in such cases
conflicts with the basic theory of the eighth amendment in two
respects. 6 2 First, vicarious liability for unintended consequences
offends the requirement that the death penalty be based on an
individualized consideration of the crime and the defendant.663
Second, neither deterrence nor retribution justifies sentencing
Enmund to death.6 6 4 Retribution does not justify the death pen-
alty because it is based on culpability, which focuses on personal
actions, expectations, and intentions. 65 The death penalty does
not measurably add to the deterrence of robbers who neither
kill, intend death, nor contemplate that lethal force will be used
661. Justice White's objective indicia analysis began with a consideration of legisla-
tive judgments. He concluded that "only about a third of American jurisdictions would
ever permit a defendant who somehow participated in a robbery where a murder oc-
curred to be sentenced to die." Id. at 3374. While not compelling, this statistic weighed
against imposing capital punishment for the crime at issue. In addition, the jury stan-
dard revealed that no person had been executed for the crime at issue in the past 25
years and only three persons, including the petitioner, were presently awaiting a death
sentence for the crime at issue. Id. at 3375-76. Finally, if prosecutors rarely sought the
death penalty for the crime at issue, the excessiveness of the death penalty here was
further supported. Id. at 3376.
662. See supra notes 490-505 and accompanying text for discussion of this theory.
663. Enmund, 102 S. Ct. at 3378.
664. See supra notes 492, 495-98, 522-27 and accompanying text for discussion of
the requirement that the death penalty contribute to these functions.
665. Enmund, 102 S. Ct. at 3378.
1982] 505
115
Hubbard et al.: A "Meaningful" Basis for the Death Penalty: The Practice, Constit
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REviEW
by others.666 The rare imposition of the death penalty on such
an offender further attenuates its effectiveness as a deterrent.66"
In addition, he noted that robberies rarely result in homicides.
Thus, the likelihood of homicide in the course of robbery could
not be substituted for an offender's intent (or knowledge) that a
homicide occur for purposes of deterrence.66 s
After a general discussion of several previous death penalty
cases, Justice O'Connor's dissent focused first on the question of
whether the death penalty for an intentional armed robbery was
acceptable to contemporary society. She criticized the majority's
approach to this empirical issue and argued that her assessment
of the question indicated that it was acceptable.669 Justice
O'Connor then considered whether the death penalty was exces-
sive when measured against the noncultural standards of the
eighth amendment. She argued that this standard was satisfied
if the penalty was "proportional to the harm caused and the de-
fendant's blameworthiness. '"8 70 Since homicide is the type of
harm that is proportional to the death penalty, and since two
deaths occured during the robbery, the issue in Enmund's situa-
tion was whether he caused the harm. Justice O'Connor simply
assumed that it was proper to say that he had "caused" this
harm because he was "legally responsible" for the two deaths
which occurred. 71 Blameworthiness, argued Justice O'Connor, is
a complex concept that is best handled on an individual basis by
the trial courts.6 "2 In particular, the term "intent" has a variety




669. Id. at 3386-90. Justice O'Connor's disagreement with the majority's analysis
emphasized three points: (1) the statistical data on jury decisions relied upon by the
majority is not sufficiently precise to indicate what percentage of cases were similar to
Enmund's, id. at 3388; (2) even if juries only sentenced non-triggermen to death under
rare circumstances, whether this indicates a rejection of death in such cases or a pattern
of reserving the death penalty for only the most extreme cases is unclear, id.; and (3)
even if the jury decisions indicated a societal rejection of the death penalty for all non-
triggermen, jury verdict statistics are only one source of data concerning cultural views.
Legislation must also be considered and a careful review of legislation does not indicate a
rejection of the death penalty in such cases since, under Justice O'Connor's counting of
the states, over half the states allow capital punishment for non-triggerman. Id. at 3390.
670. Id. at 3390-91.
671. Id. at 3391.
672. Id. at 3391-92.
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termining blameworthiness as to require a finding of intent to
kill in order to impose the death penalty for felony murders.
673
Justice O'Connor's discussion of proportionality did not explic-
itly consider whether capital punishment was excessive in the
sense that it was not necessary to achieve a legitimate goal of
punishment.
67 4
Despite her disagreement with the reasoning of the major-
ity, Justice O'Connor agreed that the case should be remanded
for resentencing. The basis for her decision to remand was that
the trial court had viewed Enmund as an actual triggerman and
had, therefore, failed to consider his lack of participation in the
killing as a mitigating circumstance.
6 7 5
The exact rule of Enmund is not clear. The felony-murder
rule is two pronged - imputing the mens rea of malice afore-
thought and imposing vicarious liability.6 76 In addition, Justice
White's holding appears to be phrased in terms of a defendant
who neither killed nor intended to kill.677 Consequently, it is not
673. Id. at 3391.
674. This omission could be due either to her rejection of this test or her view that
retribution is served by insuring that the penalty is proportional to the blameworthiness
of the defendant.
675. Enmund, 102 S. Ct. at 3394.
676. See supra notes 656.
677. Justice White phrased the issue several times in his opinion, with deletions and
additions in each restatement. He first presented the question in terms of Enmund's
petition for certiorari: "whether death is a valid penalty under the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments 'for one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended
to take life."' Enmund, 102 S. Ct. at 3371. In the next paragraph, Justice White modi-
fied the question by deleting the reference to attempt and adding considerations of
whether or not Enmund was present at the killing. Id. at 3372. In addition, he implied
that actual intent to kill was not the crucial point by introducing the element of whether
Enmund "anticipated that lethal force would or might be used if necessary to effectuate
the robbery or a safe escape." Id. This focus on anticipation is lessened by Justice
White's third restatement on the issue:
[Does] the Eighth Amendment [permit] imposition of the death penalty
on one such as Enmund who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a
murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill,
or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed.
Id. at 3376-77. The element of attempt was resurrected and the element of presence
deleted. Read literally, the latter half of the restatement connects intent, rather than
anticipation, to the use of lethal force. It seems reasonable to state that a defendant
could "anticipate" that the use of lethal force might be necessary but still not "intend"
that it be used. Thus, the relationship between intent and anticipation needs to be clari-
fied. Justice White's final restatement of the issue was embodied in his conclusion. He
based his reversal and remand on the fact that the Florida Supreme Court had affirmed
Enmund's death penalty without proof that Enmund had killed or attempted to kill and
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clear whether a person who inadvertently killed another person
during the commission of a felony can be sentenced to death.
Moreover, as Justice O'Connor's dissent emphasized, the con-
cept of "intent" is extremely vague. Would extremely reckless
behavior be sufficient grounds for capital punishment under the
eighth amendment? This article takes the position that capital
punishment is not justified except where a person can plausibly
be deterred only by the death penalty. 8 Consequently, when
these questions are considered in more detail in the discussion of
South Carolina's system,67 9 it will be argued that the constitu-
tional development in this area should satisfy this requirement
and prohibit the death penalty except where the defendant is
conscious that killing is so likely that he is running a substantial
risk of being sentenced to death if he commits the crime being
contemplated.
3. Summary and Conclusion
Although the Court is divided on the issue of capital pun-
ishment, the intermediate group's view of the eighth amendment
right to special procedural safeguards has emerged as the basic
standard which legislatures must satisfy. Even where a decision
is based on other constitutional grounds, the cases have been in-
fluenced by the core idea of the special nature of the death pen-
alty developed in the eighth amendment cases.6 80
Several issues have clearly been resolved under this stan-
dard. First, when the judge and jury have no guidelines to limit
their exercise of sentencing discretion, the capital punishment
scheme is unconstitutional because of too much discretion. 81
Second, when capital punishment is mandatory under certain
circumstances, the statutory complex is unconstitutional because
it accords too little discretion to insure that the circumstances of
"regardless of whether Enmund intended or contemplated that life would be taken." Id.
at 3379. In so concluding, Justice White interjected the elements of contemplation into
the relationship between intent and anticipation.
678. See infra notes 870-93 and accompanying text.
679. See infra notes 706-36 and accompanying text.
680. E.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). For a discussion of this case, see
supra notes 582-99 and accompanying text.
681. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). For a discussion of this case, see
supra notes 395-421 and accompanying text.
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the particular murder and the particular defendant justify the
death penalty.68 2 Finally, capital punishment is constitutional
when the statutory scheme provides standards and procedures
which adequately guide and control sentencing discretion.68 3 In
determining adequacy, some detailed questions have also been
resolved. For example, the sentencing decision must be based on
information that is available to the defendant;6" the standards
must be clear enough to enable the sentencing authority and a
reviewing court to determine whether the death penalty is justi-
fied for a particular defendant and crime;685 and a person cannot
be sentenced to death for a homicide he neither intended nor
committed.686
However, many basic issues have not been decided. For ex-
ample, it is not clear whether appellate review is required and, if
so, what form this review must take.687 The resolution of such
issues may be influenced by the views of the other two positions
on the Court. Strict requirements concerning proportionality re-
view and the murders that justify capital punishment would in-
dicate a greater concern for the per se position, while a more
flexible approach to legislative schemes would suggest that the
views of the legislative presumption position have a greater
influence.18
All three positions have strengths and weaknesses, which
are reflected in the earlier discussion.689 Nevertheless, it should
be helpful to emphasize several basic problems underlying all
three positions. First, there is the tension between limiting judi-
cial interference with democratic decision-making in a federal
system and implementing a system of constitutional checks on
the legislature. Second, there is a similar tension between cul-
tural standards of proper punishment and each Justice's per-
sonal theory of just punishment. Finally, the critical empirical
682. See supra notes 424-35 and accompanying text.
683. See supra notes 436-80 and accompanying text.
684. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1979). For a discussion of this case, see supra
notes 582-99 and accompanying text.
685. See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428. For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 627-
41 and accompanying text.
686. See supra notes 655-79 and accompanying text.
687. See supra note 603.
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issues, like the deterrent impact of capital punishment and the
actual behavior of juries and judges, are necessarily
unresolvable.90
Later portions of this article will present arguments con-
cerning the best resolution of these problems, and it will be
helpful to conclude the analysis of constitutional doctrine by
summarizing these arguments. First, there is good reason not to
grant the South Carolina legislature a generous presumption in
this area.""' Thus, the per se group and the intermediate group
seem correct in their approach. Second, judges must not limit
their review to cultural notions of proper punishment. In addi-
tion, they must use a theory of just punishment to determine
when capital punishment is legitimate.692 Thus, a central consti-
tutional task is the development of a just theory of capital pun-
ishment, and the intermediate and per se groups are correct in
attempting such development. Third, the empirical issues con-
cerning deterrence can be resolved only by insuring that both
deterrence and retribution are served in a particular case. "9
Consequently, the intermediate position is wrong in adopting
the position that either purpose is adequate. As a result, further
development of the standard of adequate procedural safeguards
should proceed in the direction of more restrictive procedural
and substantive limits on the death penalty to require that both
retribution and deterrence are satisfied.694 Other empirical issues
- for example, possible racial discrimination in sentencing -
are not so easily resolved.9 5 Finally, the intermediate position
requires the Court to monitor all state court decisions to insure
that the process is constitutionally adequate. The case load re-
sulting from this oversight could result in the neglect of other
important judicial tasks.696 Consequently, because of this prob-
lem as well as other social costs of the death penalty, the per se
position may ultimately be the best approach in this area." 7
690. See infra notes 878-81 and accompanying text.
691. See infra notes 966-69 and accompanying text.
692. See infra note 971 and accompanying text.
693. See infra notes 870-949 and accompanying text.
694. See infra notes 882-949 and accompanying text.
695. See infra notes 950-52, 965 and accompanying text.
696. See infra notes 965, 979 and accompanying text.
697. See infra notes 964-65 and accompanying text.
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B. The Constitutionality of the South Carolina Capital
Punishment Scheme
The South Carolina death penalty statute has been held
constitutional by the South Carolina Supreme Court," ' but no
federal court has considered the validity of the statute." ", It is
likely that the general scheme is constitutional because of its
similarity to the Georgia statute upheld in Gregg.00 Moreover, it
satisfies Coker since only murderers are subject to the death
penalty,70 1 and it satisfies some of the specific procedural re-
quirements developed in later cases - for example, any mitigat-
ing circumstances can be considered. 70 2 However, not all of its
details are so free from constitutional questions; the following
sections, therefore, will address the potential constitutional
problems raised by specific parts of the South Carolina scheme.
This discussion will be tentative at times because of three
factors. First, since it is not possible to anticipate or consider all
the possible problems that may arise in future cases, the discus-
sion will generally be limited to issues presented by cases that
have been decided by or appealed to the South Carolina Su-
preme Court. Second, the South Carolina opinions are often so
short and conclusory that the underlying rationales are absent or
undeveloped.7 0 3 This lack of clear rationales has two effects: it is
not always possible to determine the current doctrine in South
698. E.g., State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979).
699. The United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari in five South Carolina
cases involving six defendants. State v. Thompson, - S.C. -, 292 S.E.2d 581 (1982),
cert. denied sub. nom., Thompson v. South Carolina, - S. Ct. - (1982), reh'g denied
- S. Ct. - (1982); State v. Gilbert, - S.C. - 283 S.E.2d 179 (1981), cert. denied
sub nom., Gilbert v. South Carolina, - S. Ct. - (1982), reh'g denied, - S. Ct. -
(1982) (two defendants); State v. Hyman, - S.C. _, 281 S.E.2d 209 (1981), cert. de-
nied sub nom., Agmun v. South Carolina, - S. Ct. - (1982); State v. Shaw, 273 S.C.
194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979), cert. denied sub nom., Roach v. South Carolina, 444 U.S.
1026 (1980), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 1104 (1980); State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d
799 (1979), cert. denied sub nom, Shaw v. South Carolina, 444 U.S. 957 (1979), reh'g
denied, 444 U.S. 1027 (1980).
700. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court
has considered the Georgia capital punishment scheme at great length. See Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584 (1977); and Zant v. Stephens, 102 S. Ct. 1856 (1982).
701. § 16-3-10 (1976); § 16-3-20(A)(Supp. 1981). See supra notes 481-85 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Coker.
702. See supra notes 207-10, 607-13 and accompanying text.
703. See, e.g., supra notes 277, 284, 289-302 and accompanying text.
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Carolina; and the United States Supreme Court, which has often
relied on state supreme courts to resolve potential problems in
capital punishment schemes, 0 may lose confidence in the abil-
ity of the South Carolina Supreme Court to fulfill this role be-
cause of the lack of clear rationales in South Carolina opinions.
The third factor which makes it difficult to determine the
constitutionality of particular parts of the South Carolina
scheme is the diversity of views on the United States Supreme
Court. Their decisions have seldom been rendered by a single
majority opinion. Moreover, even though many of the constitu-
tional decisions concerning capital punishment have been deter-
mined by the intermediate "group" composed of Justices Stew-
art, Stevens, and Powell, 705 no "group" has consistently followed
a united approach. In addition, the basis of the opinion is simply
not clear in many cases. Because of these problems, attempts to
go beyond the facts of a particular case must often be tentative.
1. The Basic Substantive Issue - The Definition of Capital
Murder
The definition of those murders that justify the death pen-
alty overlaps considerably with the articulation of the guidelines
for sentencing. However, it will be useful here to consider
whether execution for some types of murder would be unconsti-
tutional regardless of the procedure used in sentencing. Con-
sider, for example, the following hypothetical:
Alpha and Beta make plans to rob Doe. Pursuant to the plan,
Beta provides Alpha with an iron pipe with which to threaten
Doe in committing robbery. When Doe resists the demand for
his money, Alpha hits him with the pipe, and Doe dies as a
result. Alpha's intent in hitting was to escape, and he did not
desire to injure Doe at all.
Under South Carolina law, both Alpha and Beta have commit-
ted murder, because malice aforethought is implied by law
704. E.g., compare Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 201 (1976), with Godfrey v. Geor-
gia, 446 U.S. 420, 422-23, 428-33 (1980). A federal district court has reversed a death
penalty in habeas corpus proceedings due to constitutionally inadequate appellate re-
view. Blake v. Zant, 513 F. Supp. 772, 814-18 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
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where a deadly weapon is used to attack another and death oc-
curs as a result of the commission of a dangerous felony, 06 and
because Beta is vicariously liable for the acts of Alpha commit-
ted in furtherance of the plan.7 07 Moreover, the robbery consti-
tutes an aggravating circumstance under the South Carolina
statute,'0 8 and Beta would be vicariously liable for an aggravat-
ing act committed by his co-conspirator Alpha.7 0 9 Thus, it seems
that Alpha and Beta could he sentenced to death under the
South Carolina statute. 10  Would either sentence be
unconstitutional?
Enmund v. Florida7 1 1 provides considerable guidance in an-
swering this question, but uncertainties still remain. The ratio-
nales of Enmund and other cases suggest that the death sen-
tence for either Alpha or Beta would be unconstitutional for two
reasons. First, it would probably be disproportionate to the
crime involved. The cultural data presented in Enmund con-
cerned persons in Beta's situation,1 2 and the majority held that
this indicated a rejection of the penalty in such circumstances.
However, this evidence is not necessarily conclusive; '3 and it is
not clear what the cultural evidence is concerning persons like
Alpha. Nevertheless, the death penalty for either Alpha or Beta
would appear to offend noncultural standards of proportionality
because they are basically robbers, not murders. 4 Thus, retrib-
utive notions of just deserts would not be served by killing
them. 15 In addition, as Justice White noted in Enmund, such
706. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
707. This vicarious liability could be based on: (1) the felony-murder rule, see supra
notes 656, 676 and accompanying text; (2) the liability of a conspirator for the acts of a
co-conspirator commited in furtherance of the conspiracy; see supra notes 186 and ac-
companying text; or (3) the liability of an accessory for the acts of the principal. See §
16-1-40 (1976).
708. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(e)(Supp. 1981).
709. See, Woomer (1), 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696 (1981). This aspect of Woomer
(1) is discussed at supra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
710. The South Carolina Supreme Court has indicated in dictum that such a sen-
tence would be permitted. See State v. Thompson, - S.C. -, 292 S.E.2d 581 (1982),
which is discussed at supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
711. 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982). For discussion of this case, see supra notes 655-79 and
accompanying text.
712. Enmund, 102 S. Ct. at 3375.
713. Id. at 3376.
714. Id. at 3377.
715. See id. at 3378.
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robbers are not likely to be deterred by the very slight chance
that a death will occur.716
A second reason for doubting that the death penalty is ap-
propriate in the hypothetical is the lack of guidelines to prevent
arbitrary decisions. In the United States, persons like Alpha and
Beta are rarely sentenced to death. In addition, no one in South
Carolina has been sentenced to death under the current statute
for an unintentional killing. As a result, the jury must have some
way of determining which persons like Alpha and Beta deserve
death; yet the scheme provides no guidelines. Consequently, the
death sentence in such a case would probably be based upon an
unconstitutionally vague standard.
7 17
A more difficult problem is presented by the use of armed
robbery as an aggravating circumstance where the killing is in-
tentional but not planned or considered at the time the robbery
was planned. Such a situation would exist in a somewhat differ-
ent hypothetical than that above:
Gamma and Delta make plans for Gamma to rob Roe by
threatening him with a gun. They explicitly intend and agree
that under no circumstances will the gun actually be used.
However, during the course of the robbery Gamma panics and
fatally shoots Roe.
Delta was a nonparticipant and did not intend death, but -the
likelihood of a homicide was higher than in Beta's case. How-
ever, this would probably not affect the outcome of Delta's case
for several reasons. First, the cultural data indicate at least a
reluctance to execute nonparticipants.71 8 Second, the possibility
of such an occurrence is so remote and the likelihood of the
death penalty if homicide did occur so low that no deterrent im-
pact is likely.719 Finally, his moral wrongdoing should be mea-
sured by what he did, not what Gamma did.7 20 As a result, retri-
bution would not justify sentencing Delta to death.
716. Id..
717. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-29, 433 (1980); Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-310 (1972). Furman is discussed at supra notes 395-421 and ac-
companying text, and Godfrey is discussed at supra notes 627-41 and accompanying
text.
718. See supra note 661.
719. See supra notes 666-68 and accompanying text.
720. See supra note 665 and accompanying text.
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Gamma's case is not so clear. Enmund stressed both partici-
pation and intent,7 2 1 and Gamma clearly has both. Thus, capital
punishment in his case is probably constitutional unless the
Court goes well beyond the narrow focus of Enmund, and such a
development is not likely. There were four dissenters in En-
mund; consequently, all the Justices in the majority would have
to agree on such a development. Justices Marshall and Brennan
are absolutely opposed to the death penalty so they would agree
with the extension.722 However, Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and
White are not all likely to concur in such a change. For example,
Justices White and Blackmun have voted with the deference to
legislation group in many cases,7 23 and striking down the death
penalty in a case like Gamma's would be a major interference
with the death penalty scheme in a larger number of states. The
extent of this interference can be seen by considering its impact
on South Carolina. Armed robbery is the most common aggra-
vating circumstance,2 and has been the only aggravating cir-
cumstance in a number of cases where the death penalty has
been imposed 25 and upheld. 26 Many of these sentences would
be in doubt if Enmund were extended to cases like Gamma's.
Nevertheless, the concern for proportionality in opinions
like Coker and Enmund provides some support for the view that
Gamma should not be sentenced to death. Under the noncul-
tural test for proportionality developed in these cases, the death
penalty must further one of the legitimate goals of punishment
- deterrence or retribution.72
7
Executing Gamma would not deter him from his crime un-
less it is assumed either: (1) that at the time of his initial deci-
sion to commit the robbery he not only thought that a homicide
was likely but also realized that he could be sentenced to death
for that homicide; or (2) that at the time he decided to shoot
Roe he realized that he was risking execution rather than merely
imprisonment. The second assumption seems unlikely given the
721. See supra notes 661-68 and accompanying text.
722. See supra notes 508-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of their
positions.
723. See, e.g., supra notes 417, 423, 531-51, 638-41 and accompanying text.
724. See supra notes 335-37 and accompanying text and tables.
725. See supra note 348.
726. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
727. See supra notes 483, 495-500, 664-68 and accompanying text.
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fact that he shot in panic. The first assumption also seems ques-
tionable 28 particularly in light of the facts. Moreover, if the
first assumption is valid, then executing Delta or Beta (or even
an armed robber whose victim was not killed)7 29 would be legiti-
mate from a deterrence point of view.
It also seems unlikely that the death penalty satisfies the
retributive goals of punishment as that goal is expressed in Jus-
tice White's opinions. Retribution focuses on insuring that the
defendant receives his just desert for his crimes73 0 and in Justice
White's scheme of retributive punishment, a person's just desert
depends very much on his intent. However, intent has a variety
of meanings, and Gamma's panic shooting is less culpable than a
long-planned, cold-blooded killing. Moreover, justifying
Gamma's execution solely because of its retributive impact faces
a number of other difficulties.7 3 1 For example, Gamma's actions
are no more wrongful that those of a person who shoots during a
robbery but does not kill anyone. Yet, such persons are not exe-
cuted.73 2 In addition, the role of the robbery as an aggravating
circumstance is no longer clear. From a retributive perspective,
why is a robber who shoots his victim in panic more wrongful
than a person who commits a deliberate, intentional murder
without any aggravating circumstance?
One final example of the difficulties with justifying
Gamma's execution in terms of Justice White's retributive per-
spective is the fact that less than one-fourth of the persons who
killed during an armed theft were sentenced to death in South
Carolina.3 3 While this may not indicate a cultural rejection of
the death penalty in such cases, it does raise doubts about the
728. Justice White seemed to view the assumption as invalid. See supra notes 666-
68 and accompanying text.
729. For general discussions of the problem of justifying differences in punishment
based solely on difference in consequences where these differences are not due to any act
of the defendant, see, e.g., "The Case of Lady Eldon's French Lace," in CRiMiNAL LAW
AND ITS PROCESSEs 362-68 (Kadish & Paulsen 3d ed. 1975); Shulhofer, Harm and Punish-
ment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U.
PA. L. Rv. 1497 (1974).
730. See infra notes 792-802 and accompanying text.
731. See supra note 729. For a general discussion of the problems of retribution
schemes and the inadequacy of retribution as a justification for the death penalty, see
infra notes 792-826 and accompanying text.
732. See supra note 729.
733. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
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retributive justification because Justice White's opinion in En-
mund made two points about such a sentencing rate. First, it
cast doubt on the acceptance of the penalty and this doubt sug-
gests that death is not regarded as the just desert for such a
crime."' Second, the sentencing pattern raises doubt about
whether the death penalty is being applied fairly, and this doubt
raises questions about whether death is indeed being based on
notions of just desert rather than on some other, improper
consideration.3 5
Consistency and justice736 indicate that Enmund should be
extended to include a case like Gamma's because the death pen-
alty should only be imposed where two conditions are satisfied:
(1) the murder could plausibly be deterred only by the death
penalty; and (2) capital punishment is proportional to the wrong
involved. When a person plans a robbery and contemplates the
use of deadly force to effectuate this robbery, then the first con-
dition is satisfied. Moreover, such premeditation satisfies the
second condition if deadly force is used and death results. Thus,
unless capital punishment is carefully limited to those murders
which satisfy these two conditions, the constitutionality of the
South Carolina scheme is subject to varying degrees of doubt
concerning the definition of capital murder.
2. The Procedural Issues - The Process of Imposing the
Death Penalty for Capital Murder
a. The Pretrial Proceedings
The United States Supreme Court has consistently resisted
challenges to prosecutorial discretion in deciding to charge mur-
der, to seek the death penalty, and to plea bargain."7 As a re-
sult, unless a defendant can show abuse of this power,73 8 the
South Carolina scheme is probably constitutional in this re-
734. See supra notes 300-01, 661 and accompanying text.
735. See Enmund, 102 S. Ct. at 3378. See also supra notes 299-301 and accompany-
ing text.
736. See infra notes 870-49 and accompanying text.
737. See, e.g., supra notes 444-45, 464, 479 and accompanying text.
738. See, e.g., Gifford, Equal Protection and the Prosecutor's Charging Decision:
Enforcing an Ideal, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 659 (1981). See supra notes 13-17 and ac-
companying text, and infra note 930 and accompanying text.
19821
127
Hubbard et al.: A "Meaningful" Basis for the Death Penalty: The Practice, Constit
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REviEW
spect,7 39 particularly since the practice can be *justified as a
"veto" on the death penalty where there is any doubt concerning
its propriety.
74 0
South Carolina's system of special pretrial rights is also
likely to survive constitutional attack since the general scheme
appears to satisfy the minimum standards of the due process
clause.7 41 However, there may be instances in which, because of
lack of funds, a defendant lacks adequate counsel or adequate
expert assistance in preparing his defense. 42
b. The Trial Proceedings
(1) The Bifurcated Trial and the Defendant's Election of a
Jury Trial or Jury Sentencing
The South Carolina statute grants the defendant the right
to choose to be tried and sentenced by a jury or to choose to be
tried and sentenced by a judge. 43 The defendant cannot: (1)
plead guilty or be tried by the judge and then sentenced by the
jury; or (2) be tried by the jury and sentenced by'the judge.
7 4  It
is not clear whether thus limiting a defendant's choice presents
constitutional problems because this issue involves several inter-
related questions which have not been resolved by the United
States Supreme Court:
(1) Whether a capital defendant has a right to sentencing by a
jury?
7 4 5
(2) If so, whether this right is improperly restricted by limiting
it to cases where guilt is determined by the jury?
739. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the South
Carolina scheme.
740. See infra note 927 and accompanying text.
741. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of these special
procedural rights.
742. E.g., Blake v. Zant, 513 F. Supp. 772, 784-87 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
743. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
744. State v. Patterson, No. 21788, slip op. (S.C. Sept. 13, 1982). See supra notes 95-
107.2 and accompanying text.
745, For an argument that the defendant has such a right, see, e.g., Gillers, Deciding
Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 39-74 (1980). This argument should be viewed critically
because the Court has not indicated that such a right would be recognized. In Proffitt,
for example, Justice Stewart noted that jury sentencing had never been constitutionally
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(3) If there is no right to sentencing by a jury, whether it is
nonetheless unconstitutional to compel jury sentencing for
those who choose to be tried by a jury while compelling judge
sentencing for those who do not - for example, because such
differential treatment is a denial of equal protection or is an
improper burden on defendant's initial exercise of his right to
be tried by a jury.
This article will only discuss the uncertainty of this issue in the
capital punishment cases and will not develop the seventh
amendment dimensions involved.
The United States Supreme Court has never directly ad-
dressed the question of whether jury sentencing is a constitu-
tional requirement, but two cases suggest that it is not. First, the
Court has approved the Florida capital punishment scheme
which allows the trial judge to impose death despite a recom-
mendation of life imprisonment by the jury.7 6 However, the jury
recommendation limits his discretion7 47 so it is not clear whether
these cases indicate that there is no right to some jury participa-
tion in sentencing. Second, Bell v. Ohio involved a defendant
who waived trial by jury and thereby lost his statutory right to
jury sentencing,7 48 but the Court refused to reach this issue and
reversed the sentence on other grounds. 49
The statute in Lockett v. Ohio provided that the trial judge
had unbridled sentencing discretion when a defendant pleaded
guilty, but the jury's discretion was limited if the defendant
went to trial by jury. In Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion,
the difference in sentencing discretion was deemed to burden
the defendant's seventh amendment right because it made
waiver of jury trial a prerequisite to unlimited potential for life
imprisonment.78 0 This difference in sentencing discretion is not
present in the South Carolina scheme; thus, this rationale does
not directly apply. Nevertheless, it does indicate that, in capital
cases, the Court will closely scrutinize whether the defendant's
choice of trial by judge or jury may be influenced by the effect of
746. See supra notes 459, 583 and accompanying text.
747. See supra note 460 and accompanying text.
748. Bell, 438 U.S. at 640. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 610, for the pertinent statutory
provisions.
749. Bell, 438 U.S. at 642 n.*.
750. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 618-19 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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that choice on sentencing.
(2) Voir Dire
Lockett makes it clear that jurors may be excluded if they
are unable to follow the law as given in the judge's instruc-
tions.711 Thus, there seem to be no constitutional problems with
the South Carolina rule concerning exclusions where a persons
beliefs could improperly interfere with his decision, although
there may have been some instances of misapplication of the
rule.75 2 However, the process of determining whether the pro-
spective jurors satisfy this test seems to result in a jury which is
more prone to convict and sentence to death.753 It is not clear
whether such tendencies would render the South Carolina
scheme unconstituional because the statistical studies are so new
that they have not been subjected to professional criticism and
because the alternatives to the current system have serious
drawbacks. For example, eliminating questions about willingness
to impose the death penalty could result in worse consequences.
It has been suggested that different juries should be used for
each stage of the trial, 75  but this will not resolve the problem.
751. See supra notes 614-26 and accompanying text.
752. South Carolina voir dire must be narrowly circumscribed by focusing on situa-
tions where impartiality is affected or where jurors wold automatically vote for or against
the death penalty. See, e.g., Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980). Thus, the South Caro-
lina scheme, discussed at supra notes 29-45, 247-54 and accompanying text, must allow
persons to be jurors regardless of their beliefs about the death penalty if these beliefs do
not have one of the effects listed above. In at least one instance, however, the exclusion
seems to have gone further. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
753. See, e.g., Hovey v. California, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128
(1980); Haney, Juries and the Death Penalty: Readdressing the Witherspoon Question,
26 CRIME & DELINQ. 512 (1980); Jacoby & Paternoster, Sentence Disparity and Jury
Packing: Further Challenges to the Death Penalty, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379
(1982). For further discussion, see infra notes 933-35 and accompanying text.
754. E.g., Haney, Juries and the Death Penalty: Re-addressing the Witherspoon
Question, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 512 (1980). In Hovey v. California, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 82, 616
P.2d 1301, 1347-55, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 182 (1980), the California Supreme Court re-
quired that the jurors be sequestered and questioned separately so their predispositions
would not be biased. This decision, however, was vigorously criticized by the dissenting
Justices as wasteful, ineffective, counterproductive, and unfounded. Id. at 82-84, 616
P.2d at 1255-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 182-84. In South Carolina, the trial judge has discre-
tion to determine how the voir dire is conducted. See supra note 30 and accompanying
text. It should be noted, however, that sequestration and individual questioning of capi-
tal veniremen appears to be the current practice in South Carolina. In addition, each
venireman is cautioned not to read media accounts of the trial, including voir dire. In
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The composition and attitudes of the jury that determined guilt
would still be affected by questions concerning the effect that
the death penalty might have on their decision, and the voir dire
of the sentencing jury could bias their makeup in favor of the
death penalty. The problem could be "solved" by striking down
the death penalty, but the United States Supreme Court is un-
likely to take such an extreme step.
(3) The Adjudication of Guilt
A criminal defendant's constitutional right to due process
requires that the State prove each element of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.755  Thus, it is unconstitutional to use
mandatory presumptions which shift the burden of disproving
an element to the defendant.756 The State may, however, rely on
permissive presumptions which permit, but do not require, the
jury to find that the prosecution has satisfied its burden of
proof.7 57 In addition, the State has considerable discretion in de-
fining the elements of the crime. Consequently, the State can,
for example, define murder simply as the intentional killing of
another person, and then require the defendant to prove, as an
affirmative defense to murder, that the killing resulted from ex-
treme emotional distress.7
58
The South Carolina law concering the elements of murder
and burden of proof is uncertain.7 5 Two cases suggest that the
defendant must prove the elements of self defense. 59 "1 Since the
absence of such a justification appears to be part of the defini-
tion of malice (and thus part of one of the elements of the
crime),760 these two cases seem contrary to the constitutional re-
quirement concerning the State's burden of proof. Although one
could argue that the absence of the justification is not one of the
elements of murder under South Carolina law, such an argument
this way, the candor of potential jurors can be better protected. Telephone interview
with Richard Harpootlian, Deputy Solicitor of the Fifth Judicial Circuit (Aug. 11, 1982).
755. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
756. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
757. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
758. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
759. See supra notes 55-77 and accompanying text.
759.1. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
760. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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would be contrary to cases defining malice in terms of lack of
justification 8 1 and to cases which appear to place the burden of
lack of excuse on the State.6 2
(4) Sentencing
The South Carolina sentencing process satisfies the Consti-
tution in most respects because it emphasizes the need to con-
trol and structure discretion to insure that there is a meaningful
basis for imposing the death penalty. Moreover, its general
framework parallels the Georgia scheme upheld in Gregg v.
Georgia.763 In addition, a number of specific provisions satisfy
subsequent cases - for example, the Lockett requirement that
the jury not be limited in its consideration of mitigating circum-
stances.764 Nevertheless, some parts of the South Carolina
scheme could be unconstitutional. For example, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court has shown an inadequate concern for double
jeopardy problems.76 5 More importantly perhaps, several aspects
of the sentencing process are probably contrary to the constitu-
tional requirement that there be a meaningful basis for the deci-
sion to impose the death penalty.
The treatment of aggravating circumstances involves three
instances of such constitutional difficulty: (1) the overlapping
nature of aggravating circumstances;766 (2) the broad construc-
tion of robbery and larceny with a deadly weapon; 871 and (3) vi-
carious liability for the aggravating conduct of another.7 8 All
761. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
762. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
763. See supra notes 4-5, 436-56, and accompanying text.
764. See supra notes 207-10, 607-08 and accompanying text.
765. See supra notes 194-204 and accompanying text. The leading case concerning
double jeopardy in situations in which the death penalty is sought in resentencing pro-
ceedings is Bullington v. Missouri, 101 S. Ct. 1852 (1981).
766. This overlap is discussed and criticized at supra notes 151-71 and accompany-
ing text. In Zant, the United States Supreme Court indicated that there was serious
doubt concerning the death penalty when one of the aggravating circumstances consid-
ered by the jury was not proper. See supra notes 642-54 and accompanying text. Since
an overlapping circumstance may influence the jury in the same way that an improper
one may, South Carolina's approach raises a problem similar to that involved in Zant.
767. This construction is discussed and criticized at supra notes 172-85 and accom-
panying text.
768. This decision is discussed and criticizied at supra notes 186-93 and accompany-
ing text. The decision in Enmund, concerning homicides which the defendant neither
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three of these instances could mislead the sentencing authority
concerning the appropriateness of the death penalty in a partic-
ular case; thus, they may offend the constitutional requirement
that sentencing discretion be meaningfully structured.
In addition, the constitutionality of several other parts of
the South Carolina scheme is at least questionable because these
aspects also cast doubt on whether the sentencing determination
has a meaningful basis. Allowing the consideration of nonstatu-
tory aggravating evidence76 9 may raise problems of vagueness
like that in Godfrey7 70 since it may not be possible to articulate
precisely the role of such evidence. In addition, Zant7 71 casts
considerable doubt on a mechanical treatment of the statutory
circumstances as a threshold requirement.7 7 2 It may be possible
to address these potential problems by carefully guiding the jury
consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors where at least
one statutory circumstance exists. However, this does not appear
to have been done in the past, '7 7 and this failure may be uncon-
stitutional. Other areas of potential constitutional problems are:
(1) the treatment of psychological, emotional, and mental handi-
caps;77' (2) the approach used in admitting and excluding evi-
dence concerning the propriety of the death penalty;775 and (3)
the definition of capital murder through the interpretation of
aggravating circumstances.7 7' The South Carolina law concern-
ing these topics is unclear, and future cases may eliminate any
question concerning constitutionality by adopting a broad ap-
committed nor intended, see supra notes 655-79 and accompanying text, certainly casts
doubt on the use of vicarious liability for aggravating conduct.
769. See supra notes 134-50 and accompanying text.
770. See supra notes 627-41 and accompanying text. Justice Stewart has implicitly
approved the consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors provided that at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance is established before imposing the death penalty.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164-66, 197; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250 n.8, 256 n.14. However, the issue
of whether such factors interfere with the need to limit discretion and provide a mean-
ingful basis for appellate review was not explicitly addressed.
771. See supra notes 642-54 and accompanying text.
772. See supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text for discussion of South Caro-
lina's possible use of the threshold approach and supra notes 642-54 and accompanying
text for discussion of the treatment of the approach in Zant. See supra note 770 for an
indication that the "threshold" approach has been implicitly approved by the Court.
773. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
774. See supra notes 212-29 and accompanying text.
775. See supra notes 247-54 and accompanying text.
776. See supra notes 706-36 and accompanying text.
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proach concerning the handicaps 77 and propriety778 and inter-
preting aggravating circumstances narrowly so they are clearly
limited to cases in which deterrence and proportionality are sat-
isfied. 7 9 This approach would insure that any imposition of the
death penalty is based on a meaningful consideration of the in-
dividual being sentenced, of the proper role of the death penalty
in particular cases, and of the need to insure that the death pen-
alty is only imposed where deterrence is plausible and where the
defendant and crime are extremely wrongful.
c. Appellate Review
Although the United States Supreme Court has not explic-
itly required appellate review by the state supreme courts, its
decisions implicitly suggest such a requirement. In Gregg, the
United States Supreme Court noted that the Georgia Supreme
Court could be trusted to insure that the death penalty was im-
posed only where it could be proportional to the crime because,
"[i]f a time comes when juries generally do not impose the death
sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the appellate review
procedures assure that no defendant convicted under such cir-
cumstances will suffer a sentence of death. ' 780 In addition, in
Zant v. Georgia, the Court stressed the constitutional require-
ment that the death penalty not be imposed capriciously, noting
that "the constitutionality of Georgia's death sentences ulti-
mately could depend on the Georgia Supreme Court construing
the statute and reviewing capital sentences consistently with
this concern.
781
The South Carolina statute provides for automatic review of
the death penalty and requires the South Carolina Supreme
Court to insure that its application is not arbitrary or capricious.
However, it appears that the court has not consistently met its
obligations under the statute. This failure is reflected both in its
777. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
778. See supra notes 247-54 and accompanying text.
779. See supra note 736 and accompanying text.
780. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976). See id. at 204-206. Two companion
cases to Gregg-Woodson and Roberts-indicated that the mandatory death penalty
schemes were unconstitutional because they lacked meaningful appellate review of jury
sentencing. See supra note 435.
781. 102 S. Ct. 1855, 1857 (1982).
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decisions approving the constitutionally suspect parts of the sen-
tencing process discussed above and in its inadequate approach
to proportionality review. Since the South Carolina Supreme
Court has no systematic way to monitor patterns of jury deci-
sions, its review procedures may not be adequate to identify cul-
tural patterns of proportionality by determining "when juries
generally do not impose the death sentence in a certain kind of
death case. '7 82 In addition, it does not seem to have an adequate
noncultural model of proportionality.783 Finally, the court has no
way of determining whether improper racial discrimination is af-
fecting the process. 8 4 Because of these inadequacies in appellate
review of proportionality, the South Carolina scheme may be un-
constitutional in practice. 8 5
3. Conclusion
Although South Carolina's general scheme will probably
survive constitutional challenges, it seems likely that future
cases will modify or clarify parts of the system to eliminate the
potential constitutional problems involved in specific aspects of
782. Zant v. Georgia, 102 S. Ct. 1855, 1857 (1982). While the South Carolina system
of judicial review has flaws, see supra notes 277-79, 286-87 and accompanying text, it
may not be constitutionally inadequate for two reasons. First, there are limits on the
amount of empirical study that can be legitimately expected of the court. See supra note
279, 307-08 and accompanying text. Second, it is not clear what type of review is neces-
sary to make the determination referred to in the quote from Zant above. See, e.g.,
Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth, & Kyle, Identifying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of
Death: A Quantitative Approach, 33 STA. L. REv., 1, 1-22 (1980). Nevertheless, the
Court's expressed disinterest in life cases, see supra note 279 and accompanying text,
raises questions about the process of proportionality review in South Carolina. See supra
notes 238-308 and accompanying text, for a general critique of the South Carolina Su-
preme Court's approach to proportionality review.
783. See supra notes 284, 288-302 and accompanying text, and infra notes 893, 923,
931-32, 949 and accompanying text. Since the United States Supreme Court has no ob-
jection to "mercy" in the capital sentencing system, see supra notes 444, 445, 464, 479
and accompanying text, it has apparently approved the "objective" model of proportion-
ality review used by the South Carolina Supreme Court. See supra notes 276-282 and
accompanying text, and infra notes 936-949. But see Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth, &
Kyle, Identifying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of Death: A Quantitative Ap-
proach, 33 STAN. L. REv. 1, 9-22 (1980). Thus, the problem is not with South Carolina's
decision to use "objective" proportionality, but with the manner in which it implements
this approach. See supra notes 284-302 and accompanying text.
784. See supra note 285 and accompanying text, and infra notes 950-52 and accom-
panying text.
785. See, e.g., Blake v. Zant, 513 F. Supp. 772, 814-818 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
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the scheme. However, completion of this process will only insure
that capital punishment in South Carolina satisfies the minimal
requirements imposed by the constitution. As a result, there will
be no assurance that the South Carolina scheme is just. In order
to address this issue and to understand better the constitutional
requirements and the policies underlying the South Carolina
system, the next part of this article develops a philosophical per-
spective on the legitimacy of the death penalty.
III. PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
There is little agreement concerning the justice of capital
punishment, largely because providing a philosophical justifica-
tion for capital punishment is troublesome in two respects. First,
like any criminal punishment, it involves the intentional inflic-
tion of pain and injury by the state; and second, capital punish-
ment is at least prima facie more questionable than other pun-
ishments because death is so complete, final, and irreversible.
Part A of this section addresses the first aspect of the dispute
and discusses the issues involved in justifying punishment. The
first two portions of this discussion place the topic in context by
addressing the nature of punishment and the interrelated ques-
tions involved in justifying punishment. The middle portion dis-
cusses the traditional justifications of punishment - retribution
and deterrence. The final portion discusses the role of a general
theory of just punishment and sketches a proposed theory. Part
B focuses on the narrow issue of the death penalty and uses the
proposed theory of just punishment to develop a critique of
South Carolina's approach to capital punishment.
This critique involves two interrelated arguments. First,
capital punishment is just only if several conditions are satisfied.
The discussion focuses on the requirement of a process to insure
that there is a meaningful basis for identifying those persons to
be executed. Such a meaningful basis exists only if two condi-
tions are clearly satisfied: (1) the only persons executed are
those who might plausibly be deterred by the death penalty but
not by life imprisonment, and (2) persons should not be exe-
cuted unless they can be viewed as severely reprehensible and
morally blameworthy.
The second argument has two prongs. First, the discussion
asserts that many aspects of the South Carolina scheme of capi-
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tal punishment indicate a commitment to insuring that these
conditions are satisfied. The second prong of the argument is
that, despite this general compliance with the requirements of
justice, there are several basic flaws in the current application of
the scheme. As a result, it is necessary to conclude that South
Carolina may unjustly execute someone in the near future. On
the other hand, no one has yet been executed because no one
has yet exhausted all the procedural protections available to
capital defendants. As a result, there is still the possibility that
the state or federal courts will correct the present shortcomings
in the South Carolina scheme. It is, therefore, too soon to know
whether the South Carolina scheme will result in an unjust
execution.
A. Justification of Punishment
1. The Nature of Punishment
Before discussing the justifications for punishment it will be
helpful to define punishment and distinguish it from related no-
tions such as restraint and rehabilitation, which are alternatives
to punishment and which are sometimes confused with justifica-
tions for punishment. In Punishment and Responsibility,7e6
H.L.A. Hart notes that the core of what we mean by punishment
involves five elements:
(i) It must involve pain or other consequences normally consid-
ered unpleasant.
(ii) It must be for an offence against legal rules.
(iii) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his
offence.
(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings
other than the offender.
(v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority con-
stituted by a legal system against which the offence is
committed.7 87
786. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
787. Id. at 4-5. For further discussion of the definition of punishment, see e.g., J.
KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 10-48 (1973); M. MACKENZIE, PLATO ON PUNISHMENT 5-
17 (1981); Ducasse, Philosophy and Wisdom in Punishment and Reward, PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 3, 78 (E. Madden, R. Handy & M. Farber ed. 1968); and
Pratt, Professor Ducasse and the Meaning of "Punishment," in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPEC-
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Restraint-for example, by imprisonment or by quarantine-is
different from punishment in two important respects: it need
not involve pain or other unpleasant circumstances other than
loss of freedom to move about, and it is sometimes imposed even
where there has been no offense. Justifications for restraint are
usually phrased in terms of prevention of harm rather than in
terms of retribution for an offense or in terms of deterrence of
an offender through the teaching of a painful lesson.
Rehabilitative approaches view criminal conduct as a mani-
festation of an "illness" or condition that can be "cured." Treat-
ment may involve restraint-for example, by commitment to a
mental institution-but it might also consist of therapy imposed
outside of institutions. Treatment differs from punishment in
two ways. First, pain and other unpleasant consequences are not
necessarily involved. Their use is only incidental to "curing" the
illness. Second, there need not be an offense against the legal
rules. The justification for rehabilitation is that it will make the
person "better" and thus reduce harmful conduct.
These concerns can overlap. For example, when a person is
imprisoned for punitive purposes, he is also restrained. While he
is imprisoned, one might also attempt to rehabilitate him by
providing occupational training or psychological therapy. These
goals are still different, however, and the distinctions can be
seen by considering a case like Commonwealth v. Ritter,7 8 in
which the defendant killed his mistress as a result of despair and
alcohol. There was no need to restrain him after the killing;789
and, except for possible alcoholism, there was nothing to treat.
Yet he was sentenced to life imprisonment to punish him for his
act.79 0
TIVES ON PUNISHMENT, supra at 20-25.
788. Phil. Co. Ct. of Oyer and Terminer, 13 Pa. D. & C. 285 (1930).
789. The court concluded that the defendant was no longer a menace to society. Id.
at 293.
790. The court rejected retribution as a reason for punishment. Id. at 290-291. The
justification for the imprisonment is unclear since the court also concluded that no deter-
rent effects would result from the punishment because Ritter individually was not a fur-
ther threat to society and because crimes like Ritter's, resulting from passion and alco-
hol, are not likely to be deterred by consideration of potential punishment. The sentence
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2. The Questions Involved in Justifying a System of
Punishment
The traditional justifications for punishing persons like the
defendant in Ritter are retribution and deterrence. Although
these justifications have been phrased in a variety of forms, the
two approaches can be distinguished in terms of whether they
are primarily concerned with the future or with the past. Deter-
rent schemes focus on preventing future crimes. The need for
and amount of punishment are determined by considering their
preventive impact on the number and severity of crimes in the
future. Retributive theories focus on the past, and punishment is
imposed in accordance with the "badness" of the criminal and of
the crime he committed. Thus, punishment is viewed as the
"just desert" imposed on a person for his past conduct, and
there is no concern with the prevention of crimes in the future.
In practice, both justifications are often used, or at least ap-
pear to be used, at the same time. 9 1 Nevertheless, there are
cases where it is necessary to distinguish them. For example, if it
appears that capital punishment does not deter murders any
more than imprisonment, then capital punishment is only justi-
fied by adopting a retributive approach to punishment. Conse-
quently, a short critique of each justification is required.
In order to better understand this critique, it is helpful to
remember that both retributive and deterrent justifications must
not only justify the imposition of punishment as a general pro-
position-i.e., answer the question "why punish?"-they must
also provide at least some insight into four other interrelated
questions:
(1) What acts should be punished?
(2) Who should be punished?
(3) How much punishment should be imposed for a particular
crime and on a particular person?
(4) What institution should address these issues and what pro-
cedures should be used?
791. For an empirical study of attitudes toward the respective importance of the
different "goals" of sentencing, see, e.g., Forest and Weilford, Punishment and Sentenc-
ing: Developing Sentencing Guidelines Empirically from Principles of Punishment, 33
RUTGERS L. REV. 799 (1981). The present article adopts the position that only a particu-
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These questions must be addressed in order to go beyond the
justification of punishment and provide a system of punishment
that enables us to consider specific cases. The following sum-
mary and critique of retribution and deterrence illustrate the
difficulties involved in formulating a justification which can pro-
vide the basis for a systematic response to all of these questions.
The discussion following this critique will then sketch a general
approach to providing such a systematic response.
3. Retributive Justification of Punishment
While retributive schemes vary, they all share two common
tenets:
12
(1) The person being punished "deserves" the punishment in
that
(a) he has committed some offense; and
(b) the amount of punishment is proportional to the of-
fense and to the "badness" of the offender.
(2) Punishment in accordance with (1) is legitimate regardless
of whether it will prevent future offenses in any way.
These two tenets will be discussed separately.
a. The First Tenet-The Notion of "Just Desert"
The first tenet has considerable appeal because it reflects
792. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILrry (1968); T. HONDERICK,
PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 2251 (1969); M. MACKENZIE, PLATO ON PUN-
ISHMENT 21-33 (1981); E. PINCOPFS, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT, 2-16 (1966);
Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of Punishment, 75 J. PHIL. 601 (1978). For short
selections from various retributive schemes, see, e.g., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
6-21 (S. Kadish and M. Paulsen 3d ed. 1975); PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISH-
MENT 102-184 (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972). A number of concerns are often improperly in-
cluded in retributive schemes. For example, revenge is often confused with retribution
because both focus on the past. Revenge, however, is not a justification for punishment.
See, e.g., E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 10-14 (1975). This point is pursued
further at infra notes 825-26, 854 and accompanying text. Another common confusion is
to mistake a deterrent theory for a retributive scheme. Three examples of this are dis-
cussed later in the text: (1) the confusion of the determination of who and how much to
punish with the question of why punish, see infra notes 820-24 and accompanying text;
(2) the view that punishment is necessary in order to prevent self-help, see infra notes
825-26; and (3) the view that punishing to increase respect for law is a retributivist
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the view that government is limited in inflicting punishment by
the requirements that no one should be punished unless he has
committed an offense and that punishment should be somehow
proportional to the offense. However, despite its initial appeal,
the notion of "just desert" has a number of basic problems. An
initial difficulty is that punitive effects are not limited to the
wrongdoer. If a guilty person is imprisoned, the innocent spouse
and children also suffer. 3 Another flaw is that the ability to un-
derstand, employ, or evaluate retributive schemes is seriously
impeded by the vagueness and ambiguity of the terms involved.
For example, the first tenet asserts that a criminal "deserves" to
be punished, but the notion of "deserves" or of "just desert" is
vague. This vagueness can be seen by considering how well it
helps answer two of the questions involved in developing a sys-
tem of just punishment.
How does one know what acts deserve punishment? In
many discussions of retribution it is unclear whether punish-
ment is retribution for: (1) a violation of the law; (2) a violation
of another person's rights; (3) a breach of morality; (4) an injury
to someone; or (5) some combination of these four .79 3 1 The diffi-
culty is not limited to situations like parking violations where
the act does not clearly involve moral issues. It also arises where
morality is clearly involved. For example, in Regina v. Dudley
and Stephens,9 4 the defendants and several other seamen had
been on a lifeboat for nearly three weeks and were likely to per-
ish from lack of food and water. To survive, the defendants
killed and ate a member of the group. Because of this suste-
nance, the remaining seamen lived long enough to be rescued.
Upon their return to England, Dudley and Stephens were
charged with murder. After trial and appeal, they were sen-
tenced to death. It seems that this punishment can only be justi-
fied by a retributive scheme. A person threatened by virtually
certain death unless he commits a homicide is not likely to be
deterred from committing that killing by the threat of death in
793. See infra notes 863, 900, 907 and accompanying text, for further discussion of
this problem.
793.1. Professor Ferdinand Schoeman was very helpful in developing and clarifying
this ambiguity.
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the future. But it is not clear that retribution is appropriate in
this case. Is it wrong to take one life in order to save several in
this kind of situation?
Perhaps Dudley and Stephens deserved punishment be-
cause it is always wrong to kill an innocent person. Giving rea-
sons for this view is difficult, however.95 If such killing is wrong
because life is sacred, then it seems that taking one life is better
than having more die because several "sacred" lives seem more
important than one. If one says it is wrong because it is wrong,
then the argument is circular and conclusory.
An alternative argument is that an affirmative act which
causes death is more culpable than an omission to act to prevent
a death. There may be situations where the distinction is signifi-
cant. For example, shooting a baby does at least seem different
from refusing to contribute money to an international program
to provide food for poor nations even though the effect of both
the shooting and the refusal is to cause a child's death. Nonethe-
less, the distinction can be criticized even here.98 Moreover,
there are other situations in which the distinction seems con-
trived and meaningless.7 9 7 For example, why should it be per-
missible to fail to provide an artificial life support system to a
patient but objectionable to "pull the plug" on the system?
798
The lifeboat situation in Regina v. Dudley and Stephens seems
more like the health care example because the persons involved
are all known and present (rather than a statistical entity
thousands of miles away) and the different consequences of the
act or omission are relatively clear, direct, and immediate.
Even if we could address such problems and devise a
scheme to be used in justifiably labeling an act as "wrong", there
would still remain the question of how much punishment is de-
served. In Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, the court sentenced
the defendants to death, but their sentences were later com-
795. For a general discussion of life and death situations, see e.g., J. GLOVER, CAUS-
ING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES (1977).
796. See, e.g., id. at 109-10.
797. See, e.g., id. at 92-116.
798. See, e.g., id. at 182-202; E. KLUGE, THE ETHICS OF DELmERATE DEATH 11-13
(1981); R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING, AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 77-115 (1976); ETIE-
CAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 133-277 (R. Weir ed. 1977); KILLING AND LErrNG DIE (B.
Steinbock ed. 1980); MATTERS OF LnV AND DEATH 28-64 (T. Regan ed. 1980). See infra
text accompanying note 965 for further discussion of this topic.
[Vol. 34
142
South Carolina aw Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss2/5
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
muted to six months imprisonment by the Crown. 9 Such dis-
parity indicates that there is no consensus on the proper amount
of punishment that is deserved for a specific wrongful act,s0
particularly where the death penalty is concerned.80'
The determination of the amount of punishment is further
complicated by the fact that retributive schemes usually require
that punishment be proportional not only to the crime but also
to the "badness" of the wrongdoer. For example, if two men
both commit theft but one does it for the thrill and out of a
desire to hurt others while the second does it only to feed his
family and with a feeling of guilt and remorse, many retribu-
tivists argue that the first should be punished more severely.
80 2
These problems in determining the amount of punishment
are not limited to life and death dilemmas like those in Regina
v. Dudley and Stephens. For example, questions of making the
punishment proportional to the individual offender are always
present when a recidivist is sentenced. Even with a first of-
fender, problems arise upon considering the totality of circum-
stances involved in evaluating an "act." For example, how does
one determine just desert in cases involving civil disobedience of
a trespass statute in order to protest racial discrimination?
b. The Second Tenet-The Purpose of Punishment
Retributivists are often criticized for their lack of concern
for deterrence. According to the critics, if there are no such ben-
799. CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 10 n.2 (S. Kadish & M. Paulsen 3d ed. 1975).
In United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383), an American
case similar to Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, the defendant seaman was convicted of
manslaughter for ejecting some passengers in an overcrowded lifeboat. He was sentenced
to six months imprisonment and a fine of $20, but the penalty was later remitted. CRIMI-
NM LAW AND ITS PROCESSES, supra at 544. For discussion of the issues in such cases, see,
e.g., F. HICKS, HuMAN JETTISON (1927); Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers,
62 HAxv. L. REv. 616 (1949).
800. The difference in sentencing might be the result of the different institutional
roles of the judiciary or the executive, i.e., courts lack the discretion to sentence a mur-
derer to a short sentence, but the executive has the power to commute the sentence or
grant a pardon. See, e.g., Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARv. L.
REv. 616, 619, 631-37, 641-42 (1949).
801. See, e.g., Videmar & Ellsworth, Research on Attitudes Toward Capital Pun-
ishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 68-92 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982).
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eficial consequences, then people are being punished for no pur-
pose and this is wrong. Three types of approaches have been
used to respond to such criticisms. First, some argue that crimi-
nal actions result in an imbalance in the moral order that must
be restored by punishing the defendant. Second, it can be ar-
gued that deterrence is not the only beneficial result of punish-
ment. By forcing the criminal to "pay his debt" to society, it
helps reintegrate the criminal into society. A third response is to
confuse deterrence and retribution and defend retribution by
deterrence arguments.
(1) Restoring the "Moral Order"
Some retributivists argue that imposing punishment where
it is deserved is inherently good because it restores a balance to
the "moral order;" there is no need to show that it results in any
other good consequences.803 From this perspective, imposing
punishment is viewed as being like enforcing a promise and
preventing unjust enrichment.804 If Alpha promises to pay Beta
$5.00 to mow Alpha's yard and if Beta mows the yard in reliance
on that promise, some argue that it is unnecessary to ask
whether enforcing Alpha's promise will have beneficial re-
sults-for example, by deterring people from breaching agree-
ments in the future. Instead, it is only necessary to say that Beta
has earned the $5.00 and now "deserves" to receive it or that
Alpha has benefited and would be unjustly enriched if payment
were not required.805
This position has two problems. First, it is not altogether
803. See, e.g., T. HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATION 22-26
(1969); Pugsley, A Retributivist Argument Against Capital Punishment, 9 HOFSTE, L.
REV. 1501, 1510-16 (1981). This position is reflected in the view that the death penalty is
just because it expresses society's legitimate anger at an outrageous crime. See supra
notes 638-39 and accompanying text. Punishing for mere anger would be revenge, not
retribution; thus, it is important that this anger be based on moral grounds rather than
emotion. See infra note 854 and accompanying text. Later it will be argued that there is
no such moral basis for imposing the death penalty. See infra notes 870-71, 876-77 and
accompanying text.
804. See, e.g., A. VON HmSCH, DOING JUSTICE 45-49 (1976); Mabbot, Punishment, IN
THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 41, 45-46 (S. Grupp ed. 1971); Morris, Persons and Punish-
ment, 52 THE MONIST 475, 478 (1968).
805. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 344-48 (1971); Whiteley, On Duties,
57 Pnoc. oF ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 97 (1952).
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clear that promising would impose moral obligations unless the
consequences of the practice were generally beneficial.808 Second,
even assuming that promising did impose moral obligation with-
out regard to consequences, there are numerous disanalogies be-
tween promising and punishment. For example, few, if any,
criminals have explicitly agreed to obey the particular criminal
prohibition they have violated. 07 Arguing in terms of an implied
promise to obey would raise numerous other problems.808 For ex-
806. See, e.g., D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR AcTION 163-69 (1971).
807. Oaths of loyalty and pledges of allegiance arguably qualify as such an explicit
promise, but the following problems exist in viewing them as promises: (1) Are they mere
rituals? (2) Do they include an agreement to obey all the laws all the time? (3) Are they
freely given or are they coerced to some extent? (4) To whom is the promise made? (5)
What about persons who have never made an oath or pledge since becoming adults?
808. Speaking in terms of an implied promise raises a host of problems. For exam-
ple, who is the person to whom the promise is made and can this person authorize
breaches of the promise? Underlying such specific problems is the basic difficulty in ar-
guing that it is legitimate to imply a promise when none was explicitly made. The
problems are clear in the following considerations of some of the conduct that arguably
could serve as the justification of this implied promise:
(1) It can be argued that participation in the political process - e.g., vot-
ing - indicates a promise to be bound by the results. This view involves a
number of difficulties: What about non-participants? Is it accurate or even fair
to say that because a person votes in an election he, therefore, promises to
obey all the laws all the time? Should there be some minimal level of meaning-
ful participation? How would this level be determined? What about laws re-
sulting from legal processes where a person did not participate directly - e.g.,
administrative decrees? To whom is the promise made? All other citizens? All
other participants? If the promise is made to all other participants, can it be
broken where only a non-participant will be affected?
(2) Since a person receives the benefit of other persons obeying the law, it
can be argued that receiving this benefit implies a promise that the recipient
will also obey the law. This argument can be buttressed by reference to the
exercise of legal rights, e.g., participation in voting or appealing to the law in
resolving disputes. This position is subject to a variety of objections. For
example:
(a) What do we mean when we say a person "benefits" from the
system of laws? Do we mean he is better off than with no laws? If so,
then the obligation exists in almost any legal system, no matter how
reprehensible and unjust. However, this result seems intuitively offen-
sive. If we mean that he is better off than he would be if there were a
different hypothetical system, how do we identify this hypothetical legal
system? What if a person is worse off under the actual legal system than
he would be under the hypothetical one?
(b) Is the obligation owed only to those who confer the benefits?
How do we identify these persons? Are they all citizens? What about
lawbreakers? Is a person free to disobey the law if only lawbreakers are
affected?
(c) Why is it proper to say that receipt of benefits implies a promise
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ample, an explicit promise indicates "just desert" by its terms.
But how does one determine the "just desert" for breaching an
implied promise? As indicated above,809 there is good reason to
doubt our ability to determine "just desert" in such
circumstances.
Another objection to the analogy between promising and
punishment is that even if there is a moral obligation to fulfill a
promise, it should be distinguished from the legally enforceable
obligation to perform a contract. Under this view, promises
should not be enforced by the legal system without assurance
that good consequences will result. Underlying this criticism is a
reluctance to grant the state the right to use its coercive power
to correct an imbalance in the "moral order" even though no
good consequences result, Such a grant of power is contrary to
many current theories of the just state, which stress the need to
limit state power, particularly the power to punish, and skepti-
cism about the utility of an objective moral order to impose such
limits on the state.810 Thus, a breach of the "moral order" may
be a necessary condition of punishment, but not a sufficient con-
dition. 11 In other words, the state may not punish without such
a breach; but even if there is such a breach, punishment is
neither required nor is it justified absent a showing of something
more-for example, beneficial consequences like deterrence.
This last objection reflects the point of view that, despite
to obey all laws? How would one refuse these benefits? Do we always
say that receipt of a benefit implies a promise to convey a similar bene-
fit? If a person obeys the law for selfish, prudential reasons and thus
conveys a benefit to X, why should this imply an obligation on X's part
to obey the law even where it is not in X's self-interest to do so?
(3) Since other persons have obeyed the law in reliance on X's also obey-
ing the law, X has an obligation to obey the law as well. This approach is
similar to the benefits argument but focuses on the detriment that others incur
by obeying the law rather than on the benefits conveyed to X by that obedi-
ence. Because of this similarity it is subject to similar objections such as: Is the
obligation owed only to those who obey in reliance on X's obedience? Why
should reliance of others necessarily impose an obligation on X? Additional
problems result from the fact that persons obey the law for a variety of rea-
sons; and reliance on X, if present in fact at all, is only one such reason. Thus,
it is not self evident that reliance supports an obligation to obey.
809. See supra notes 793-802 and accompanying text. See supra note 808.
810. See generally, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
811. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSEBEITY 3-13 (1968); T.
HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT. THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 148-89 (1969); Armstrong, The
Retributivist Hits Back, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 19, 35-39 (S. Grupp ed. 1971).
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the problems involved, we should not reject the notion that
there is a moral order which limits the state. There is considera-
ble merit in this perspective because, as the following discussion
of alternative retributive purposes 12 and deterrence813 will indi-
cate, it is not possible to address some questions, such as how
much should a person be punished, without such a scheme. Con-
sequently, a later portion of this article adopts this perspective
and argues that the best way to fulfill this need (while also
avoiding the problems of vagueness and possible abuse of the
coercive power of the state) is to view proportionality as a neces-
sary,1 4 but not a sufficient,1 5 condition for punishment and to
impose procedural safeguards on the application of the propor-
tionality condition.818
(2) Reintegrating Wrongdoers into Society
A second response to the criticisms of the second tenet is
that deterrence is not the only good consequence that results
from punishment. Punishment also aids in reintegrating a crimi-
nal into society. People have certain natural, justifiable psycho-
logical reactions to a person who commits crime. They may, for
example, regard the criminal with contempt, anger, disapproval,
fear, and distrust. In addition, the criminal may feel guilty and
remorseful about his crime and view himself as a bad person.
817
812. See infra text accompanying note 819.
813. See infra notes 829-41, 848 and accompanying text.
814. See infra notes 864-69 and accompanying text.
815. See infra notes 850-63 and accompanying text.
816. See infra notes 867-69, 894-932 and accompanying text.
817. If the criminal does not have these feelings, the punishment may help him de-
velop them by emphasizing society's condemnation of his conduct. See infra notes 845-
46 and accompanying text. See, e.g., State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970). The
defendant was convicted of rape and robbery and sentenced to concurrent one-year
terms of imprisonment with a provision for parole at the discretion of the parole board.
Acting pursuant to its power to disapprove (but not increase) a sentence, the Alaska
Supreme Court observed:
In view of the circumstances of this record, we think the sentence imposed
is not well calculated to achieve the objective of reformation of the accused.
Considering the apologetic tone of the sentencing proceedings, the court's en-
dorsement of an extremely early parole, and the current minimum sentences
which were imposed for these three serious felonies, we fail to discern how the
objective of reformation was effectuated. At most, appellee was told that he
was only technically guilty and minimally blameworthy, all of which minimized
the possibility of appellee's comprehending the wrongfulness of his conduct.
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It is socially useful, therefore, to have a mechanism for allowing
a criminal to atone for his crime and thus start over again with a
relatively clean slate.81s A retributivist could argue that punish-
ment fulfills this function and assists in reintegrating a criminal
into society. Consequently, punishment is beneficial to the crim-
inal and to society even if it provides no deterrent impact.
While such reintegration is a valid function of punishment,
difficulties could arise if popular notions of "just desert" di-
verged from "objective" notions. Such difficulties would arise if
most members of society felt that an act of sodomy by two con-
senting adults was so repulsive that only twenty years of impris-
onment would atone for the "crime." Without some concept of
proper punishment which is independent of cultural notions of
morality, we would be logically required to approve any such
penalty if the majority feels that it is necessary. 19
(3) Confusing Deterrence with Retribution
The third approach to criticism of the second tenet also as-
serts that retribution has good consequences. Unfortunately,
however, these consequences are really deterrent effects. Thus,
this approach confuses retribution with deterrence and offers ra-
tionales in support of retribution that are really forms of the
deterrence perspective. A common instance of this confusion is
to speak in terms of the need to punish wrongdoers in order to
reaffirm norms of behavior or to maintain respect for the law.
Under this view, if wrongdoers do not receive their just desert in
the form of punishment, then legal rules are merely words and
people will be confused about proper behavior and lose respect
for the legal system.8 20 However, the reason for the concern
We also think that the sentence imposed falls short of effectuating the goal of
community condemnation ...
Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
818. See, e.g., F. ALEXANDER & A. STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC
212-14 (rev. ed. 1956); Waelder, Psychiatry, and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility,
101 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 386-87 (1952).
819. For a discussion of why it is objectionable to punish simply because of a social
desire, see supra note 792 and infra notes 825-26, 854 and accompanying text.
820. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-84, 184 n.30 (1976); J. STEPHEN,
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 75-93 (1883); Gahringer, Punishment and
Responsibility, 66 J. PHIL. 291, 291-93 (1969); Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of
Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 378 386-87 (1952).
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about norms and respect is the desire for norms to be followed
and for the law to be obeyed. In other words, the concern is to
deter violations of legal and other norms of behavior.
82 1
The confusion here results in part from the failure to distin-
guish two questions: why have any criminal punishment; and
why is a particular individual punished?8 22 The answer to the
first question often reflects a deterrent perspective: punishment
is necessary to deter crime. On the other hand, the answer to the
second question is usually phrased in retributive terms: the
wrongdoer deserves punishment. For example, South Carolina
has adopted criminal prohibitions against certain types of con-
duct-shoplifting,8 ' for instance-and if a person violates these
provisions, we say that he deserves punishment because he vol-
untarily broke the rules. Even though we speak in terms of just
desert under such a set of rules, this manner of speech should
not obscure two points: (1) the rules may be designed to deter
shoplifting; and (2) the punishment of a particular shoplifter is
necessary if the threat of punishment is to be an effective deter-
rent. In other words, the shoplifter deserves punishment because
he has truly been "bad"; he had an obligation to obey the rules
and breached this obligation.824 But the source of his obligation
is a rule designed to deter shoplifting in the future and the justi-
fication for punishing shoplifting is to deter crime. This deter-
rence orientation conflicts with the second tenet of retributive
rationales.
A similar problem underlies another argument that is often
given in support of retribution: offenders must be punished by
the legal system because, if they do not receive their just desert,
society will engage in self-help to vent its instinct for such pun-
ishment.825 This rationale, however, is really concerned with de-
terring illegal self-help, not with imposing just desert. Moreover,
if the punishment is imposed to channel the community's desire
for vengeance or moral rectification, there is a serious risk of of-
821. See infra notes 843-47 and accompanying text.
822. For development of this distinction, see, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONsmiLrrY, 3-13 (1968); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 35-61
(1968); A. VON I-hRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 35-96 (1976); Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules 64
PHIL. REV. 3 (1955).
823. §§ 16-13-110 to -140 (Supp. 1981).
824. See infra note 860 and accompanying text.
825. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-84 (1976).
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fending the first tenet because the amount of punishment will
probably be proportional to popular emotions rather than to the
offender's wrongfulness. While there is a definite relationship
between social views as to just deserts and some objective stan-
dard, the two conceptions of desert are not necessarily the
same.8
26
4. Deterrent Justifications of Punishment
There are two distinguishable types of deterrence-specific
and general. 27 Specific deterrence refers to deterrence of the
specific criminal being punished. In a sense, specific deterrence
is a form of rehabilitation since the punishment is imposed on
the specific individual to "cure" him of criminality by deterring
him from committing similar crimes. General deterrence is
designed to prevent people generally from committing crime by
making them aware that crime is punished.
Since deterrent theories view punishment as a way of influ-
encing human behavior, all such theories must be based on a
model of human conduct. Thus, another important distinction in
considering deterrence models is the identification of two differ-
ent models of human behavior. The first, more basic model
views behavior in terms of rational persons concerned only with
their own selfish interests. The second model is more complex
because it views behavior both in terms of self-interest and in
terms of a concern for respecting obligations even when this is
personally costly.
a. The Basic Model of Human Behavior-Rational Self-
Interest
According to the rational self-interest model, many people
can only be deterred from committing crime if threatened with
punishment that is sufficiently severe to outweigh their gains
from crime. It is not essential to this model that punishment
deter all people from all crimes. Thus, the model does not deny
that there may be many persons who refrain from criminal be-
826. See supra notes 483, 487, 551 and accompanying text, and infra notes 825, 854,
864-69 and accompanying text.
827. See, e.g., H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 39 (1968).
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havior because of such things as an internal ethic or a desire to
avoid social censure. Nor does it deny thatthere are many peo-
ple who are not deterred because they, for example, are irra-
tional or lack choice. This model only asserts that some "signifi-
cant" portion of the population is deterred by, and only by, the
threat of punishment.
82 8
This model seems to be a plausible representation of a sub-
stantial portion of human behavior. It also appears to provide a
guide to the proportionality question because there is no point
in punishing a person more than is necessary to deter him. For
example, if a $50 fine deters speeding, then it would be unjusti-
fied to impose a $100 fine. Nevertheless, this approach is subject
to a number of criticisms, and the following paragraphs provide
a brief review of some of the major objections.
First, the model of behavior assumes the validity of state-
ments such as the following:
If X is likely to gain $500 from a robbery, if there is a 5%
chance of detection and imprisonment for the crime, and if
each year in prison is worth at least $2,000 to X, then he will
be deterred by a sentence of slightly over five years because the
discounted value of the sentence (.05 x $2,000 x 5) exceeds the
$500 to be gained.
Yet it is only possible to do this in a theoretical sense; specific
dollar values and percentages are not assignable in the real
world. In many cases, one might respond that this criticism does
not matter because only approximations are needed. However,
rough guesses may not be adequate when capital punishment is
involved. 29
A second flaw can be illustrated by assuming the following
pattern of behavior of a population of 100,000 persons in re-
sponse to variations in the amount of punishment for the crime
of shoplifting.
828. See, e.g., Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 949 (1966).
829. See infra notes 878-932 and accompanying text.
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TABLE VII
Number of persons committing Penalty for













0 Death preceded by
extreme torture
This pattern is entirely consistent with the basic model. People
will respond differently to the same amount of punishment be-
cause a year in prison will be a greater cost to some than to
others, because some people will have a greater "need" to
shoplift, and because people will have different views about the
likelihood of their being caught and punished. Thus, increasing
the amount of punishment would be expected to increase the
deterrent effect. The problem with applying the deterrent model
to this factual situation is that the rationale can justify any pun-
ishment, including death and torture, because there is some
marginal increase in deterring shoplifting for each increase in
punishment. A deterrent theorist can respond to this situation
in one of two ways: (1) concede that all the above amounts of
punishment are justified; or (2) propose a more refined scheme
for determining what amount of punishment is proportional to
the crime so we can identify which punishments are too small
and which too large. The first response is intuitively troublesome
because most people feel that torturing and then executing
shoplifters is so out of proportion to their crime that it would be
wrong to do so. Consequently, the most common response to the
542 [Vol. 34
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shoplifting illustration is to refine the basic model.
Jeremy Bentham adopted this approach in An Introduction
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.830 Bentham de-
fended punishment from a utilitarian perspective and argued
that inflicting pain was justified so long as the harm it deterred
exceeded the pain inflicted. Using his utilitarian framework he
argued that there are a number of situations where no punish-
ment is justified:
[1] Where it is groundless: where there is no mischief for it to
prevent; the act not being mischievous upon the whole.
[2] Where it must be inefficacious: where it cannot act so as to
prevent the mischief.
[3] Where it is unprofitable, or too expensive: where the mis-
chief it would produce would be greater than what it
prevented.
[4] Where it is needless: where the mischief may be prevented,
or cease of itself, without it: that is, at a cheaper rate . .
In addition, Bentham developed the following principles for de-
termining the amount of punishment which is justified:
[1] The value of the punishment must not be less in any case
than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the
offense.
83 2
[2] The greater the mischief of the offense, the greater is the




[3] Where two offenses come in competition, the punishment
for the greater offense must be sufficient to induce a man to
prefer the less.8 "
[4] The punishment should be adjusted in such manner to each
particular offense, that for every part of the mischief there may
be a motive to restrain the offender from giving birth to it.s "
830. J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in
THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MiLL 791 (E. Burtt ed. 1939). For a recent
economic model of criminal law, see, e.g., R. POSNE, ECONOMC ANALYSIS OF LAW 163-77
(2d ed. 1977). Though Posner's model is more sophisticated than Bentham's, it basically
has the same flaws.
831. J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in
THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 791, 843 (E. Burtt ed. 1939).
832. Id. at 844.
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[5] The punishment ought in no case to be more than what is
necessary to bring it into conformity with the rules here
given.836
[6] That the quantity actually inflicted on each individual of-
fender may correspond to the quantity intended for similar of-
fenders in general, the several circumstances influencing sensi-
bility [to pain] ought always to be taken into account [in
sentencing].1
7
Bentham's scheme appears to be a useful way of identifying
both the acts that are "bad" enough to be punished and the
amount of punishment that is proportional to each offense. But
there are problems with the approach.
One problem is that the refinements result in inconsisten-
cies with the basic deterrent model. This result can be illus-
trated by comparing the above robbery example with the crime
of shoplifting. The example assumed a 5 percent probability of
being sentenced for robbery. It seems plausible that the
probability of detecting the person who commits a robbery is
greater than that of discovering a shoplifter since so many oc-
currences of shoplifting will not even be discovered, much less
reported, and because so many more police resources are de-
voted to each robbery. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
there is a one in a thousand chance of being caught shoplifting.
Using the basic deterrent model of behavior, this difference in
probability of being caught for robbery as opposed to shoplifting
would lead to the following sentence structure for a person who
calculates the cost of a year's imprisonment to be $2,000:
TABLE VIII
CRIME BENEFIT TO PROBABILITY OF MINIMUM SENTENCE






Robbery $500 .05 5 years
Shoplifting $ 20 .001 10 years
836. Id.
837. Id. at 845-46.
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Sentencing a person to twice the penalty for shoplifting as for
robbery would conflict with Bentham's scheme of proportional-
ity. However, if sentencing is discounted by probability of pun-
ishment, such conflicts are inevitable.
Another flaw in Bentham's scheme is that it treats the crim-
inal's suffering and the victim's suffering equally. For example,
if the harm to the victim of a crime was $10,000 and the only
way to deter this type of crime would be to impose suffering of
$11,000, Bentham's scheme indicates that the criminal should
not be punished. This view totally ignores the distinction be-
tween the innocence of the victim and the guilt of the
criminal.
838
These problems with Bentham's approach reflect a more
general objection to deterrent views based on the basic model:
the application of the basic deterrent approach to many situa-
tions yields intuitively offensive results. The discussion of Ben-
tham reflects two such outcomes: (1) punishing shoplifters more
severely than robbers, and (2) refusing to punish a person be-
cause the reduction in injury to an innocent victim would be less
than the injury to the criminal resulting from his punishment.
This same insensitivity of the deterrent approach to guilt and
innocence is reflected by the lack of objection to punishing an
innocent person so long as people could be convinced that he
was guilty and thus deterred from committing crime.839
A final difficulty with the basic deterrence model is that it
may not accurately describe human behavior. In particular, a
considerable amount of empirical research suggests that the
amount of punishment is really not a very important factor in
determining the degree of deterrence. Instead the primary factor
is likely to be probability of detection. 4 0 Although there is no
clear, simple answer to the question of empirical validity con-
cerning the relative importance of detection vis-a-vis amount of
punishment,841 there is at least good reason to avoid dogmatism
838. See infra notes 863, 896 and accompanying text.
839. See infra notes 859-63 and accompanying text, for further discussion of the
impropriety of punishing the innocent.
840. See, e.g., Antunes and Hunt, The Deterrent Impact of Criminal Sanctions:
Some Implication for Criminal Justice Policy, 51 J. URBAN LAW 145, 158-59 (1973). But
see, e.g., Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
949, 965-70 (1966).
841. See, F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME
19821 545
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about the validity of the model.
b. The Complex Model of Human Behavior-Rational Self-
Interest and Obligation
The more complex model accepts the view that rational self
interest is a useful concept for understanding a substantial por-
tion of human behavior. Many people are indeed almost totally
selfish, and even altruists are at least partially selfish. 42 How-
ever, the complex model rejects the notion that selfishness alone
is a sufficient basis for a deterrent theory. In addition, a consid-
erable amount of behavior results from an internal sense of obli-
gation to obey the law.843 The distinction between obligation and
self-interest may be seen by considering situations in which a
person could steal with virtual certainty of not being caught.
The selfishness model would predict theft in such a situation,
yet many people would not steal under such circumstances be-
cause they feel it would be "wrong."
It could be argued that this behavior is consistent with -the
selfishness model because the sense of obligation not to steal is
simply the result of a decision that it is in each person's self-
interest to have the law of theft obeyed generally. This argu-
ment has an initial appeal because it is true that all would suffer
if individual possessions were not secure. However, it is not nec-
essarily true that I am better off if your possessions are secure
from theft. If I could steal from you without being caught and if
my theft would not change your behavior towards my posses-
sions, then it would be in my self-interest to steal from you. This
is precisely the situation in any large society: no single instance
of theft has a significant impact on whether people generally be-
lieve that others are obeying the law. As a result, it would be
rational to steal if this could be done without detection because
no single theft would threaten the thief's self-interest in having
the law of theft obeyed by others. Thus, obligation is not simply
another form of the self-interest model.
CONTROL 194-208 (1973)[hereinafter cited as F. ZImRmNG & G. HAWKINS].
842. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 191-92 (1961).
843. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 55-57, 80-88, 96, 134-37 (1961);
Sarat, Support for the Legal System: An Analysis of Knowledge and Behavior, 3 AM.
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At the same time though, the complex model includes a
concern for self-interest in the development of notions of obliga-
tion. Even though a person may feel that theft is wrong, he may
steal if he thinks society (or a significant portion of society) no
longer accepts his view of theft. This result could occur when
theft is widespread or when thieves are not punished. Thus, one
effect of punishment is to reaffirm norms and increase respect
for the law by: (1) assuring members of society that it is not
foolish to base their behavior on their sense of obligation; 44 (2)
conveying a strong message about social disapproval of certain
types of conduct and thus strengthening moral inhibitions;" 5
and (3) inculcating the habit of obeying the law.8'
This more complex model appears to be an accurate
description of a vast range of behavior, including not only the
purely selfish conduct envisaged in the simpler model, but also
more complicated actions resulting from obligation. However, to
the extent that it relies on the selfishness model, it is subject to
most of the problems associated with that model. In addition,
the inclusion of a sense of obligation in the complex model re-
sults in new difficulties. A short discussion of several of these
should illustrate the type of problems involved.
First, all the deterrent models require measurement of em-
pirical patterns of behavior to determine what effect punishment
will have on crime. Such measurement is difficult with the rela-
tively simple selfishness model; it becomes virtually impossible
when the notion of'respect for the law as a motivating factor is
included. Thus, skepticism is required with regard to empiri-
844. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 240 (1971); F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS,
supra note 841 at 87-89.
845. J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 98-105 (1970); F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS,
supra note 841 at 84-87.
846. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS supra hote 841 at 87-89.
847. This difficulty results in part from the ambiguity of the concept "respect for
law." Does this concept refer to a specific criminal law, to all criminal laws, or to all laws,
civil as well as criminal? If law generally is meant, are all laws the same? For example, is
it equally as important to have respect for parking requirements as for murder prohibi-
tions? Another fundamental difficulty results from the need to show both that punish-
ment changes internal attitudes about law and that these changes result in changes in
behavior. Empirical studies, however, have had problems in developing specific factual
support for such relationships. One principal difficulty is that if punishment is increased
in amount or severity and compliance increases, it is not clear whether the increased
compliance is the result of fear or an increase in respect. In order to answer this ques-
tion, surveys of people's attitudes concerning the change in punishment and in behavior
5471982]
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cal assertions concerning specific penalties where such assertions
are based on concern for respect for law.
Other problems result from the possibilitity of conflict be-
tween the two components of the complex model: selfishness and
obligation. This conflict can be illustrated by several plausible
assumptions about shoplifting:
(1) Most recidivists cannot be deterred by punishment short of
life imprisonment because so many of them are irrational.
(2) Most recidivists could be "cured" of their irrationality, but
the cure is expensive.
(3) Most persons would have their respect for law diminished if
such "excessive" punishment were imposed or if expensive
treatment were provided to criminals at no charge.
The selfishness portion of the complex model indicates that ei-
ther life imprisonment or perhaps a compulsory treatment ap-
proach should be imposed if this is cheaper; however, the com-
plex model's concern for obligation and respect for law indicates
that neither is appropriate.
It is not clear how such dilemmas should be resolved. One
possible approach would be to "maximize" deterrence and em-
phasize the selfishness or the obligation model depending upon
which approach gives the greatest amount of deterrence. Thus, if
respect for law had a greater impact in reducing crime in the
above shoplifting example, it would be appropriate to continue
to use imprisonment for short terms even though it had no im-
pact on the recidivists. However, this resolution of the conflict is
objectionable because it is virtually impossible to make such em-
pirical determinations about relative deterrent impact.
Other problems emerge when one attempts to develop and
apply the concepts of obligation and respect for law. Some of
these difficulties can be appreciated by restating the model as
follows:
must be conducted. However, such surveys are difficult and questionable, particularly
when they rely not only on answers about attitudes but also on self-evaluations of the
behavioral effects of these attitudes. See, e.g., F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS supra note 841
at 307-12; LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 208-12 (L. Friedman and S. Macaulay 2d
ed. 1977). Although a willingness to accept such attitudinal research might exist when
determining whether obligation and respect have some role in obedience, relating this
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In order to deter crime, we need to reaffirm norms and main-
tain respect for law by assuring citizens that persons who com-
mit crime will be punished in proportion to their wrongdoing.
The last portion of this statement parallels the first tenet of re-
tributive schemes of punishment. As indicated in the earlier dis-
cussion of this tenet, it is difficult to determine what acts should
be punishable and how much punishment is proportional to a
particular person's crime.
This task is even more difficult within the context of a de-
terrent scheme, because deterrence focuses on actual behavior
rather than on some objective scheme of just desert. As a result,
there is always the potential for conflict between cultural no-
tions of just desert and objective notions. For example, we could
justify punishing an innocent person if we could make society
believe he was guilty and if it were necessary to punish someone
in order to increase respect for law. Such conflicts could also
arise in determining what acts are punishable and how much to
punish. For instance, if virtually all of a society is both white
and racist, respect for the law would be diminished if the crimi-
nal law were not racially discriminatory in favor of whites-for
example, by punishing homicide of a white by a black more se-
verely than homicide of a black by a white." 8
5. A Proposed System of Just Punishment
Many of the objections to deterrence and retribution can be
addressed by viewing these justifications as only one part of a
scheme of punishment in a just state. For instance, both retribu-
tion and deterrence have been criticized for their inability to
provide sufficient guidance to address concerns such as propor-
tionality in punishment. By expanding the analysis to include
other concerns normally included in discussions of justice, such
as notions of a right to equal treatment, it is possible to say
more about problems such as proportionality. For example, it is
improper to use race to determine the amount of punishment,
and this might be so even if the race of the defendant were a
statistically significant indication of the amount of punishment
848. For discussion of such a problem in South Carolina, see supra note 285 and
accompanying text, and infra notes 950-52 and accompanying text.
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necessary to achieve some level of deterrence. This section
adopts this broader perspective and sketches a scheme of just
punishment in terms of five tenets or requirements which must
be satisfied if punishment is to be just.
This scheme is designed to serve as a framework to be used
in considering the justice of capital punishment in South Caro-
lina. Consequently, this section does not fully consider the
scheme of just punishment. Such development, which would in-
clude not only details and refinements omitted here but also an
analysis of the basis for asserting that these and only these ten-
ets are required,849 is beyond the scope of this article. Conse-
quently, specifics will be omitted unless they are directly rele-
vant to capital punishment. Similarly, arguments for the tenets
will be omitted or limited to brief indications of their usefulness
in providing a system of ordered liberty.
a. A Reasonably Just Society
The system of punishment must operate within the frame-
work of a reasonably just society. This first tenet is necessary
because there may be circumstances in which the background
system of legal rights and duties is so unjust that numerous vio-
lations of the law might be justified. This situation could arise,
for example, when the rules of governing ownership of property
or participation in selecting legislators are so unfair that the
wrongfulness of most types of theft is open to debate.5 0
849. If these arguments concerning the basis of the tenets were to be developed fur-
ther, the development would take a social contract approach. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971). In the context of the present discussion, this approach can be roughly
summarized as follows: If an individual knew nothing specific about his society or about
himself (for example, his intelligence, race, sex, or parents), he would accept the pro-
posed tenets as guides for determining just punishment. See id. at §§ 24-25, 38.
850. The textual statement is limited because of the problems involved in determin-
ing the relationship between moral and legal obligations in an unjust society. For exam-
ple, no matter how unjust the system of ownership, murdering a person in order to rob
him seems wrong except in the most extreme circumstances. See infra note 860 and
accompanying text. For a general discussion of some of the problems in such a situation,
see, e.g., L. FULLER, THE MOrALITY OF LAw 245-53 (rev. ed. 1969). For a general discus-
sion of obligation, see supra notes 807-11 and accompanying text.
550 [Vol. 34
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b. Limits On the Types of Conduct That May Be Punished
Conduct should not be prohibited unless the prohibition is
necessary to prevent harm to persons who do not consent to
that harm and unless it is possible for people to comply with
the prohibition. Some might object to this second tenet on a va-
riety of grounds - for example, because it restricts the state's
ability to adopt paternalistic legislation or to prohibit conduct
which offends public decency or morality.851 However, it is not
necessary to address such objections or to explore the reasons
for this tenet 52 here because South Carolina's scheme of capital
punishment satisfies the tenet. This requirement of just punish-
ment is listed in order to measure the South Carolina approach
against a general standard which cannot be criticized as lacking
sufficient limits on the state's conduct.
c. The Purposeful Nature of Punishment
Punishment is justified only if it deters crime or assists in
reintegrating wrongdoers into society. This third tenet insures
that the harmfulness of punishment will provide some benefit.
This is accomplished both by prohibiting punishment where no
good can result and by preventing one type of excessive punish-
ment-i.e., punishment in excess of the amount necessary to de-
ter the crime or to assist in reintegrating the criminal into soci-
ety. Thus, this tenet achieves to some extent the goals that
Bentham had in mind when he developed his scheme discussed
above. Most of the objections to Bentham's scheme can be met
by the other tenets, which require that punishment decisions not
be made solely on stark utilitarian grounds. If these other tenets
are respected and if the reintegrative purpose of punishment is
considered, then we need not be concerned with problems such
as punishment of the innocent or the torture and execution of
shoplifters.
This third tenet also limits the types of goals that can be
851. See, e.g., P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
852. For arguments concerning the need for harm to others, see e.g., J. MILL, ON
LIBERTY (1859). For a discussion of the requirement that conduct be possible, see, e.g.,
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1959); L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 7079 (rev.
ed. 1969); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 236-37 (1971).
1982] 551
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used to justify punishment. For example, the state cannot nor-
mally justify the imposition of unpleasant circumstances if the
purpose is to coerce confessions, compel disclosure of informa-
tion, or break the spirit of a person. When these purposes are
involved, the state is torturing people, not legitimately punish-
ing them.ss3 Similarly, we should not punish a person simply to
satisfy some vague sense of community outrage. Such vengeance
is not justified because it violates the defendant's right to re-
spect by treating him simply as a means of gratifying an emotion
held by a substantial number of persons.
54
d. Punishment in Accordance with Rules
Punishment can only be imposed in accordance with a
clear rule promulgated prior to the offense. 55 One reason for
this fourth tenet is that it fosters individual liberty by restrict-
ing the state. For example, it grants a right of "notice" of the
prohibition and of the amount of punishment. Thus, it forbids
the use of ex post facto laws or the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions where a person could not reasonably be expected to know
the conduct involved was prohibited 58 The requirement that
punishment be "in accordance with rules" also limits the state
since it provides a basis for identifying and preventing arbitrary
action by officials.857 For example, it enables us to have mean-
ingful procedures of arrest and trial that are designed to insure
853. Torture is objectionable for a number of reasons: (1) it is dehumanizing; (2) it
grants the state too much power over individuals; and (3) the information gained is not
reliable. See, e.g., C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT (H. Paolucci trans. 1963); M.
RUTHREN, TORTURE: THE GRAND CONSPIRACY (1978); Klayman, The Definition of Torture
in International Law, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 449 (1978); Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124
(1978); Twining and Twining, Bentham on Torture, 24 N. IR. L.Q. 305 (1976).
854. See supra note 315 and accompanying text, and infra notes 862-63 and accom-
panying text. It can be argued that responding to such outrage is necessary to accom-
plish reintegration or to maintain respect for law and thus to increase the deterrent im-
pact of the criminal law. See supra notes 817-19, 844-46 and accompanying text.
However, this argument is limited to those situations in which such a deterrent or reinte-
grative effect exists; and there is good reason to be skeptical about either of these im-
pacts. See supra notes 819, 847-48 and accompanying text, and infra note 877 and ac-
companying text.
855. For general discussion of such a requirement, see e.g., L. FULLER, THE MORAL-
iTY OF LAW 33-94 (rev. ed. 1969); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 238 (1971).
856. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 255 U.S. 225 (1957).
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that the accused has in fact committed the crime. 58 A second
reason for this requirement is that it would be impossible to de-
ter conduct without having provided meaningful notice of the
conduct to be deterred.8 59 Finally, this requirement provides
part of the basis for distinguishing wrongdoers from the rest of
the population.
This last distinction is possible because in a reasonably just
society there is an obligation to obey criminal prohibitions.
While the character of this obligation is subject to debate under
some circumstances,860 there is no dispute that there is both a
legal and a moral obligation not to kill or steal absent excep-
tional circumstances such as theft of food to save a life. It is also
undisputed that the very notion of obligation is meaningless un-
less breaches of the legal/moral obligation to obey the law are
labelled as wrong and unless the wrongful character of the
breach has an impact on treatment of the wrongdoer. In other
words, when a person has breached his legal/moral obligation to
obey the law, three things are justly said: (1) that he is a wrong-
doer; (2) that his victim is innocent (if the victim has not com-
mitted some act which would justify, excuse, or mitigate the
wrongdoing); and (3) that this difference has an important im-
pact on the way the wrongdoer and the innocent victim are
viewed. As a result, it is possible to address two potential objec-
tions to the third tenet, which asserts that punishment is legiti-
mate if it achieves some future benefit.
The first such possible objection is that the third tenet is
too narrow because it allows punishment in situations in which
punishment of some crime provides very little social benefit
from deterring crime or from reintegrating wrongdoers into soci-
ety. Some people find this objectionable because punishment
under such circumstances may be socially inefficient in that the
harm to the wrongdoers from punishment outweighs the meager
858. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
859. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 202 (1961).
860. See, e.g., S. BENN & R. PETERS, SOCIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE
297-331; C. PATEMAN, THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION (1979); J. RAWLS, A THE-
ORY OF JUSTICE §§ 51-59 (1971); J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 233-289 (1979); A. SIM-
MONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1979). Some of the problems in-
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social benefit gained from punishment.861 The fourth tenet's re-
quirement of prior rules renders this objection invalid. The suf-
fering of a wrongdoer who is being punished is not entitled to
the same treatment as that of the innocent victim.
A second potential objection to the third tenet focuses on
situations in which a punishment is justified solely because of its
deterrent impact on the general population. In such cases, one
could object that the criminal is being treated as a means to ac-
complish a socially beneficial result and that this is morally ob-
jectionable because every person has a right to be treated as an
end in himself. To evaluate this objection, it is necessary to di-
vide it into two component assertions: (1) that persons have a
right to be treated as ends rather than means; and (2) that this
right is offended by punishing people to achieve general
deterrence.
The first assertion has considerable merit, which can be il-
lustrated by considering our reaction to the following:
An evil scientist has devised an extremely efficient solar energy
cell which will provide cheap energy for all. He offers to make
the design available to society, if society will grant him two
persons, Alpha and Beta, as slaves to do with as he wishes.
Many persons would feel that the scientist's offer should be re-
fused because there is something "wrong" with using Alpha and
Beta as the means to achieve cheap energy. Moreover, this sense
of a wrong to Alpha and Beta would hold even for people who
might say that the bargain is justified because the benefit from
the solar energy cell is so great that it outweighs the wrong to
Alpha and Beta. Thus, there seems to be a consensus on the no-
tion that persons are morally entitled to a certain respect, which
requires that we not simply treat them as objects to be traded
for some social gain.6 2
861. See supra notes 831, 838 and accompanying text.
862. For philosophical perspectives on this intuitive notion, see, e.g., R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); I. KANT, ON THE FOUNDATION OF MORALITY (E. Liddell
Trans. 1970); Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for
Death 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1174 nn. 104-05 (1980). Several points should be made
concerning the textual assertion. First, there are many situations where it is moral to
treat persons as a means-for example, many, if not most, economic transactions involve
such treatment. Thus, the textual statement is that persons have a right not to be
treated as only a means. See, e.g., I. KANT, supra at 138-40, 152-162. Second, there may
be situations in which violations of the right to be treated as an end are justified-for
[Vol. 34
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Despite the merits of the first part of the objection, the sec-
ond assertion about the impropriety of general deterrence is in-
valid because it ignores the importance of the wrongful nature of
criminal conduct. This importance can be seen by changing the
earlier illustration abiout solar energy cells as follows:
The design is available and the cells are used widely. However,
vandals are preventing the cells from providing cheap, abun-
dant energy by shooting the energy cells with rifles. A statute is
enacted prohibiting such shooting and Gamma deliberately vi-
olates this prohibition.
The punishment of Gamma cannot be equated with the enslave-
ment of Alpha and Beta. The reason for the prohibition-the
production of cheap solar energy-is the same reason as that
given for the enslavement of Alpha and Beta. However,
Gamma's case is profoundly different because the prohibition
changed the context of his behavior by imposing a legal and
moral obligation on Gamma. It is just to punish him because of
this breach and the punishment is triggered by his wrongdoing,
not simply by a desire to produce energy.88 s
This difference can be seen from another perspective by
considering a final illustration addressed to the problem of
example, when the violation is necessary to prevent some catastrophe. See R. DWORKIN,
supra, at 191. Finally, speaking in terms of the right to be treated as an end may not be
helpful in many circumstances. For example, if the power cells in the textual example
would significantly improve the living conditions of a number of persons, it could be said
that refusing to hand over Alpha and Beta is tantamount to treating these prospective
beneficiaries as simply the means of protecting Alpha and Beta. Moreover, this conflict
cannot be easily resolved by distinguishing an act-granting Alpha and Beta to the sci-
entist-from an omission-not granting Alpha and Beta-because of the underlying
problems in justifying the act-omission distinction. See supra notes 796-98 and accompa-
nying text.
863. Problems remain, however. For example, one of the side effects of punishing
Gamma may be the suffering by innocent persons who have relationships with Gamma.
See supra note 793 and accompanying text, and infra notes 900, 907 and accompanying
text, for further discussion of this problem. Another problem is that mistaken convic-
tions are inevitable in a fallible system. See, e.g., infra notes 898-99, 959 and accompany-
ing text. As a result, it is possible to argue that some innocent persons will be convicted,
and that innocent persons will be used as a means to achieve effective deterrence. See,
e.g., Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death,
53 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1143 (1980); infra notes 899, 959 and accompanying text. There are
only two solutions to this problem: abandon all punishment or devise a procedural
scheme that minimizes the likelihood of erroneous convictions. Because of the tremen-
dous problems with the first approach, our system utilizes the second. See, e.g., notes
infra 924-35 and- accompanying text.
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vandalism:
Despite the statute, vandalism was not deterred because van-
dals did not think they would be caught. The state officials,
therefore, fabricated a convincing case against Delta so that
vandals would believe that enforcement was effective and
would thereby be deterred.
Punishment of Delta is wrong and is prohibited by the fourthk
tenet. The deterrent impact of his punishment might be equal to
or greater than that of Gamma's punishment, but Delta is not a
wrongdoer.
e. Proportionality
As the preceding discussion indicates, the notion of "wrong-
doing" is crucial to the justification of punishment. This impor-
tance is reflected in the fifth tenet: punishment must be based
on a procedural scheme which insures that punishment is pro-
portional to the wrongfulness of the crime and to the "badness"
of the wrongdoer. Before discussing the procedural emphasis of
this tenet, it will be useful to discuss the reasons for requiring
proportionality in punishment and the problems involved in im-
plementing such a vague requirement.
First, it not only requires the state to treat similar cases
alike but also focuses on the crime and the criminal as relevant
aspects of similarity. To punish differently based on the race of
the victim or of the criminal is a clear example of action that is
improper under this tenet. Race has nothing to do with wrong-
fulness in this context. In contrast, age can be highly relevant.
Under some circumstances, this tenet would permit, indeed re-
quire, the consideration of either the age of the victim-rape of
a ten year old, for example-or the age of the accused-a five
year old who had shot someone, for example.
Second, the reintegration of criminals into society requires
such a scheme since punishment is designed to insure that a
criminal has "paid his just debt."8" Thus, more serious crimes
such as armed robbery should be punished more severely than
petty shoplifting. In addition, excuses and other mitigating fac-
tors must play a role. For example, a man who steals bread to
864. See infra notes 817-19 and accompanying text.
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feed his family should not be punished as severely as a person
who steals because he enjoys the suffering of his victims. Simi-
larly, a person with a severe mental defect should be punished
less severely if his defect contributed to his criminal conduct.
Factors such as seriousness of harm, exigent circumstances, and
mental defect are all relevant to determining a person's just de-
sert and thus are important indicators of the amount of punish-
ment necessary to accomplish the reintegrative role of
punishment.
Third, satisfying the reintegrative notion of proportionality
should have a beneficial impact on deterrence because such pro-
portionality should increase respect for the legal system and re-
inforce basic norms of right and wrong behavior. This should
improve the willingness of the general population to obey the
criminal law voluntarily and support law enforcement efforts.
Despite the need for proportionality in punishment, it is an
extremely vague concept and is difficult to apply in many cases.
For example, how does one compare an instance of white collar
crime, such as illegal price-rigging by an otherwise respectable
and productive citizen, with theft and housebreaking by an un-
employed thirty-year-old with no useful skills? Other examples
of this difficulty were presented in the earlier discussion of retri-
bution 65 and deterrence.866 Another problem which is central to
capital punishment is raised by the question of when, if ever, is
execution proportional to a crime? This aspect of proportional-
ity will be discussed in more detail below, but further considera-
tion of vagueness is appropriate here because it will elucidate
the reasons for the procedural emphasis of the proportionality
requirement in capital punishment cases.
The discussion of the fourth tenet indicated several reasons
for avoiding vagueness in rules. 86 7 Two of these reasons are that
vague standards provide no guidance to citizens, and that vague
restrictions cannot limit the state by identifying and preventing
arbitrary action by officials. These problems could be solved by
rigid, mechanical rules; but this would often result in other,
sometimes greater problems. One such problem is that it may
not be possible to identify the "right" rule. In addition, it is im-
865. See supra notes 799-802, 819 and accompanying text.
866. See supra notes 829-41, 847-48 and accompanying text.
867. See supra notes 855-60 and accompanying text.
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possible to foresee all the possible situations and variations to
include in a rule. Moreover, even with total prescience, it would
not be possible to formulate a comprehensible rule that includes
all the possible variables. In short, it is impossible to completely
eliminate a role for official discretion in interpreting and apply-
ing vague standards such as the requirement of proportionality
in punishment."'6
Discretion, however, need not mean arbitrariness and un-
predictability, because it is possible to devise procedural safe-
guards to at least reduce the likelihood of arbitrariness. Several
common procedural limitations are: (1) clear rules indicating -the
cases where discretion is appropriate and limiting the range of
decisions that might be made; (2) guidelines that are relevant to
the exercise of discretion; (3) statements of reasons for a deci-
sion; and (4) checks on abuse by the review of decisions by a
higher official, by the need to convince a majority of the mem-
bers of an official body to decide in a particular way, or by open
debate and criticism of decisions.86' Thus, even though propor-
tionality is vague, it can serve a meaningful role in a just system
of punishment if adequate procedural safeguards are used. For
this reason, the fifth tenet is phrased in terms of the adoption of
procedures adequate to insure punishment in accordance with a
thoughtful consideration of the badness of the crime and of the
criminal.
B. Capital Punishment in South Carolina
The scheme of just punishment sketched above can be used
to critique the justice of South Carolina's scheme of capital pun-
ishment. An argument in favor of the scheme consists of five as-
sertions concerning the tenets of just punishment:
(1) South Carolina is a reasonably just state.
(2) Murder is the type of conduct that should be criminalized.
(3) Capital punishment may deter some murders that life im-
prisonment would not deter, and the South Carolina scheme is
868. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS BK. V, Ch. 9; H.L.A. HART, Tm
CONCEr OF LAW 121-26 (1961); PLATO, STATESMAN 294; Christie, Vagueness and Legal
Language, 48 MINN. L. REv. 885 (1964).
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designed to insure that capital punishment is imposed only
when persons might plausibly be deterred by capital punish-
ment but not by life imprisonment.
(4) The crime of murder and the punishment scheme for mur-
der are clearly defined, and capital punishment is imposed only
in accordance with this scheme.
(5) Capital punishment is imposed only on the basis of an elab-
orate procedural system designed to insure that this very se-
vere punishment is only imposed on very "bad" people for very
"bad" murders.
The objections to capital punishment focus on the last three as-
sertions, and the following discussion will consider these objec-
tions to determine whether South Carolina's system of capital
punishment is just.
These objections can be divided into three categories. First,
some argue that the third tenet of punishment is not satisfied
because capital punishment does not deter murders that life im-
prisonment would not deter. Second, it is argued that the last
three tenets are violated because, even if capital punishment
does provide such deterrence, the South Carolina scheme is in-
adequate to provide a meaningful basis for executing some per-
sons while sentencing others to life imprisonment. A third argu-
ment emphasizes the unique nature of the death penalty and
asserts that, even if the death penalty does deter and even if
there is a meaningful basis for selecting persons to be executed,
the death penalty is nonetheless improper.
As a general matter, these objections are not valid because
the South Carolina scheme contains a number of provisions that
address the concerns underlying the objections. Nevertheless,
the cumulative impact of these objections is sufficient to support
the conclusion that the South Carolina scheme is currently un-
just in many important respects. The system could, in theory at
least, be reformed to meet these specific shortcomings. However,
the conclusion to this section indicates that there is reason to be
pessimistic about South Carolina's adoption of these reforms.
1. General Deterrence - The Only Legitimate Purpose of
Capital Punishment
In order to satisfy the third tenet of just punishment, a par-
ticular punishment must deter crime or assist in reintegrating
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wrongdoers into society. Other purposes - for example, cor-
recting "moral imbalance, 8 70 expressing community outrage,
7 1
and efficient use of resources 87 2- have already been shown to be
inadequate as justifications for punishment. Capital punishment
obviously provides no reintegrative impact. Since the alternative
is life imprisonment, the death penalty does not provide addi-
tional specific deterrence.8 73 Thus, capital punishment can only
be justified on the basis of its general deterrent effect - i.e., it
must be shown that some persons who are deterred from com-
mitting crime by the threat of the death penalty would not be
deterred if only life imprisonment were imposed.
Some critics of capital punishment argue that it does not
provide any more deterrence than life imprisonment. 74 In evalu-
ating this assertion, it is helpful to remember that general deter-
rence arguably results from two different types of effects: (1) by
deterring persons from committing crime because they fear pu-
nitive sanctions;875 and (2) by deterring crime by fostering re-
spect for law.
7 6
The second type of deterrent impact has received virtually
no attention in the context of capital punishment. This is not
surprising, because it would be virtually impossible to determine
whether imprisoning murderers for life rather than executing
them so diminshes respect for law that it results in violations of
the law that would not have otherwise occurred. Moreover, the
existence of such a subtle correlation seems so speculative and
implausible that this type of deterrent impact could not be used
to satisfy the requirement that punishment be purposive and
thus justify executing murderers rather than imprisoning them
870. See supra notes 803-16 and accompanying text. While this emotion cannot
alone justify punishment, it does provide an essential part of a system of just punish-
ment. See supra notes 812-16 and accompanying text.
871. See supra notes 315, 854 and accompanying text.
872. See supra notes 316-17 and accompanying text.
873. See supra note 827 and accompanying text. The textual assertion assumes that
the imprisonment will provide effective restraint. While there may be occasional cases of
escape or of commissions of further crimes, the assumption seems to be valid as a general
proposition.
874. See, e.g., Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases
of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1187-1224 (1981).
875. See supra notes 828-41 and accompanying text.
876. See supra notes 842-48 and accompanying text.
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It is also difficult to determine whether the fear of the death
penalty deters potential murderers who would not be deterred
by the threat of life imprisonment. If this determination were
possible, we would know whether capital punishment satisfies
the third tenet of just punishment. Although most studies sug-
gest that there is no such deterrent impact, the studies are con-
tradictory and inconclusive .8 78 The basic difficulty with all such
studies is that there are too many variables involved. For exam-
ple, if the murder rates differ between two societies or in the
same society at different times, we cannot be sure whether the
variation is due to the use of capital punishment or to some
other variable such as wealth, social attitudes, or availability of
weapons. 7 9 Thus, even though most studies suggest that there is
no incremental deterrent impact from capital punishment, 80 the
issue is simply unresolved. 81
2. A Meaningful Basis for Selecting Persons to be Executed
- Strengths and Shortcomings of the South Carolina
Scheme.
Some of the empirical problems in determining whether
capital punishment provides an incremental deterrent impact
877. See supra notes 847-48 and accompanying text.
878. See, e.g., Gibbs, Preventive Effects of Capital Punishment Other than Deter-
rence, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, 103-16 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982); Klein, Forst,
& Filator, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An Assessment of the Evidence,
in id. at 138-59; Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of
the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1187-1224 (1981); PANEL ON
RESEARCH ON DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE EFFECTS, Report of the Panel-Deterrence,
in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON
CRIME RATES 59 (A. Blumstein, I. Cohen, & D. Hagin eds. 1978); Phillips, Strong and
Weak Research Designs for Detecting the Impact of Capital Punishment on Homicide,
33 RUTGERS L. REV. 790 (1981). For a general discussion of the empirical problems of
deterrence models, see, e.g., PANEL ON RESEARCH IN DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE EF-
FECTS, Report of th- Panel-Deterrence, supra at 19-63. See also supra notes 829, 840-
41, 847 and accompanying text.
879. See, e.g., Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases
of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1187-1224 (1981).
880. Id. at 1197-1222; Amsterdam, Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA 346, 354-58 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982).
881. See supra note 878. This inconclusiveness seems inevitable in the near future
since all studies conducted prior to the adoption of the current system of capital punish-
ment cannot be conclusive concering the current system.
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can be addressed by using standards and procedures designed to
insure that capital punishment is only imposed where two condi-
tions are satisfied. First, the murder involved is of a type that
can plausibly be deterred. Second, considering the circumstances
of the crime and the characteristics of the murderer, it is fair to
say that any doubt about the deterrent efficacy of executions or
the morality of punishing to accomplish deterrence should be re-
solved in favor of protecting innocent victims rather than in
favor of protecting serious wrongdoers. If these conditions are
satisfied, then there is a meaningful basis for saying that deter-
rence is justly achieved by executing some murderers but not
others. In other words, it is possible to feel more confident about
the deterrent impact of the death penalty and less concerned
with the possible consequences of guessing wrong about
deterrence.
Largely as a result of the need to comply with the require-
ments of the United States Constitution, 8 2 the South Carolina
scheme for imposing capital punishment can be viewed as a sys-
tem of standards designed to satisfy the two conditions of
"meaningful" imposition of the death penalty.883 Nevertheless,
the South Carolina system has shortcomings and is currently un-
just in many respects. While some of these can be corrected, it is
not clear whether they will be; moreover, it may not be possible
to correct some of the flaws. Consequently, there is no way to
eliminate a certain sense of doubt about the fairness and deter-
rent efficacy of the death penalty and therefore, about the jus-
tice of capital punishment in South Carolina.
a. Procedural Protections to Insure that the Particular Type
of Murder can Plausibly be Deterred by the Death Penalty
The statutory list of aggravating and mitigating factors is
the primary technique used to insure that the death penalty is
only imposed where the likelihood of deterrent impact is in-
creased. 8 4 For example, deterrence is more likely where a person
882. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
883. For a discussion of this view of the scheme, see supra notes 108-32 and accom-
panying text.
884. See § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(e), (f); (4); (5); (6); (7)(Supp. 1981). For criticism of the
position that deterrence is more likely in situations involving killing of policemen or
murder for hire, see, e.g., Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral
172
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss2/5
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
views the murder in terms of economic gain and this increased
likelihood is reflected by the listing of the commission of murder
"for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of mone-
tary value" as an aggravating circumstance. s5 On the other
hand, a deficiency in rational faculties or in self-control would
reduce the likelihood of deterrence. Thus, the majority of the
listed mitigating circumstances address such deficiencies.8"'
The application of this scheme has serious shortcomings,
however, because the South Carolina Supreme Court has shown
little concern for insuring that the condition of plausible deter-
rence is satisfied. For example, this lack of concern is reflected
in the court's open-ended approach to aggravating circum-
stances887 and its apparent willingness to make a murderer vi-
cariously liable for the aggravating conduct of a codefendant s8
and to use conduct subsequent to the murder as an aggravating
circumstance.8 9 Similarly, its failure to adopt an explicit re-
quirement that only intentional killings should be subject to
death 90 indicates a troubling disinterest in insuring that capital
punishment is only applied where deterrence is likely. The im-
pact of this disinterest will-be reduced by constitutional limits
on imposing the death penalty where an unintentional killing is
involved.8 "' However, it may still be constitutionally permissible
to sentence to death for some unintentional or impulsive kill-
ings, even though this would be unjust.9 2 Moreover, even if the
United States Supreme Court should unequivocably hold in the
Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1177, 1195 (1981). Professor
Lempert argues that murder in these instances cannot be deterred by any punishment
because of the incentive to kill to escape capture or the confidence that a well-planned,
professional murder will not go awry. However, if his assertion is true it would be as-
sumed that there is never any deterrent impact from punishing, whether by imprison-
ment or execution, persons who shoot policemen or who engage in contract killings; yet
this broad assumption is very implausible. Moreover, his criticism does not address the
fact that these situations may involve cases in which persons will not only consider the
potential for punishment but also be affected by the incremental impact of the death
penalty. This incremental impact is crucial to the defense of the death penalty.
885. § 16-3-20(B)(4)(Supp. 1981).
886. § 16-3-20(C)(2),(5),(6),(7),(8),(9)(Supp. 1981).
887. See supra notes 134-204 and accompanying text.
888. See supra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
889. See supra notes 138, 172-85 and accompanying text.
890. See supra notes 78-83, 230-32 and accompanying text.
891. See supra notes 655-68 and accompanying text.
892. See supra notes 676-78, 706-36 and accompanying text.
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future that it is unconstitutional to execute unintentional killers,
the South Carolina Supreme Court's lack of concern with inten-
tion and deterrence may remain and manifest itself in other ar-
eas - for example, in its exercise of proportionality review.893
b. Procedural Protections to Insure that the Defendant and
his Crime are Seriously Wrongful
In addition to insuring a plausible deterrent impact, a capi-
tal punishment scheme must also insure that the defendant and
his crime are seriously wrongful. This second condition is neces-
sary for two reasons. First, the fifth tenet of just punishment
requires an adequate consideration of whether the death penalty
is proportional to the wrong involved. Second, this emphasis on
wrongdoing helps address the uncertainty about the deterrent
impact of the death penalty.
Some critics of the death penalty argue that the burden of
proof of its deterrent effect should be on the state and that the
inconclusiveness of the empirical studies, therefore, means that
capital punishment should be abandoned. 94 This approach is
subject to two objections. First, if there can be no death penalty
anywhere, it will be virtually impossible to conduct empirical
studies (except those based on historical data) that can be used
to satisfy the state's burden. 93 Second, the critics of capital
punishment phrase the issue as if it were a struggle between the
state, with all of its awesome resources, on one side and a single,
helpless individual on the other. Accordingly, say the critics, the
state should have the burden of proof on the deterrence issue.
However, this manner of stating the issue totally ignores the
plight of the innocent victims of murder and the wrongfulness of
the murder.89 6 If we cannot be sure whether capital punishment
deters but it is plausible to assume that it might deter in some
893. For an example in which such a problem appears to be involved, see supra
notes 289-95 and accompanying text.
894. See, e.g., Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases
of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1222-24 (1981).
895. Since the current model for the United States is still being shaped by the deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court, studies based on historical data would always
be subject to the criticism that they are based on a different capital punishment scheme.
896. See supra notes 838, 859-63 and accompanying text, supra. A similar type of
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cases, then it seems fairer to execute murderers and risk execut-
ing them for no reason, than to refuse to execute and risk the
lives of innocent victims who might be saved by the increased
deterrent effect of capital punishment. Moreover, when phrased
in this way, it seems fair to say that we need not show that for
each murderer executed at least one murder is deterred.8 7
However, it is not easy to be sure that only very bad wrong-
doers will suffer from the death sentence because of four
problems. First, there is always the possibility that a person will
be convicted erroneously.8 s While such a risk always exists in
any criminal proceeding, the irrevocable nature of the death
penalty arguably increases the severity of the problem.8 9 Sec-
ond, whenever a person is executed, it is likely that innocent
persons who have close relationships with him - his wife and
children, for example - will also suffer more severely than they
would if he were imprisoned for life.900 Third, because of the
procedural protections, particularly rights of appeal, granted in
capital cases, so much time elapses between the commission of
897. See, e.g., Conway, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Considerations
in Dialogue Form, 3 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 431, 435-43 (1974), for an argument based on the
notion that the lives of the potential victim and the killer are entitled to equal weight.
The point made in the text above is subject to limitations because the number of
murders deterred may be small. See infra note 964 and accompanying text. Therefore, it
may be that at some point so few people are protected by this incremental deterrent
effect that the right of these potential innocent victims to be protected by the general
deterrent effect of capital punishment is outweighed by other concerns. See supra note
862. These might include concern for defendants, see infra notes 924-35; concern for the
high costs of the death penalty, see infra notes 964-65 and accompanying text; or con-
cern for eliminating racial discrimination. See infra notes 950-52 and accompanying text.
898. South Carolina recently had two examples of such erroneous convictions. In
State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 278 S.E.2d 335 (1981), the defendant's conviction and
death sentence were reversed. On retrial, he was acquitted. State v. Linder, No. 79-GS-
15-216 (S.C., Nov. 9, 1981). In the second example, evidence discovered after the trial
conviction indicated that the two defendants may have been wrongly convicted. The
State, July 21, 1982, at 1-C col. 1; 5-C; col. 3.
899. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
346, 369-52 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982); Bedau, Miscarriages of Justice and the Death Pen-
alty, Death Penalty in America, supra id. at 234-41; Lempert, Desert and Deterrence:
An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 1177, 1225-31 (1981); Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super
Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980). By considering legal errors-e.g.,
denial of the right to a neutral jury through improper voir dire-as well as factual errors,
the problem is compounded. E.g., Amsterdam, supra. It should be stressed that the un-
derlying problem here-punishment of the wrongly convicted innocent person-exists
with all punishment. See supra note 863.
900. See notes 793, 814, 855, 865 and accompanying text.
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the murder and the actual execution that there is a possibility of
such radical change for the better that the "person" executed is
not the same "bad person" who committed the crime. 0 1 Fourth,
some critics of capital punishment argue that deliberate execu-
tions increase the number of murders because they have a "bru-
talization" effect - i.e., by making murderers seem "important"
and by lessening respect for life, the number of murders is actu-
ally increased.9 0 2 If this empirical assertion is true, capital pun-
ishment not only fails to reduce murders, it may also actually
increase the chances that an innocent victim will die. Conse-
quently, both murderers and some potential victims would pre-
fer that capital punishment not be used; and wrongdoing could
not be used as the basis of a fair allocation of the burden of
proof. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence concerning brutali-
zation, like the evidence concerning deterrence, is so very
sketchy and inconclusive9 3 that a dilemma results: how to
choose between the innocent victim who might be saved by de-
terrence and the innocent victims who might be killed because
of brutalization?
There is no clear answer to these problems, but the follow-
ing approach offers at least a tentative resolution. First, proce-
dures should be designed to insure that the defendant is indeed
guilty as charged - for example, by imposing heavy burdens of
proof on the state. Second, the possible suffering of innocent rel-
atives should be a relevant factor in determining whether a per-
son should be sentenced to death. Third, the possibility of refor-
mation should be considered as a mitigating circumstance in the
sentencing phase of a capital case, and a sincere, substantial ref-
ormation should be relevant to decisions by the executive to
commute a death sentence to life imprisonment.904 Fourth, since
there has been so little study of the brutalization effect, it seems
901. Such a concern appears to be involved in the prohibition against the execution
of insane persons. See, e.g., Hazard and Louisell, Death, The State and the Insane: Stay
of Execution, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 381, 386-87 (1962).
902. See, e.g., Bowers & Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization, What is the Effect of
Execution?, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 453 (1980); King, The Brutalization Effect: Execution
Publicity and the Incidence of Homicide in South Carolina, 57 Soc. FORCES 683 (1978).
903. See, e.g., Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases
of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MiCm. L. REV. 1177, 1216-17 (1981).




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss2/5
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
fair (for now at least) to assume that there is little, if any, bru-
talization effect.9 0 5 However, since there may in fact be such an
effect, attempts should be made to minimize it in the approach
to executions. For example, the treatment of murderers should
indicate respect for life even where capital punishment is used.
The South Carolina capital punishment scheme reflects a
sensitivity to these concerns in a variety of ways. First, the bur-
den of proof of guilt and of aggravating circumstances is on the
state.9 06 Second, South Carolina has shown a concern for mini-
mizing the suffering of innocent relatives by recognizing a mur-
derer's having a child and grandmother as a mitigating circum-
stance. °7 Third, statutory mitigating circumstances, such as the
age of the defendant,90 8 indicate a concern for the possibility
that he may be reformed and improved in the future.90 9 Fourth,
respect for life is reflected in the statutory aggravating circum-
stances designed to insure that any person sentenced to death is
clearly a "bad" -person who has committed a serious wrong -
for example, murder coincident with rape or torture.9 10 All of the
listed mitigating circumstances also reflect this concern. A per-
son with mental, emotional, or psychological deficiencies is less
"bad." 911 Similarly, a person or crime is not as seriously wrong in
cases involving the other statutory mitigating factors: lack of
905. See supra note 903 and accompanying text. The textual assumption concerning
brutalization is subject to the objection that it is not consistent with this article's as-
sumption that general deterrence is more plausible in some cases. Arguably, there is no
more reason to assume no brutalization effect than it is to assume some deterrent effect.
This objection has merit; no matter how much study is made of either effect, the results
are likely to be inconclusive. See supra notes 829, 840-41, 847, 878-81 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, the brutalization effect seems more like the deterrent effects resulting
from respect for the law because both effects are based on changes in attitude. Since this
article rejects respect for law as a justification for the death penalty, see supra note 877
and accompanying text, the problem of consistency is reduced. At the same time, how-
ever, it cannot be denied that there is considerable room for disagreement about these
important empirical relationships.
906. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
907. In State v. Plath, - S.C. -. , 284 S.E.2d 221 (1981), the South Carolina Su-
preme Court noted that while the trial court did not specifically charge the child as a
mitigating circumstance, the daughter and grandmother had testified at the trial and the
jury was free to consider any evidence in mitigation. Id. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 230.
908. § 16-3-10(C)(b)(7)(9) (Supp. 1981).
909. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(2), (C)(b)(1), (2), (5), (6), (8) (Supp. 1981).
910. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(a), (c) (Supp. 1981). See § 16-3-20 (C)(a)(1)(b), (c); (3)
(Supp. 1981).
911. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(2), (6), (7) (Supp. 1981).
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prior record of violence,912 consent or provocation by victim, 1 3
and minor role in the crime.9 14 In addition, when the victim par-
ticipates in,915 consents to,91 or provokes the crime, 17 there is
less reason to resolve any doubt about deterrence in favor of
protecting such victims.
The South Carolina scheme for identifying serious wrongs
and wrongdoers has a number of flaws, however. Examples of
such serious problems are the use of nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances,918 the use of aggravating circumstances that over-
lap with the crime of murder 19 and with one another,920 vicari-
ous liability for aggravating acts committed by a codefendant
21
and perhaps for a murder committed by another,922 and the ap-
parent lack of meaningful proportionality review by the South
Carolina Supreme Court.
92 3
c. Procedural Bias in Favor of the Defendant
Another method to insure the satisfaction of the two condi-
tions - plausibility of deterrence and wrongfulness of the de-
fendant and his act - is to bias the consideration in favor of the
accused. South Carolina has adopted this approach at many
points in the death penalty scheme. For example, the jury must
find the existence of at least one of the statutory aggravating
circumstances, 924 but the jury is not limited to the statutory list
in determining whether mitigating circumstances are present
925
and may recommend life even if an aggravating circumstance ex-
ists but no mitigating circumstance exists.9 26 Another instance of
this approach is the grant of a "veto" to execution at various
912. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(1) (Supp. 1981).
913. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(3), (8) (Supp. 1981).
914. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(4) (Supp. 1981).
915. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(3) (Supp. 1981).
916. Id.
917. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(8) (Supp. 1981).
918. See supra notes 134-50 and accompanying text.
919. See supra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
920. See supra notes 159-71 and accompanying text.
921. See supra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
922. See supra notes 676-79, 706-36, 891-92 and accompanying text.
923. See supra notes 284-302 and accompanying text.
924. § 16-3-20(C) (Supp. 1981).
925. See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
926. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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stages of the process. A person cannot be sentenced to death un-
less the prosecution seeks the penalty, the jury sentences to
death, the judge upholds the sentence, and the South Carolina
Supreme Court upholds itY
27
Unfortunately, there are important exceptions to this bias
in the South Carolina system. First, burdens of proof are not
always on the state - for example, the apparent placing of the
burden of proof of self-defense on the defendant 28 and the
vagueness concerning the burden of proof as to mitigating fac-
tors and the ultimate propriety of the death penalty in a partic-
ular case.9 29 Second, very little is known about the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in this area. As a result, there is no as-
surance that prosecutors are not abusing their power to use the
threat of execution to compel defendants to plead guilty to mur-
der or to a lesser crime. There may be a legitimate role for plea
bargaining, but it should be narrowly constrained to prevent
abuse.9 30  Granting prosecutors the unrestricted power to
threaten death arguably goes beyond these contraints, particu-
larly since the threat can be used in cases where there are seri-
ous doubts about the propriety of the use of the death penalty.
Third, it is not clear that the "veto" system works effectively.
For example, the trial judge and the South Carolina Supreme
Court may not provide an adequate check on the abuse of jury
discretion. The death penalty has been reversed for procedural
errors in a number of cases; however, no jury recommendation
for death has been reversed because of a substantive lack of a
meaningful basis for execution. Although the lack of such rever-
sals might be due to legitimate factors in the cases, the decisions
do not indicate these factors.931 Moreover, there is reason to be-
lieve the South Carolina Supreme Court does not have an ade-
quate model of proportionality review.93 2 Finally, the extensive
voir dire in capital cases93 3 may have two troublesome effects.
First, it may increase the likelihood of a guilty verdict because
927. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
928. See supra notes 55-77 and accompanying text.
929. See supra notes 233-38, 242-43 and accompanying text.
930. See, e.g., A. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
AND THE GUILTY PLEA (1981).
931. See supra notes 280-81, 284 and accompanying text.
932. See supra notes 283-302 and accompanying text.
933. See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
1982] 569
179
Hubbard et al.: A "Meaningful" Basis for the Death Penalty: The Practice, Constit
Published by Scholar Commons,
570 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
the discussion of punishment prior to trial apparently predis-
poses the jury to assume the defendant is guilty, particularly
where each prospective juror listens to the voir dire of all the
others. 34 Second, it may increase the likelihood of a guilty ver-
dict and a death sentence recommendation because it tends to
exclude persons who are more predisposed to support the de-
fense and to vote for life imprisonment.
9 3 5
d. Excessive Punishment and Equal Treatment
The South Carolina scheme arguably fails to provide a
meaningful basis for selecting persons to be executed because it
denies defendants their right to equal treatment. In order to as-
sess this criticism, it is necessary to distinguish two types of ine-
quality. First, one might object simply because some persons are
sentenced to death while other, equally "bad" persons are sen-
tenced to life imprisonment.9 36 Second, one might object because
934. See, e.g., Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 69-82, 616 P.2d 1301, 1347-55,
168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 174-82 (1980); Haney, Juries and the Death Penalty: Readdressing
the Witherspoon Question, 26 CRIa AND DELINQ. 512 (1980). Because of this effect, the
California Supreme Court required the prospective jurors to be sequestered and ques-
tioned separately during voir dire. Hovey, 28 Cal. 3d at 80-81, 616 P.2d at 1354-55, 168
Cal. Rptr. at 181-82. Three judges dissented from this holding for the following reasons:
because of the cumbersome, wasteful nature of such a proceeding; because of the loss of
the benefits of traditional voir dire; because of the doubtful benefits of the new scheme;
and because the holding was based on only one scientific study - i.e., Haney, supra
Hovey, 28 Cal. 3d at 82-85, 616 P.2d at 1355-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 182-84. It should be
noted that South Carolina often appears to utilize such sequestering in practice. See
supra note 754.
935. See, e.g., Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 2d 1, 26-69, 616 P.2d 1301, 1314-46,
168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 141-74 (1980); Haney, Juries and the Death Penalty: Readdressing
the Witherspoon Question, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 512 (1980); Jacoby & Paternoster, Sen-
tencing Disparity and Jury Packing: Further Challenges to the Death Penalty, 73 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379 (1982). The California Supreme Court ultimately concluded
that the California approach to exclusions based on views concerning the death penalty
had not been shown to affect the jury because the sociological studies involved did not
consider a system exactly like California's. Hovey, 28 Cal. 3d at 6869, 616 P.2d at 1346,
168 Cal. Rptr. at 173-74.
936. See, e.g., Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth, & Kyle, Identifying Comparatively Ex-
cessive Sentences of Death: A Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1980); Bowers
& Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26
CRIME & DELINQ. 563, 601-07, 616-32 (1980). The prisoners on death row in South Caro-
lina have complained about the lack of relative proportionality in death sentencing.
"Death Row Inmates Question 'Root Doctor' Life Verdicts," The State, July 8, 1982, at
4-C, col. 3, 4. For a general discussion of relative proportionality in sentencing, see e.g.,
Davis, Sentencing: Must Justice Be Even-Handed?, 1 LAw AND PHIL. 77 (1982).
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the decision to impose the death penalty may be based on im-
proper factors like the race of the victims. 37 Each of these ine-
qualities will be discussed separately.
(1) Excessive Punishment - Objective and Relative
Proportionality
A person's punishment may be excessive in two ways. First,
it can be excessive by being disproportionate to the particular
crime and criminal when measured against some "objective"
standard of proportionality. Second, even if the punishment is
"objectively" proportional in relation to the specific crime and
criminal, it can be "relatively" excessive if similar persons who
commit similar crimes are punished much more leniently - i.e.,
because "simple" inequality exists. Both types of disproportion-
ality are objectionable; but the first is more so since it involves
punishing a person more than he deserves, while the second type
raises difficulties because some people are being punished less
than they deserve. This is particularly true where capital pun-
ishment is involved since executing an undeserving person is in-
tuitively more disquieting than imposing life imprisonment on a
person who could legitimately be sentenced to death while at the
same time executing others who can be legitimately executed.
Because "objective" disproportionality is so much more
troublesome, the primary concern should be to reduce such dis-
proportionality.938 As indicated in the more general discussion of
proportionality, 93 the best approach to addressing this concern
is to devise a procedural scheme to insure objective proportion-
ality. When the death penalty is involved, this scheme must be
biased in favor of life imprisonment so that problems resulting
from the inability to resolve the empirical issues concerning the
deterrent impact of the death penalty can be reduced. 40
One necessary consequence of South Carolina's having
adopted such a bias against capital punishment is that relative
excessiveness is virtually certain, and this result raises a prob-
937. E.g., Jacoby & Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity and Jury Packing: Further'
Challenges to the Death Penalty, 73 J. oF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379 (1982).
938. See, e.g., E. van den Haag, In Defense of the Death Penalty: A Practical and
Moral Analysis, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, 323 (H. Bedeau 3d ed. 1982).
939. See supra notes 865-69 and accompanying text.
940. See supra notes 878-935 and accompanying text.
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lem. If three similar persons commit similar murders, if the ju-
ries sentence only two of them to death, and if the trial judges
sentence one of these to death and the other to life, then the
South Carolina Supreme Court faces a dilemma. If the primary
concern is the potential deterrent impact of the scheme, then
the remaining person should be sentenced to death if death
seems appropriate in the "objective" sense of proportionality.
However, if the primary concern is equal treatment, then the re-
maining person cannot be sentenced to death because such pun-
ishment would be excessive if compared to the other two. More-
over, since relative excessiveness is virtually certain given the
bias of the system, no one could be executed if absolute even-
handedness were the primary concern.
As indicated above, there are good reasons for placing
greater emphasis on "objective" proportionality. Thus, it is not
surprising that both the South Carolina Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court have apparently resolved the
above dilemma in favor of deterrence and thus in favor of "ob-
jective" proportionality.14 1 In other words, the South Carolina
Supreme Court has implicitly construed the section of the Code
concerning proportionality review to read: "the Court shall de-
termine ...whether the sentence is [objectively] excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, consid-
ering both the crime and the defendant. '8 42 Interpreted in this
way, it is sufficient to review only death cases to determine
whether these indicate that a particular person's death sentence
is objectively disproportionate. Such review need not be a mere
formality. A consideration of all the cases where death is im-
posed by the trial judge and jury could provide helpful guidance
in determining what constitutes sufficient wrongfulness to justify
the death penalty.
In addition, this interpretation complies with the require-
ment of the fourth tenet that punishment be imposed in accor-
dance with the rules. Statutes must be interpreted;9 4 and a
number of helpful, though often contradictory, canons of inter-
pretation have been developed over the years.94 One of these
941. See supra notes 276-82, 783 and accompanying text.
942. § 16.3-25(C)(3) (Supp. 1981).
943. See supra notes 867-968 and accompanying text.
944. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521-35 (1960).
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canons is that the language of the statute should be construed so
as to give effect to its "plain meaning."9'4 5 However, another
well-accepted canon of statutory interpretation is that individual
sections of a statute should not be interpreted in a way that
would defeat the basic purpose of the total statute. Each section
should be interpreted to give meaning to that section while also
furthering the basic statutory purpose.94 6 This is precisely the
result of the above interpretation of the section of the South
Carolina statute requiring proportionality review; given the bias
against the death penalty, there would be no executions if rela-
tive proportionality were the standard. Consequently, objective
proportionality is used in order to effectuate the basic statutory
purpose.
Although there are strong arguments in favor of the justice
of focusing on objective proportionality, the current South Caro-
lina scheme for insuring objective proportionality is inadequate
in many respects. South Carolina uses a procedural approach to
address the difficult task of determining when a person and
crime are so bad that capital punishment is justifed.47 However,
this process needs considerable reform because the standards
and procedures used to guide the sentencing process have the
shortcomings discussed above.94 8 As a result, the trial court may
impose the death penalty on persons who are not the type who
can be deterred by the death penalty or where the crime or per-
son is not sufficiently wrongful. Moreover, errors by the trial
court may not be corrected because the South Carolina Supreme
Court's approach to proportionality review has several serious
deficiencies.
949
(2) Excessive Punishment - Racial Inequality
Even if South Carolina only imposed the death penalty on
persons who could plausibly be deterred and who were suffi-
ciently wrongful, the system would be unjust if white persons
who satisfied these two conditions were sentenced to life impris-
945. Id. at 524.
946. Id.
947. See supra notes 855-932 and accompanying text.
948. See supra notes 887-93, 918-23, 928-35.
949. See supra notes 284-302 and accompanying text.
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onment while similar black persons were sentenced to death.
Fortunately, there does not seem to be such blatant racial dis-
crimination in the imposition of the death penalty in South Car-
olina.9 50 However, a more subtle form of discrimination may be
involved because there appears to be a statistically significant
correlation between sentencing decisions and the race of the vic-
tims, the death penalty being more likely where the victim is
white.9 5 1 If such a racial bias does play a significant role, the
system would be unjust.
Three points concerning this problem are clear. First, it is
not evident whether this pattern is the result of improper racial
discrimination or of some other, legitimate factor or factors.952
Second, despite this uncertainty, the burden should be on the
state to investigate further, since there is evidence indicating a
substantial possibility of racial discrimination. South Carolina,
however, has not shown any interest and concern with investi-
gating this problem. Third, if such a racial pattern does exist,
elimination of the death penalty seems to be the only way to
resolve it. Since persons sentenced to life imprisonment by the
jury cannot be sentenced to death by the South Carolina Su-
preme Court, the only possible solution would be to reverse
cases where the death penalty is imposed. However, it is impos-
sible to know which death penalty decisions are racially moti-
vated. If the court simply reversed all cases involving white vic-
tims, while upholding cases involving black victims, then a new
form of racial discrimination would be involved.
950. See, e.g., Jacoby & Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity and Jury Packing: Fur-
ther Challenges to the Death Penalty, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 383-84 (1982).
951. Id. at 384-86. For criticisms of racial and social discrimination in capital pun-
ishment sentences in other states, see, e.g., Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimi-
nation under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIM & DELiNQ. 563, 593-601, 607-16,
629-32 (1980); Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Flor-
ida Experience, 95 HAnv. L. REv. 456 (1981).
952. The published results of the study of racial discrimination in South Carolina
capital sentencing did not consider, for example, whether the pattern could have resulted
from differences in aggravating circumstances. Jacoby & Paternoster, Sentencing Dis-
parity and Jury Packing: Further Challenges to the Death Penalty, 73 J. CraM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 379 (1982). Such a difference might occur if armed robbery tends to be
characterized by white victims and black defendants. See supra notes 335-37 and accom-
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3. Absolute Objections to the Death Penalty
Some persons take an absolute position and argue that the
death penalty is objectionable even if it does deter because it is
always wrong for the state to kill citizens. One problem with this
position is that it is not clear why such killing is wrong. The
state frequently makes decisions that cause death. For example,
the decision to impose a 55 m.p.h. speed limit on highways
rather than a 50 m.p.h. limit results in increased deaths since
the higher speed limit results in more traffic fatalities. Moreover,
the state cannot avoid deciding to kill in the murder situation
because this absolute objection concedes that capital punish-
ment does have a deterrent impact. Consequently, not using
capital punishment is, in effect, a decision in favor of the death
of the victims of the murders that could have been deterred.
Two reasons could be given for such a decision. First, it could be
argued that there is an important moral difference between de-
liberately killing a specific person and deliberately deciding to
follow a course of action which fails to prevent a death which is
only statistically certain. Second, it can be argued that deliber-
ate cold-blooded killing by the state, using its vast resources and
acting for its citizens, is not done in a reasonably just state. 53
There are a number of difficulties with this absolute posi-
tion. First, the distinction between killing an identifiable person
as opposed to a statistical person is questionable. 9" If death re-
sults because a person went to the top of a tower and randomly
fired at unknown persons on the ground or placed capsules filled
with cyanide in bottles of Tylenol on a store's shelves, we would
not think that his conduct was any better than that of a mur-
derer who knew his victim.9 55 If it has any effect, such random
disregard for life indicates that the murderer's conduct is more
shocking.
Second, the absolute argument is premised in part on the
953. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
346 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982).
954. See, e.g., G. CALABREsi & P. BOBBiT, TRAGIC CHOICES 117-22 (1978); C. FRIED,
AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 207-36 (1970); G. GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES
210-13, 286-97 (1977).
955. See, e.g., Hubbard, Efficiency, Expectation and Justice: A Jurisprudential
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notion that there is an important distinction between acts and
omissions. However, while the distinction is helpful in some cir-
cumstances, its general validity is questionable.956 Consequently,
it is necessary to show that it is valid in the case of killing; but
there are numerous situations where the distinction does not
seem proper in this context. For example, there is no important
difference between hitting a pedestrian by steering the car in his
direction and hitting him by failing to apply the brakes even
though he is clearly visible and it would be a simple matter to
brake. Similarly, we are more likely to praise than criticize
(much less punish) a person who deliberately kills a terrorist
who is preparing to shoot a hostage. Thus, defense of the abso-
lute position requires going beyond the fact that executions are
deliberate and showing that there is no justification for such a
deliberate act.
Third, since the absolute position concedes that there may
be a deterrent impact, the argument concedes that innocent vic-
tims may die as a result of not imposing capital punishment.
Even though these victims are statistical entities, they are prob-
ably innocent while the murderers are wrongdoers. As indicated
above, 57 there are good reasons to prefer innocent victims, and
there is no reason to change this preference simply because the
identity of innocent victims is unknown.
Because of the problems with the absolute position,9 58 the
objection to deliberate killing by the state should be expressed
as a condition: the state should not deliberately kill unless such
killing is justified under the circumstances. Phrased in this man-
ner, the problem is clearly similar to that presented in justifying
any punishment. Punishment always involves the deliberate in-
fliction of unpleasantness by the state, and this should not be
done unless justified. If punishment in the form of imprison-
ment is justified by its deterrent impact, why is capital punish-
ment improper even though it deters? What is special about
executions?
One answer to this question is that death is irrevocable. A
result of this irrevocability is that mistakes cannot be corrected.
956. See supra notes 796-98 and accompanying text.
957. See supra notes 838, 859-63 and accompanying text.
958. See, e.g., G. GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVEs 39-59, 231-32, 246-49,
255-58 (1977), for additional discussion of the problems involved.
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This problem was addressed earlier.959 Another result is that it
precludes any chance for reform and reintegration of the crimi-
nal. The criminal is, in effect, no longer viewed as a person
worth our concern and respect. Thus, executions are arguably
objectionable because all persons have a basic right to human
dignity which the state would deny if it were to identify a spe-
cific individual (as opposed to a statistical person) and execute
him.96
0
The difficulty with the argument for human dignity is that
it fails to consider the rights of the victims of murders. Their
identity may not be known, but that does not make them any
less real. Moreover, the victims may be innocent while the mur-
derers are guilty of serious wrongdoing. Thus, even if it can be
said that it is in some sense "wrong" to execute murderers, this
"wrong" is outweighed by the saving of the lives of innocent vic-
tims. Once again, it is not possible to speak in terms of
absolutes.98 1
It should be helpful to conclude the discussion of the abso-
lute position by summarizing the argument in favor of the jus-
tice of capital punishment:
Capital punishment could be justifiable under some circum-
stances first, because it is at least plausible that it deters some
murderers that life imprisonment would not deter, and second,
deliberate killing by the state is not unjustified given the fol-
lowing: (1) The state cannot avoid life and death choices; (2)
the distinction between the acts and omissions is questionable,
particularly in the context of homicide; (3) justice is better
served by objecting only to executions that are not justified
than by absolutely prohibiting all executions; and (4) capital
punishment is justified because any wrong done to the person
executed is justified by the prevention of the murders of inno-
cent victims.
959. See supra notes 898-99, 906 and accompanying text. See supra note 863 for a
general discussion of the problem of mistakes and an analysis of the reasons for punish-
ing even though we know mistakes are inevitable.
960. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring);
id. at 270-73, 281, 291 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also, Pugstey, A Retributivist Argu-
ment Against Capital Punishment, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1501, 1516-23 (1981).
961. See, e.g., G. GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES 217-27, 231-40 (1977).
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4. Conclusion - Four Questions
Four basic questions must be answered in order to assess
the justice of the South Carolina capital punishment scheme.
First, is the scheme as presently devised and applied just? The
answer to this is affirmative in many respects. However, the
scheme does not satisfy the tenets of just punishment in a num-
ber of specific details. As a result, we cannot confidently con-
clude that there will not be cases where the death penalty is un-
justly imposed.
No one has yet been executed, however, so these problems
could be resolved if there is an adequate answer to the second
question: how can the scheme be revised so that the death pen-
alty is only imposed justly? Although there is good reason to be
cautious in answering this question, 62 it seems that in theory, if
a democratically elected legislature decided to adopt a scheme to
deter murders,9 8 3 it should be possible to devise a scheme for
imposing the death penalty which meets virtually all of the sub-
stantial objections to capital punishment. The basic outline of
this scheme parallels the current South Carolina scheme in
many respects but would use more safeguards to insure that
there is a meaningful basis for selecting persons to be executed.
Even if the South Carolina system could be reformed, an-
other question must be faced: is it worth it? Providing the nec-
essary safeguards will be expensive; only a few persons will be
executed and the deterrent impact of these executions will prob-
ably be minimal at best.9" Perhaps these resources could be bet-
ter used elsewhere in our efforts to reduce crimes and
injustices."65
962. See, e.g., supra notes 877-81, 898-905 and accompanying text.
963. See infra note 966 and accompanying text.
964. The studies of deterrence are inconclusive. See supra notes 878-81 and accom-
panying text. However, this very inconclusiveness suggests that the deterrent impact is
not substantial because a substantial impact would probably have some empirical sup-
port and there does not seem to be any such support. See supra note 880 and accompa-
nying text.
965. The costs include: (1) the expense of conducting capital trials and appeals,
which are more expensive than non-capital cases, see supra notes 316-17, 696 and accom-
panying text; (2) the costs resulting from the substantial, widespread objection to any
death penalty, (3) the possible increase in homicides resulting from the brutalization
effect, see supra notes 902-03; (4) the possible execution of the "wrong person", see
supra notes 898-99, 901 and accompanying text; and (5) the suffering of innocent per-
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Finally, addressing these questions is useless without con-
sidering a fourth question: will the South Carolina scheme in
fact be reformed so the death penalty will not be imposed un-
justly? The answer to this question goes beyond philosophical
analysis to forecasting. Nevertheless, since our system of just
punishment is based in part on a faith in institutions, it is ap-
propriate to consider the characteristics that the institutions of
South Carolina should have in order to justify optimism about
the elimination of injustice through reform.
The basic institution in a democracy is the legislature. As
the elected representative of the people, the South Carolina leg-
islature is given considerable latitude in resolving disputes con-
cerning the deterrent impact of the death penalty and concern-
ing conflicting values. Thus, one of the strongest reasons for
viewing the death penalty in South Carolina as just is that the
legislature has adopted it.96 6 However, there are several factors
which suggest that the democratic process is not a reliable indi-
cator of the just result in this case. For example, citizens and
legislatures do not seem to be well informed about the issue and
seem uninterested in learning more. 67 In addition, the persons
who are tried for capital murder in South Carolina appear to
come largely from segments of society that are relatively weak
politically.e6 8 Thus, it is not surprising that many of the basic
sons related to the person exceucted, see supra note 900 and accompanying text.
966. See, e.g., J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 198-99 (1971); supra notes 487-551
and accompanying text.
967. The textual assertion is based on non-random discussions, review of media ac-
counts, and survey of transcripts of voir dire in capital cases. In addition, the inadequacy
of the South Carolina Supreme Court's model of review reflects a lack of concern with
the topic of capital punishment. See supra notes 284-302, 362-71 and accompanying text.
Others share this perspective about the United States as a whole. See supra note 528
and accompanying text.
968. This discriminatory impact is reflected in the aggravated homicide cases in
which race can be determined from the record. Approximately 60% of the defendants in
aggravated homicide cases are black; when the death penalty is sought, over 50% of the
defendants are black. Jacoby & Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity and Jury Packing:
Further Challenges to the Death Penalty, 73 J. CRiM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY, 379, 383
(1982). (Blacks constitute less than a third of the total population in the state. South
Carolina Stat. Abstract 9 (1980)). But see supra note 952 for criticism of this study. The
impact is also reflected in the fact that so many defendants are indigent and thus are
represented by the Public Defender's Office or by appointed attorneys. The point in the
text is not that intentional racial or economic discrimination is involved in the adoption
or application of the scheme. Instead, the point is that we cannot rely on the legislators
to indicate the proper result because the poor and racial minorities are less able to influ-
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improvements in the South Carolina scheme have resulted from
the impact of decisions by the United States Supreme Court. 99
Although such criticisms can often be made about the legislative
process, they modify the endorsement of legislation as prima fa-
cie just and give us reason to be less optimistic about legislative
reform.
Another central institution is the court system, which must
impose constitutional limits on the legislature and interpret
statutes and precedents in a way that is both constitutional 70
and just.071 Although the South Carolina Supreme Court has
taken a number of steps to fulfill this responsibility, many of
these steps were in response to United States Supreme Court
decisions. 972 Moreover, the South Carolina decisions are defi-
cient in many respects. In this regard, perhaps its most impor-
tant shortcoming is its failure to articulate and apply a just the-
ory of the meaningful imposition of the death penalty.9 73 With
such a theory, most, if not all, of the basic flaws in the South
Carolina scheme could be resolved through statutory interpreta-
tion. However, given the past patterns of decisions, there is rea-
son to be concerned about the likelihood of such a development.
Moreover, even if such reforms occurred, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court is only one part of the court system; trial judges,
attorneys (particularly the solicitors), and the juries must also
meet their responsibilities. If, for example, racial discrimination
affects their decisions, then the judicial institutions cannot be
relied upon to impose the death penalty justly 7 4 This is an im-
portant problem, and it is not encouraging that so little has been
ence legislation than are other segments of society. For a similar criticism of all schemes
in the United States, see supra notes 401-02 and accompanying text; Bowers & Pierce,
Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME &
DELINQ. 563, 593-601, 607-16, 629-32 (1980). It is also relevant to note that the percent-
age of blacks in this country opposed to the death penalty is much higher than the per-
centage of whites opposed. See, e.g., Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 56, 616 P.2d
1301, 1338, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 165-66 (1980).
969. See, e.g., supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
970. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 32 (1971); supra notes 487-551 and
accompanying text.
971. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-23 (1977); Hubbard,
"Contract Cohabitation": A Jurisprudential Perspective on Common Law Judging, 19
J. FAM. L. 655, 688-92 (1981).
972. See, e.g., supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
973. See supra notes 284-302, 362-71 and accompanying text.
974. See supra notes 950-52 and accompanying text.
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done to investigate the possibility of improper discrimination.
Similarly, the role of prosecutorial discretion in seeking the
death penalty is central to the justice of the South Carolina sys-
tem, but virtually nothing has been done to monitor the exercise
of this discretion or to develop standards to guide its exercise.
97 5
The final South Carolina institution that is important in ap-
plying the death penalty is the office of the Governor. The life-
boat cases clearly illustrate the role of executive clemency, 9"
and the South Carolina Governor may face analogous cases. For
example, a person who has been truly reformed since being sen-
tenced to death would be a good candidate for a commutation of
his sentence to life imprisonment. 97 7 The Governor's Office is
also perhaps the best institution for developing data on statisti-
cal patterns of sentencing in South Carolina.97 8 However, the
Governor's Office has not undertaken such a task, and there is
no way of knowing how the virtually unrestrained power to com-
mute death sentences will be applied.
The United States Supreme Court may correct failures in
the South Carolina scheme by continuing to strike down the
death penalty where no meaningful basis exists for its imposi-
tion. The United States Supreme Court, however, has a heavy
caseload and must respect the values implicit in federalism and
representative democracy. Moreover, its opinions reflect basic
disagreements, and there is a possibility that only a minority of
the Justices have committed themselves to a just theory of capi-
tal punishment.9 7 9 As a result, it is not possible to be sure that
the United States Supreme Court will prevent injustice.
Ultimately, the answer to the fourth question depends upon
each person's faith in these institutions and upon his optimism
about their performance. Opinions, therefore, can vary. Never-
theless, the past performances of the South Carolina legislature
and courts do not appear to give much support to those who are
optimistic about South Carolina satisfying the requirements of
just punishment without considerable pressure from the United
States Supreme Court.
975. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
976. See supra notes 794-800 and accompanying text.
977. See supra notes 901, 904 and accompanying text.
978. See supra notes 303-08 and accompanying text.
979. See supra notes 680-97 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although no position concerning capital punishment is free
from criticism, several points are clear. First, the general scheme
for capital punishment in South Carolina is constitutional, al-
though several important aspects may be unconstitutional. Sec-
ond, while the scheme generally satisfies the requirements for
justly imposing the death penalty, it has a number of basic
flaws. Third, many problems of constitutionality and justice
could be resolved by the South Carolina Supreme Court. Fourth,
if the South Carolina Supreme Court fails to meet its responsi-
bility in this regard, many of the problems could be corrected by
the federal courts. Fifth, other institutions should be involved in
deciding about capital punishment in an informed and meaning-
ful way. Finally, the citizens of South Carolina have critical roles
as jurors and as voters; and these roles require them to make
intelligent, informed decisions about the proper role, if any, of
capital punishment in South Carolina.
The death penalty is a uniquely final, irreversible form of
punishment and no one, whether he is an official or a citizen,
should be disinterested in whether it is justly imposed. Where
society does have such interest and elects to impose the death
penalty only in those few cases where it may provide additional
deterrence and where particularly bad crimes and criminals are
involved, there is reason to believe that the penalty is just. How-
ever, unless South Carolina clearly has such sincere interest and
concern, and until the South Carolina scheme has such narrow
scope, the death penalty in South Carolina will, in many re-
spects, be both unconstitutional and unjust.
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